Preamble

The House met at half-past Two o'clock

PRAYERS

[Mr. SPEAKER in the Chair]

PRIVATE BUSINESS

BRITISH TRANSPORT COMMISSION BILL (By Order)

Second Reading deferred till Tuesday next at Seven o'clock.

READING AND BERKSHIRE WATER &c. BILL (By Order)

Read a Second time and committed.

SOUTH BUCKS AND OXFORDSHIRE WATER BILL (By Order)

Read a Second time and referred to the Examiners of Petitions for Private Bills.

PETITION

Huish's Grammar School, Taunton

Mr. du Cann: I beg to ask leave to present a Petition signed by 17,600 residents of Taunton and the surrounding countryside, being persons interested in the welfare of the ancient establishment of Huish's Grammar School, Taunton. This Petition has the unqualified support of Somerset County Council, Taunton Town Council, Taunton Rural District Council, Taunton Trades Council, and of the masters and boys and old boys of the school.
The Petition states, in effect, that the school buildings are inadequate, that the equipment, especially for the teaching of science, is out of date, and that the matter is of grave local concern. The Petition concludes:
Wherefore your Petitioners pray that at the earliest possible opportunity a new three-stream grammar school should be built to replace the existing buildings of Huish's Grammar School, Taunton.
And your Petitioners, as in duty bound, will ever pray.

To lie upon the Table.

Oral Answers to Questions — EDUCATION

School-Building Programme, Newcastle-under-Lyme

Mr. Swingler: asked the Minister of Education, in view of the increasing population and overcrowded classrooms, what special steps he will take in the coming year to increase the school-building programme in Newcastle-under-Lyme.

The Minister of Education (Mr. Geoffrey Lloyd): I believe that the programme already approved is sufficient to meet the immediate needs of the area, and I am not at present contemplating any special measures.

Mr. Swingler: The Minister may believe that, but Newcastle-under-Lyme Education Committee does not. Is the Minister aware that Newcastle-under-Lyme Education Committee has persistently put in what it regards as minimum requirements and that these have been persistently reduced by the Ministry, as the result of which the situation has become worse and not better? Will the Minister now investigate the situation to see if he can give the educacation committee a fair chance of catering for the children?

Mr. Lloyd: Very considerable investigation has been carried out in the normal course, and two schools have been approved in the current programme. They are principally for the new housing areas. I understand that some other proposals were not thought to be justified in the general context of the difficulty in which the country is of providing first of all for the bulge.

Books (Cost)

Mr. Vane: asked the Minister of Education what is the approximate average annual cost of books per pupil in primary and secondary schools, respectively.

Mr. Geoffrey Lloyd: About 10s. and 24s.

Mr. Vane: Will my right hon. Friend see what he can do to ensure that there is no undue economy on the provision of books? When considering pressure for


buildings and for more teachers' salaries, transport, and so on, will he not forget that the expenditure on books is one of the most important contributions to education, and will he ensure that there is not unreasonable economy in that provision?

Mr. Lloyd: I would agree with my hon. Friend in that, but the general principle, even in this sphere, is value for money.

Dr. King: Is the Minister aware that there never was a time in the history of the country when so many excellent school books were produced, and yet most of them are out of the range of the teachers because no local authority in the country is spending enough on books for schools?

Mr. Lloyd: I take note of what the hon. Member says.

Infants' Schools (Uniforms)

Mr. Janner: asked the Minister of Education whether his attention has been called to the action of some heads of infants' schools who are insisting that all pupils should wear some form of uniform; and whether he will issue instructions to such heads deprecating this practice.

Mr. Geoffrey Lloyd: This is a matter for the local education authority.

Mr. Janner: Will the right hon. Gentleman give some indication to the local education committees as to what he feels about it? Does he realise that this is a big imposition on many parents who do not want their children to be regarded as different from others in the school? If the right hon. Gentleman is not prepared to do something about it in this manner, is he prepared to recomment to the Treasury that it should pay the difference between the cost of the children's normal wear and that of their school uniform?

Mr. Lloyd: I hoped the hon. Member might be satisfied if I said that this is a matter for the local education authorities. I think it is properly a matter for them. At the same time, it is very rare for infants to have a uniform and this seems right to me.

Mr. Speaker: Miss Burton.

Mr. Janner: On a point of order. Will the Minister be good enough to say what he meant by, "This seems right to me"?

Mr. Speaker: Not now. We have passed from that Question.

Sport (U.N.E.S.C.O. Study)

Miss Burton: asked the Minister of Education whether the United Kingdom delegate to the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation has yet been invited to participate in the Organisation's study of the place of sport in education; and what reply has been given to such invitation.

Mr. Geoffrey Lloyd: There is no outstanding invitation to the United Kingdom to take part in a study of this subject.

Miss Burton: Is the Minister aware that I am trying to elicit information on this point? As we are members of U.N.E.S.C.O., may we assume that if our delegate is invited to take part in any particular work there, apart from the merits of the case, he will accept such an invitation?

Mr. Lloyd: The position is that there was an invitation some time ago which was declined for what were thought to be good reasons, namely, the desire to keep U.N.E.S.C.O. to the most practical and worth-while subjects. On the other hand, I have read the Report and, while it is interesting, I must point out that the English idea of sport is such that the English do not like professional professorial discourses on sport. At the same time, I can see that there is some rather interesting information, perhaps, for some countries which are backward in education matters.

School-Building Programme, 1959–60

Mr. du Cann: asked the Minister of Education what proposals he has for building new schools during the 1959–60 building programme to replace inadequate, unsuitable or out-of-date accommodation.

Mr. Geoffrey Lloyd: I cannot say anything yet about this programme.

Mr. du Cann: Is my right hon. Friend aware that up and down the country there are a number of schools which


urgently require rebuilding? Does he not agree that in this modern day and age, when improved education is so necessary in the national interest, it is time that the Government decision not to replace the existing schools should be reviewed as a matter of urgency?

Mr. Lloyd: Yes, Sir. I appreciate my hon. Friend's pertinacity in the cause of this fine and ancient school, and perhaps it would be best if we returned to the subject on his next Question which deals with the matter.

Mr. M. Stewart: Although there seems to he some difference behind him about what exactly are the right objects of educational expenditure, is the right hon. Gentleman aware that there is an interesting enthusiasm for more expenditure in one direction or another, and will he pay some deference to that opinion?

Mr. Lloyd: There is no doubt throughout the country that we want educational progress, and there is undoubtedly a feeling of frustration in the educational world because we are having to cope with the bulge and because so much of our tremendous effort in building is having to go in that direction, thus preventing us from making progress in quality, which we very much want to do.

Huish's Grammar School, Taunton

Mr. du Cann: asked the Minister of Education if he is aware of the concern felt in Taunton and the surrounding countryside at the inadequacy of the premises housing Huish's Grammar School; that there is an urgent need to build a new three-stream entry school; and what action he proposes to take to remedy the situation.

Mr. Geoffrey Lloyd: Yes, Sir, and I agree that a new school is needed as soon as circumstances permit. I cannot yet say when this will be.

Mr. du Cann: While thanking my right hon. Friend for the sympathy which I know he feels for this very worthy cause, may I ask him whether he is aware that boys attending the school are being taught in a 1919 United States Army hut which is in so bad a condition that the walls and the floor do not even meet, that there are only seven lavatories in the school for 450 boys and that accommodation is totally inadequate? Is

he not aware that I have just presented a Petition signed by the remarkable number of 17,600 people in Taunton? Will he give a date when he thinks that this work may begin?

Mr. Lloyd: To give my hon. Friend a definite date is exactly what I cannot do today, but he can rely on the fact that I am very sympathetic about this very important matter.

Mr. du Cann: On a point of order. In view of what I must describe as an unsatisfactory Answer, I beg to give notice that I shall endeavour of raise the matter on another occasion.

Special Schools (Waiting List)

Mr. M. Stewart: asked the Minister of Education how far local education authorities have been required, since May, 1956, to estimate the number of children in their areas requiring day and boarding places, respectively, in special schools for the educationally sub-normal, and not at present attending such schools; and what are the figures of the latest estimate.

Mr. Geoffrey Lloyd: The special return made in May, 1956, has not been repeated, but in a return on a rather different basis in January, 1957, local education authorities informed me that 7,210 children were awaiting places in special day schools and 6,612 places in boarding schools.

Mr. Stewart: Does the Minister remember that it appeared from the last Report of his Ministry on this subject that the returns which we have had on this matter were rather misleading? Is he arranging that in subsequent Reports we shall have returns which will give a correct picture?

Mr. Lloyd: I certainly hope to do that.

Grammar Schools

Sir F. Medlicott: asked the Minister of Education how many grammar schools have been completed in England and Wales during each of the last five years; and how many of such schools are planned to be commenced during each of the next five years.

Mr. Geoffrey Lloyd: Since the Answer contains a number of figures, I will, with permission, publish it in the OFFICIAL REPORT.

Sir F. Medlicott: As a great number of these schools have been built, is it not quite extraordinary that there should have been such delay, for more than a quarter of a century, in the rebuilding of Huish's Grammar School, which has just been mentioned and in which I must disclose an affectionate interest as an old boy?

Mr. Lloyd: I hope that my hon. Friend will take some comfort from the answers which I gave earlier on that subject, because he will be justified in doing so. It is interesting and satisfactory to note that during the last five years there has, broadly speaking, been a strong upward tendency in the numbers of new grammar schools built each year and also in the number of major extensions added to existing schools. For this coming year there will be about 30 new grammar schools and 100 major extensions.

Following is the information:


PROJECTS COMPLETED AT GRAMMAR SCHOOLS


Calendar Year
New Schools
Major extensions


1953
…
…
5
24


1954
…
…
16
24


1955
…
…
14
19


1956
…
…
26
31


1957
…
…
37
46





98
144

On 31st December, 1957 70 new schools and 48 major extensions were under construction. Between 1st January, 1958 and 31st March, 1959 about 30 new schools and 100 major extensions are likely to be started. Further forecasts would not be reliable.

Circular 334 (W.E.A. Resolution)

Mr. Lewis: asked the Minister of Education whether he has received the copy of the resolution passed by the Workers' Educational Association protesting against his department's Education Circular 334; and whether he will agree to meet representatives of the Association to discuss their protest.

Mr. Geoffrey Lloyd: Yes, Sir, and I have already written to the hon. Member about it.

Mr. Lewis: Is the Minister aware that one of the presidents of this excellent organisation is his right hon. Friend the Home Secretary? May I suggest that he

has a word with the Home Secretary to see whether that right hon. Gentleman will lead the deputation to the Minister?

Mr. Lloyd: The association has not asked to bring a deputation to me.

University Awards (Triennial Review)

Mr. Mulley: asked the Minister of Education if, in view of the triennial review of university awards, the expansion of the universities and the fact that eight years have passed since the matter was examined, he will now set up the working party, envisaged by the then Parliamentary Secretary in debate on 29th November, 1956, to examine the whole basis of university awards, the selection of students and related questions.

Mr. Geoffrey Lloyd: I am considering these matters, but I am not yet in position to make a statement.

Mr. Mulley: As this matter has been under consideration for about 15 months, and is causing great concern in the educational world, will not the Minister take urgent action to deal with it, and, in particular, with the need for a clearing house or other arrangement for university entrants and the division between central and local funds for the scholarships themselves?

Mr. Lloyd: I am expecting to receive the recommendations of the working party which has been conducting the triennial review and to announce decisions on them as soon as possible—that is, the new rates which will take effect from this autumn.

Youth Service

Mr. Sydney Irving: asked the Minister of Education if he is now in a position to redefine the aims of the Youth Service and the sphere of its future activities.

Mr. Geoffrey Lloyd: Yes, Sir. I regard the Youth Service as a permanent part of the education service, concerned with the leisure time activities of young people, especially those who are no longer at school. I regret that I cannot make more money available for it now, but I am convinced of its value and of the importance of the work done by those engaged in it. I intend to encourage and foster their efforts as much as I can.

Mr. Irving: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware of the very severe neglect, with some of which he has been charged, of the Youth Service in the past and which has led to the loss of some of its very best personnel? As there will be between one-third and one-half more children between the ages of 15 and 20 in the next five years and as it is already difficult to place school-leavers, is there not need for an extended service with more guidance?

Mr. Lloyd: The misunderstandings which have arisen in the relatively recent past have been because the Ministry, not having more money available to give to the Youth Service in accordance with the normal procedure, has felt that it ought not to encourage it too much. On the other hand, I frankly told a deputation from King George's Jubilee Trust recently that I could not at present make more money available but that I would do everything else I could to help the service. I also made it clear that we regarded the service as important although we could not at present spend more money on it.

Mr. M. Stewart: Will the right hon. Gentleman elaborate what he meant by doing everything else he can to help to service?

Mr. Lloyd: The deputation attached importance to a statement by me on behalf of the Government of the value that the Government attach to the Youth Service. This afternoon I have taken advantage of this Question to do that, and it will be appreciated in certain quarters in the service.

Oral Answers to Questions — TRADE AND COMMERCE

Man-made Fibre Fabrics (Informative Labelling)

Mr. Dodds: asked the President of the Board of Trade what is being done to encourage a uniform method of describing man-made fibre fabrics as an important step towards informative labelling of textiles so that many of the difficulties now being experienced by the public, laundries, dry cleaning and dyeing firms through lack of information will be removed.

The President of the Board of Trade (Sir David Eccles): The British Standards Institution has recently published a

standard setting out a uniform method of describing man-made fibre fabrics. This was prepared in consultation with all sections of the industry and with wholesalers. makers-up, retailers and consumers, who will presumably now make use of it.

Mr. Dodds: In view of the fact that there are numerous new fibres which are making textiles so complex that even experienced retail buyers find them a mystery—and bearing in mind all the hard work to which the right hon. Gentleman has referred—is it not obvious that for the benefit of all concerned, and especially the public, we should have something more definite than a pious hope that manufacturers will take up this informative labelling so as to avoid undue waste, which the country cannot afford? What is the Minister doing to encourage this?

Sir D. Eccles: I believe that they will take it up, but it is not Government policy to have compulsory labelling.

Goods (Certificate of Quality)

Miss Burton: asked the President of the Board of Trade whether he is aware of the concern of manufacturers and consumers at the fact that anyone may issue a certificate of quality for goods, which certificates are frequently based on trivial standards; and if he will be prepared to introduce legislation on the matter.

Sir D. Eccles: I am not aware of any widespread concern. A critical approach by purchasers to these certificates would be more effective than legislation.

Miss Burton: Is the President aware that he is fortunate in not having to purchase these goods? Furthermore, what does he propose should be done to merchants who sell goods stating that they have been tested by XYZ—and using that fact as a selling recommendation—when in reality they have been tested and failed by XYZ? Does he propose that there should be no redress?

Sir D. Eccles: I am told that it is exceedingly difficult to take legislative action in this matter. We have no powers at present. By and large, it is a question of judgment as to quality. A man may say, "My beer is best," but it cannot very easily be proved.

Miss Burton: Is the Minister aware that he is on the wrong tack? How can a person tell that the goods have been failed by XYZ unless the label says so? No merchant in his right senses is likely to say so.

Sir D. Eccles: The publicity which the hon. Lady gives to these matters is doing good, but this is not a case where we can proceed by compulsion.

Miss Burton: On a point of order. In view of the unsatisfactory nature of the reply—and if it is possible to get round the question of legislation—I beg to give notice that I shall raise the matter on the Adjournment.

Consumer Advisory Council and Consumer Research Association (Merger)

Miss Burton: asked the President of the Board of Trade if he will make a statement concerning the merger of the Consumer Advisory Council of the British Standards Institution with the Consumer Research Association; and what effect this will have on the Government grant made to the Institution.

Sir D. Eccles: Formal discussions between the two bodies have not taken place and it would be inappropriate to comment on an idea which is still the subject of preliminary discussions within each body.

Miss Burton: When do these discussions cease to be preliminary? Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that this has been mooted in the Press since the beginning of December? Is he further aware that on 9th December The Times stated that this matter was to be discussed by the Council of the British Standards Institution at its meeting in the middle of February? As we have now arrived at 20th February, can the Minister say whether that meeting has taken place, and, if it has not, when is it likely to be held?

Sir D. Eccles: Many things which are mooted in the Press do not come to much. As far as I know, no formal discussions have yet taken place.

Reception of Visitors, Dover

Mr. Dodds: asked the President of the Board of Trade, in view of the importance of the tourist trade, if he will consult with other Departments and

trading interests concerned to improve at Dover the reception and clearance of visitors.

Sir D. Eccles: If the hon. Member can produce adequate evidence of unsatisfactory arrangements at Dover, I will consider arranging the consultations he suggests.

Mr. Dodds: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that I will produce these complaints, which have been handled by many Government Departments? It is obvious that somebody should try to co-operate in order to see that people who return here or visit us from overseas find a little more order at Dover and a better welcome than they are getting at present. I will provide the Minister with the information.

Overseas Trade Fairs (Report)

Mr. Sydney Irving: asked the President of the Board of Trade if he has received the report of the Exhibitions Advisory Committee on its review of the present practice and policy on overseas trade fairs; and what changes he proposes to make.

Sir D. Eccles: The Committee submitted a report in July of last year and I am circulating in the OFFICIAL REPORT a summary of its conclusions. I have accepted them in principle and propose to act on them as the occasion arises, within the limits of the money available. I hope to receive further advice from the Committee from time to time.

Mr. Irving: In view of the hash that we are making of the Brussels exhibits, does not the right hon. Gentleman think that the time has come for him to do something? Is he aware of the highly unfavourable criticism of our exhibits in the Press and elsewhere; that because of a lack of information our three oast-houses have been described as the three monkeys—see nothing, hear nothing and say nothing—that the concentration has been upon pomp and pageantry; that there is nothing about practical achievements, and that Zeta is hardly mentioned? Is he prepared to do something about this?

Sir D. Eccles: The hon. Member has taken much more trouble over his


supplementary question than he has over helping British exports.

Following is the summary:

PRINCIPAL CONCLUSIONS OF BOARD OF TRADE EXHIBITIONS ADVISORY COMMITTEE

1. Information about Fairs

(a) The Board of Trade should continue to provide information about trade fairs.
2. Official Stands and Displays
(b) In overseas fairs where official Government stands are installed it is not sufficient for the United Kingdom to provide mere inquiry desks and a stand with display is essential.
(c) Such displays should normally be concentrated on a single industry or group of industries, and approaches should be made to Trade Associations in some of the capital goods industries for their co-operation in organising them.
(d) The number of these stands in any year should be limited and the fairs chosen for them should vary from year to year.
(e) The main cost of these stands must be borne by the Board of Trade, but firms or industries whose goods are shown on them should be expected to lend exhibits free of charge and normally to pay for transport and for expert staff where their attendance is necessary.
3. Specialised Fairs
(f) If the results of joint participation of industry and Government in specialised fairs are found to be successful, this joint participation should be increased.
4. National Pavilions
(g) In fairs organised on the basis of national pavilions the United Kingdom will be outclassed and British manufacturers may be virtually deprived of the opportunity of showing their goods unless a contribution is made from public funds to the cost of organising a pavilion.
(h) Where such pavilions are necessary the responsibility for constructing and managing them should normally rest with the Board of Trade, who should let out the space at a rent as high as is consistent with the primary purpose of filling the pavilion with a representative show of British goods, even if this is insufficient to cover all costs. There may be occasions, however, when the management of pavilions can conveniently be entrused to a commercial concern for a fee. We do not consider it desirable in present circumstances to set up any joint body representing industry and the Government for this purpose.
5. Level of Government Expenditure
(i) The United Kingdom is not spending as much as its main competitors on official participation in overseas fairs. Expenditure on United Kingdom official participation in such fairs should be reviewed now and should remain under constant review, consideration being given to any upward adjustment necessary in respect of 1958–59 and later years.

Electrical Apparatus (Repair Costs)

Mr. Janner: asked the President of the Board of Trade whether his attention has been called to the excessive increases which have been made recently in the cost of repairing various types of domestic equipment; and whether he will consider calling together a conference of the leading trade associations concerned with a view to seeing what action can be taken to control such increases and to prevent excessive profits.

Mr. Gibson: asked the President of the Board of Trade what steps he proposes to take to investigate and control the recent widespread excessive increases in the prices charged for the repair of radio, television and other electrical apparatus.

Sir D. Eccles: I am clear that repair charges are a matter for the customer. The right course is to leave publicity and competition to keep the charges reasonable.

Mr. Janner: Does the Minister realise that that is a very unsatisfactory Answer? It is estimated that of the 14 million households in this country  least half have television sets, and that the people concerned are quite ignorant as to what repairs are necessary when anything goes wrong? Something should be done to see that the public is not fleeced in any way when these repairs are carried out. Is the Minister satisfied that he is doing anything at all in this very important matter which is causing considerable anxiety?

Sir D. Eccles: The size of the market mentioned by the hon. Member proves what a lot of competition there must be. Neither the Minister of Supply nor I has any power to control repair charges, and I do not see how we could do it.

Mr. Gibson: Is the Minister aware that that is not only completely unsatisfactory but contrary to the exposures which have already been made in the Press? Is he aware that the Daily Mail of 21st January carried an article headed "Repair racket. Dealer who charged five times the price"? Is he further aware that many of us are receiving complaints of this sort of thing, as well as having personal experience of it, week


by week? Surely it is the duty of the Board of Trade to use its power to protect the consumer.

Sir D. Eccles: I read the article in the Daily Mail with interest, and I am sure that it will have done good. We have not had many complains in the Board of Trade and, as I told the hon. Member for Leicester, North-West (Mr. Janner), we have no powers to control repair charges.

Mr. Jay: Do the President's answers mean that he does not propose to take any action in the direction of protecting the public?

Sir D. Eccles: The publicity that we are now giving the matter—with the aid of hon. Members opposite—will do some good, but I do not propose to take any legislative powers.

Mr. Nabarro: Get the "Co-ops" to put it right.

Factory Building, South-West and North-West Wales

Mr. Jay: asked the President of the Board of Trade whether his Department will build factories in advance of demand from individual firms, in South-West and North-West Wales in order to expand employment there.

Sir D. Eccles: In North-West Wales, which is not a Development Area, four factories have been built with the help of the Development Fund, and two further factories are due to be built there.
In South-West Wales there is now vacant industrial property, and I should want evidence that industry could not make use of this property before considering building further factories.

Mr. Jay: Is not the present situation in South-West Wales the worst unemployment crisis that we have had in any part of the country since the war? Does it not call for some exceptional and urgent action by the Board of Trade?

Sir D. Eccles: Yes, and that action is being taken. There is now a committee in South-West Wales considering what can be done with the eight—as I believe it is—tinplate mills which have been closed.

Advance Factories, Scotland

Mr. Malcolm MacPherson: asked the President of the Board of Trade whether he has considered the experience of Northern Ireland in respect of the value of advance factories in the promotion of industrial expansion; and to what extent he is now willing to encourage the provision of advance factories in Scotland.

Sir D. Eccles: The Northern Ireland authorities consider that the provision of advance factories has helped to attract industry. But the money available for Government-financed factories in Great Britain is limited, and it seems better to spend it on the specific requirements of individual firms than on building with no tenant in view.

Mr. MacPherson: Does not that Answer contradict the experience of Northern Ireland? Has the right hon. Gentleman made any analysis of the two situations? Why should it be better to build advance factories in Northern Ireland but not in Scotland? Is there any difference in the experience of trade or the industrial situation in the two parts of the country which would suggest that different policy?

Sir D. Eccles: The unemployment level in Northern Ireland has been, roughly, twice that of Scotland and, therefore, the House agreed on exceptional measures. I am fairly sure that the building of advance factories in this country would not be the most useful way of spending the capital available.

Sir J. Hutchison: In view of the fact that past records show that advance factories were taken advantage of in Scotland to a great extent, and as Scotland looks as though she will suffer very severely under the new naval programme, will my right hon. Friend consider this whole question again?

Sir D. Eccles: I am considering it with my colleagues, but at the present time I think it better to wait until we can get an industrialist who says what kind of factory he wants.

Mr. Gibson: Wait till the crisis hits us.

Mr. Woodburn: Is the President aware that the rate of unemployment in Scotland is at least twice that of England and


that in one town the rate is up by 8 per cent.? This is a serious matter for an industrial district. Is he aware that in Scotland, South Wales and Northern Ireland advance factories have proved themselves to be the only way to attract industry?

Sir D. Eccles: For that reason two-thirds of the expenditure approved for the Development Areas last year was for Scotland.

Mr. Jay: Is not the finance available for this work limited only by the decision of the Government, and as, since the war, advance factories have repeatedly proved to be the quickest way of bringing help to an area, why does not the President pursue that policy?

Sir D. Eccles: I do not believe that in present circumstances advance factories would attract tenants.

Foodstuffs (Weight Ticket Regulations)

Mrs. Mann: asked the President of the Board of Trade if he will place his proposed new Regulations regarding weight tickets on food, fruit and vegetables in the Library and send copies of his proposals to hon. Members on request.

The Parliamentary Secretary to the Board of Trade (Mr. F. J. Erroll): I will, on request, send any hon. Member a copy of the letter in which the Board consulted interested organisations about certain proposed changes in the law. The Regulations themselves cannot be drafted until representations from all these bodies have been considered.

Mrs. Mann: May I express to the hon. Member my appreciation of these proposed changes because they indicate the end of a campaign? Would not the matter be much more effective if housewives were informed that it will be an offence for traders to sell a wide range of fruit and vegetables without weight tickets being clearly marked?

Mr. Erroll: I appreciate the remarks which the hon. Lady has made. It would be better first to publish the Regulations before issuing advance information about what they may contain.

Mrs. Mann: asked the President of the Board of Trade whether his new

Regulations regarding stated weights on fruit, vegetables, etc., will be in operation this summer.

Mr. F. J. Erroll: No, Sir.

Mrs. Mann: I am disappointed that these Regulations cannot be brought into operation this summer. The proposals would delight the housewives and would have the effect of stabilising prices. While it is known that Regulations regarding alcoholic liquors and soft drinks are to be postponed, is it not possible to bring the soft fruit Regulations into operation this summer?

Mr. Erroll: No, Sir. We are in difficulties here with the timetable. We have to obtain the views of the industries concerned on the draft Regulations. After the Regulations have been approved by both Houses of Parliament, in the case of one set of Regulations there has to be a waiting period of six months which is imposed by the Act.

Aircraft Industry (Unemployment)

Mr. Jay: asked the President of the Board of Trade what steps he is taking to introduce new work into areas now suffering from unemployment due to cessation of aircraft orders.

Sir D. Eccles: My right hon. Friend the Minister of Labour and National Service tells me that there is no area where cessation of aircraft orders has resulted in an appreciable addition to unemployment. The Board of Trade will continue its efforts to steer new industry to places in special need of additional work, whatever the reason for this may be.

Mr. Jay: Have not there been discharges of labour for this reason in Northern Ireland, apart from other areas?

Sir D. Eccles: I shall have to have notice of that question.

Oral Answers to Questions — NATIONAL FINANCE

Purchase Tax

Mr. Nabarro: asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether he is aware that the present provision by which a 90 per cent. rate of Purchase Tax is applied not only to all toilet preparations but to the packages, containers and


bottles in which they are supplied, imposes a severe handicap on the export business of the toilet preparations industry in this country in so far as in many cases it may necessitate having different packages for the home and export market; and whether sympathetic consideration may be given to this matter at an early date.

The Financial Secretary to the Treasury (Mr. J. E. S. Simon): My right hon. Friend has received representations on this point and has undertaken to bear them in mind.

Mr. Nabarro: Yes, but is my hon. and learned Friend aware that four months ago I put this point to the President of the Board of Trade and that it is proving gravely detrimental to exports of British toilet preparations and the use of the most modern scientific containers, such as aerosol? As it is essentially a matter of interpretation and not change, would my hon. and learned Friend give a direction for the proper interpretation to be made at an early date?

Mr. Simon: No, Sir. I do not think it is a pure matter of interpretation, but my right hon. Friend has in mind what my hon. Friend has just said.

Mr. Nabarro: It is a very good point all the same.

Mr. Nabarro: asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether he is aware of a ruling by the Customs and Excise authorities that whereas tooth brush racks are only chargeable to Purchase Tax at 30 per cent. under Group 11, tooth brush holders which are personal to the user are chargeable at 90 per cent.; and what machinery exists to decide what tooth brush holders are personal to the user for the purpose of Purchase Tax charges.

Mr. Simon: Toothbrush racks are taxable at 15 per cent. They are bathroom fittings and are quite easy to distinguish from toothbrush holders, which are carrying receptacles.

Mr. Nabarro: Yes, but this invidious distinction gives preference to the communal use of toothbrushes which ought to be discouraged in the interests of personal hygiene. Has not the Treasury perceived that in all these years? Why should not toothbrush holders and racks

be freed from Purchase Tax altogether as essential to personal cleanliness and hygiene?

Mr. Simon: I think that my hon. Friend is mixing up bathroom fittings and carrying receptacles.

Mr. Nabarro: asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether he is aware that, whereas plan file chests are at present only liable to Purchase Tax at the rate of 5 per cent., plan file chests if combined with drafting tables are subject to tax at 30 per cent.; and whether this anomaly may be rectified at an early date.

Mr. Simon: Plan file chests combined with drafting tables are, like other office furniture, charged at 15 per cent., and not 30 per cent. In answer to the second part of the Question, I would refer my hon. Friend to the reply given to him on 19th November.

Mr. Nabarro: Whether the rate of tax be 15 per cent. or 30 per cent. is irrelevant. Is it not a fact that there is a distinction in the rates of tax as between a plan file chest sold by itself and one sold with a table? As both these articles of equipment can be used only in drawing offices and are items of capital equipment for industry, why should my hon. and learned Friend perpetuate what he was pleased last week to call "this damned nonsense"?

Mr. Simon: My hon. Friend's supplementary question rests on the false assumption that these articles can be used only for office equipment.

Greyhound and Horse Racing (Taxation)

Mr. Lewis: asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer why the totalisator at greyhound racing tracks has to pay a 10 per cent. tax whilst exactly the same totalisator at horse racing tracks, used for exactly the same purpose, is free from tax; when this system of discriminatory taxation was introduced and for what purpose; and whether he will change the present system in his forthcoming Budget.

Mr. Simon: This duty took this form because of differences in the conditions of betting on horse and dog racing. It was introduced in 1947 to raise revenue. As


regards the last part of the Question, I cannot anticipate my right hon. Friend's Budget.

Mr. Lewis: Can the Minister explain why it is that an ordinary working man from my constituency going to a greyhound race track and putting his 2s. on the tote has 10 per cent. tax deducted while a wealthier man going to a horse racecourse and putting exactly the same bet on the same totalisator loses nothing in tax? Why is there a tax on one and not on the other, and should not they both be treated alike?

Mr. Simon: This is not a question with which I can deal by way of answer to a supplementary question, but if the hon. Member will look at the Budget statement of his right hon. Friend in 1947 he will find a full discussion of the matter there.

Sterling Area (Current Deficit)

Mr. Leather: asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer the figure of the current deficit of the rest of the sterling area with the United Kingdom in the last three financial years.

The Paymaster-General (Mr. Reginald Maudling): I regret that figures in terms of financial years are not available. The current deficits of the rest of the sterling area with the United Kingdom for the latest calender years for which estimates have been published are:



£ million


1954
…
…
…
…
282


1955
…
…
…
…
222


1956
…
…
…
…
299


In the first half of 1957 the deficit was 117.

Mr. Leather: Would not my right hon. Friend agree that these figures show that, whatever the vicissitudes of the sterling area as a whole, the balance of payments of the United Kingdom as a unit has been extremely strong during all these years? As confidence abroad in the United Kingdom as the manager of sterling area currency is of vital importance, would it not be highly desirable to publish not only the sterling area figures monthly but the United Kingdom figures separately, so that people can see how well the United Kingdom is doing?

Mr. Maudling: I will look into my hon. Friend's suggestion. We must in this

country earn a large surplus in order to trade with the rest of the sterling area and to finance investment in the rest of the sterling area, which is so important.

Steel Companies (Expenditure)

Mr. Frank Allaun: asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer in view of the large sums now being paid by steel companies out of what would otherwise be taxable profits, for a campaign against steel renationalisation, if he will subject such expenditure to tax.

Mr. Simon: I would refer the hon. Member to my right hon. Friend's reply to the Question asked by the hon. Member for West Ham, North (Mr. Lewis) on Tuesday.

Mr. Allaun: Is it not a fact that if the steel owners were not spending this money on propaganda it would be taxable and available to increase Government income, as the Inland Revenue originally held? Does the hon. and learned Gentleman hold that the decision over Messrs. Tate and Lyle applies to this very different situation and campaign?

Mr. Simon: No claim has yet been made to deduct any such sums from the profits returnable for tax. It is not for me to say how far the case of Morgan versus Tate and Lyle applies to these circumstances, but it does not necessarily apply.

Entertainments Duty (Cinemas)

Mr. Rankin: asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer what would be the cost of total abolition of the cinema tax calculated on the present basis of attendance at cinemas.

Mr. Simon: I cannot give an estimate of the cost of abolishing the Entertainments Duty on cinemas in advance of my right hon. Friend's Budget statement.

Mr. Rankin: Is the hon. and learned Gentleman aware that the President of the Board of Trade, in a written reply to me earlier this week, said that the Government expected that cinema attendances would be down by 18 per cent. for 1957? Would that not then represent a fall in taxation yield of about £5 million and therefore represent a recruitment to the Exchequer of £25 million? Can the Chancellor do proportion, and is my proportion correct?

Mr. Simon: The matter is not quite as simple as that, because the fall in admissions has been partly offset by an increase in seat prices.

Sterling-Dollar Exchange Rate

Mr. Leather: asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer if he will consider removing the upper limit on fluctuations in the sterling-dollar exchange rate.

Mr. Maudling: I have nothing to add to previous statements of Government policy on this subject.

Mr. Leather: Would not my right hon. Friend agree that the short-term advantages of removing the ceiling are clearly established while the long-term advantages are evenly balanced? That being so, would he not agree that it is time that a little fresh wind blew through the Treasury in these matters?

Mr. Maudling: I do not think the Treasury, any more than any Government Department, is entirely free of draughts. The last Government statement on this matter was to the effect that we intend to maintain the existing exchange rate parity at 2·80 dollars to the £, and the Government do not intend to allow the margin to widen. I cannot add anything to that statement.

Opera and Ballet (Arts Council Subsidy)

Mr. Vane: asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer what proposal has been put to him to the effect that the continued and increasing subsidy to the Arts Council for supporting opera and ballet in London in two widely separated and unsatisfactory buildings should be discontinued and that London's needs would be more justifiably and less extravagantly achieved by disposing of the existing obsolete buildings with their valuable sites and constructing instead one building containing both an opera house and a smaller theatre.

Mr. Simon: No such proposal has been put to my right hon. Friend.

Mr. Vane: Would not my hon. and learned Friend regard this suggestion as a serious one towards a very necessary improvement, particularly for opera?

Mr. Simon: I do not dissent at all about the seriousness of the suggestion,

but it is not for my right hon. Friend to determine how the money which he gives to the Arts Council is distributed. That is a matter for the Arts Council itself.

Surtax and Income Tax (Aggregation of Income)

Mrs. L. Jeger: asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer how many working wives pay Surtax on the whole of their income; and how much it would cost to abolish aggregation of income for Surtax purposes.

Mr. Simon: About 85,000 taking the wife's earned income as the top slice of the joint income. The cost of abolishing aggregation would be nearly £5 million in a full year on the assumption that the separation applied only to earned income.

Mrs. Jeger: Would not the Chancellor of the Exchequer enjoy the undying devotion of 85,000 women and their husbands by removing this unfair incidence of Income Tax?

Mr. Simon: I certainly cannot anticipate my right hon. Friend's Budget statement, but for all I know he already enjoys the undying devotion of 85,000 women.

Mrs. L. Jeger: asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer how much Income Tax would have to be paid by two unmarried doctors living together with a gross joint income of £4,000; and how much would be payable by two married doctors, presuming the expenses to be identical.

Mr. Simon: Assuming that the income is all earned and that there are no dependants, the Income Tax and Surtax payable would be between £1,083 and £1,490 in the case of two single persons, and between £1,310 and £1,430 in the case of a married couple, depending on the amount earned by each person.

Mrs. Jeger: Do not these figures indicate that there is again an unfair incidence of taxation and Surtax? Would it not be very fitting if the right hon. bachelor the Chancellor of the Exchequer could go down to history as the Chancellor who removed the tax on marriage?

Mr. Simon: The odd thing is that people continue to get married in spite of every discouragement.

Hotel and Restaurant Industry (Income Tax)

Mr. Vane: asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether he is aware of the discrimination against the hotel and restaurant industry in the present law which excludes them from the benefits of Section 271 of the Income Tax Act, 1952; and whether he will introduce legislation to remove this disability.

Mr. Simon: Hotels and restaurants are treated in the same way as other commercial buildings. As regards the second part of the Question, my hon. Friend will understand that I cannot anticipate my right hon. Friend's Budget statement.

Mr. Vane: Would not my hon. and learned Friend suggest to his right hon. Friend that before making his Budget statement he should bear in mind that the catering and hotel industry is now in a position greatly to increase earnings of foreign currency which are so valuable to this country, and that he should do what he can to make it possible for them to do this?

Mr. Simon: Yes, my right hon. Friend will take that matter into consideration with all other relevant matters in his general review of taxation.

British Forces, Germany (Support Costs)

Mr. E. Fletcher: asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer what arrangements have now been made with the Federal German Government or by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation for meeting the support costs of the British forces in Germany.

Mr. Maudling: This matter is still under consideration by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and I have as yet nothing to add to my right hon. Friend's reply on 4th February.

Mr. Fletcher: In view of the fact that the Chancellor of the Exchequer in the Defence Estimates is taking credit for the receipt of £47 million, will appropriate savings be made in case the money is not forthcoming from the Federal German Government?

Mr. Maudling: It would be very unwise at the moment to assume that we shall not find a satisfactory solution to this problem.

West German Government (United Kingdom Loans)

Mr. Jay: asked the Chanceller of the Exchequer what loans were made to West Germany by the United Kingdom Government in the early post-war years; and how far these loans have been repaid by the West German Government.

Mr. Maudling: Loans were made to West Germany by Her Majesty's Government in the early post-war years in kind by way of economic assistance. The value of this assistance was £201·8 million. It was agreed in 1953 that the Federal Government should repay £150 million of this sum over 20 years in full and final settlement. So far £37·5 million has been repaid. In addition, a deposit of £75 million was made in 1957 by the German Central Bank with the Bank of England from which future repayments could be made.

Mr. Jay: Does that mean that there is still a considerable outstanding balance owed to this country by West Germany?

Mr. Maudling: Yes, Sir. The outstanding balance would be £112½ million.

Pensions (Increases) Act (Staff Side Representations)

Dame Irene Ward: asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer when he expects to give an answer to the staff side on their representations through the official side on the deteriorating position of public and local government servants covered by the Pensions (Increases) Act.

Mr. Simon: Shortly.

Dame Irene Ward: Is my hon. and learned Friend aware that in the staff letter to the official side there is reference to a pledge given by the Prime Minister at Brighton? If the staff side—and a lot of other people—think there was a pledge to the people on small fixed incomes, would he be so kind as to instruct the official side to redeem the Prime Minister's pledge?

Mr. Simon: I have seen the letter written by the staff side, but I do not think that it would be appropriate for me to comment on it, pending the outcome of negotiations.

Income Tax (Reduced Rate Band)

Dame Irene Ward: asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer how many people he estimates would be affected by restoring the 1955–56 bands of Income Tax payments with a ceiling of £600 gross income per annum; and what would be the cost.

Mr. Simon: Counting the joint income of husband and wife as one, about 8 million taxpayers have incomes under £600 and it would cost nearly £40 million to restore the lowest reduced rate band of £100 to them.

Dame Irene Ward: Would my hon. and learned Friend bear in mind that it was considered, at the time the operation was made, in 1956, that those in the lower income groups got a worse deal out of that Budget, and that it was regarded as a particularly unfortunate cut for people in the lower income groups? As my hon. and learned Friend is anxious to help these people, will he see what he can do to make conditions better?

Mr. Simon: There was no cut at all. All taxpayers benefited by the remissions of taxation given by my right hon. Friend the Member for Monmouth (Mr. P. Thorneycroft).

Commonwealth Countries (Free Trade)

Mr. Biggs-Davison: asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer to what extent Her Majesty's Government's offer of free trade between the United Kingdom and Canada is to be made to other Commonwealth countries.

Mr. Maudling: Her Majesty' Government are always prepared to discuss such proposals with other Commonwealth Governments.

Mr. Biggs-Davison: Would my right right hon. Friend agree that as things are it would be very difficult to achieve free trade between various Commonwealth countries? Having regard to what the Prime Minister said yesterday about the unique importance of the Commonwealth as a world force. will Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom use the coming Commonwealth Trade and Economic Conference and all possible opportunities to replace the largely obsolete Ottawa system by a

modern, up-to-date system of Commonwealth preference and development?

Mr. Maudling: We certainly hope at the forthcoming Commonwealth Conference to work out with our colleagues ways and means of extending inter-Commonwealth trade, but I think it would be unwise at this stage to particularise any one method.

Customs Examination, Victoria Station

Mr. M. Lindsay: asked the Secretary to the Treasury why only four Customs officials were available for 1,300 passengers returning from the Continent on the train which reached Victoria Station at 14.30 hours on 12th January. 1958.

Mr. Simon: Two trains arrived at about that time carrying 1,048 passengers all of whom, with their baggage, had already been cleared through the Customs at Folkestone. There were six Customs officers on duty at Victoria, but they were concerned only with unaccompanied baggage which some passengers had registered through to Victoria.

Mr. Lindsay: Is my hon. and learned Friend aware that it is quite a common practice to register baggage through and that, according to my information, the last groups of these travellers spent more than an hour and a quarter before passing through the Customs? Could not better arrangements be made, because this has a very unfortunate effect on foreign visitors?

Mr. Simon: The information I have been given is that nearly all the baggage was cleared through the Customs within half an hour of its being unloaded from the train. I entirely agree with the implication of my hon. Friend's supplementary question, but, of course, the amount of Customs facilities which can be deployed at any one point must depend on such factors as the cost of making the officers available. It would be unjustifiable to have more than are required to cope with the anticipated baggage.

Mr. E. L. Mallalie: Is the hon. and learned Gentleman aware that Customs are barbarous institutions which ought to be abolished?

Oral Answers to Questions — ANTARCTICA

Mr. Biggs-Davison: asked the Prime Minister what consultations were held with his colleagues in Australia and New Zealand about the problem of claims to national sovereignty in the Antarctic.

The Prime Minister (Mr. Harold Macmillan): I would refer my hon. Friend to the reply I gave on Tuesday.

Oral Answers to Questions — AIRCRAFT (NUCLEAR WEAPONS)

Mr. Brockway: asked the Prime Minister what action is now being taken to train decontamination teams to protect civilians, in view of the recent statement of the Atomic Energy Commission and the Defence Department of the United States of America that unfissioned nuclear material dangerous to life might be scattered as dust by the crash of aircraft carrying atomic or hydrogen bombs; what arrangements are being made to give immediate warning to the public in the affected area; and if he is satisfied that such action can be effective in removing danger to health and life.

Mr. de Freitas: asked the Prime Minister whether he is aware of the fresh evidence in the hands of the United States Government of the danger of unfissioned nuclear materials being released if an aircraft carrying nuclear weapons crashes; and whether he will now arrange for civil defence and Royal Air Force first aid and rescue parties to receive training similar to that given to the special United States decontamination teams referred to in the recent United States Defence Department statement.

The Prime Minister: The information given in the statement released by the United States Department of Defence on 14th February was already known to Her Majesty's Government when my right hon. Friend the Lord Privy Seal made his statement in this House on 4th February.
I am placing a copy of the American statement in the Library of the House. Careful study of it will show that there is no disagreement between the United States and ourselves on the risks and

hazards involved in the crash of an aircraft carrying a nuclear weapon.
On the specific points mentioned in the Questions, I would draw attention to the passage in my right hon. Friend's statement of 4th February in which he said that contamination of the ground, if any, could be dealt with in due course by special military teams. This is entirely consistent with the procedure envisaged in the American statement.

Mr. Brockway: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that in his absence the Lord Privy Seal stated that the danger was negligible, and that that previously was the view of the American Government, but that the Defence Department of the American Government has had to withdraw from that position and to establish decontamination schemes? In view of the impossibility of having decontamination schemes scattered about the country, will the Prime Minister at least hold up the carrying of these bombs in aircraft until the summit talks and the disarmament conference?

The Prime Minister: I think the hon. Member is confusing two points. I said before I left, and my right hon. Friend repeated, that there was no danger of a nuclear explosion. The American statement, if the hon. Member will read it, confirms that. That is quite a different question from the question which arises of a possible contamination, not by a nuclear explosion of which I said there is no danger—I believe the experts now put it at one chance in 3,000 million, and I think I was justified in saying "no danger"—but from the possible dispersion of a certain amount of material that would be dealt with in the way I have suggested.

Mr. de Freitas: If the Americans have found it necessary to have specially trained teams to deal with this matter, surely the very least the Prime Minister can say is that what we pressed for on many occasions shall now be brought about and that special training will be given to selected Civil Defence and Royal Air Force teams on the same lines in this country?

The Prime Minister: That is being done as regards the Royal Air Force.

Oral Answers to Questions — MINISTERS' MEETING, CHEQUERS

Mr. Lewis: asked the Prime Minister whether he will make a statement on the matters discussed at the Ministers' conference held at Chequers during the weekend of 15th–16th February, 1958.

The Prime Minister: No, Sir.

Mr. Lewis: Can we take it that the reason for that is that one of the subjects discussed was the recent Rochdale by-election and that, because of that result, the Lord President of the Council has been banished to America, since we have been told that he has now left?

The Prime Minister: I had a sort of inkling when I saw this Question that the hon. Member would be more interested in the supplementary question than in my reply. Now he has made his point, and I suggest that he repeats it in one of his political speeches outside. It is quite good.

Oral Answers to Questions — CONTROLLED THERMONUCLEAR FUSION (SECURITY CLASSIFICATION)

Mr. Mason: asked the Prime Minister if the scientific declassification committee has yet given any indication whether the Government can now automatically announce successes of the progress of the Zero Energy Thermonuclear Assembly towards harnessing the hydrogen bomb for peaceful purposes.

The Prime Minister: I am informed that the Atomic Energy Authority intends at appropriate intervals to release unclassified information on their work on controlled thermonuclear fusion, as it does in other fields. As my right hon. Friend the Lord Privy Seal told my hon. Friend the Member for Chigwell (Mr. Biggs-Davison) on 21st January, the rules of security classification which govern the release of information are periodically reviewed.

Mr. Mason: Is it not a really farcical situation in which a publicly-owned industry is making successes in the possible application of atomic energy and its announcements are subject to veto by a declassification committee, on which

American scientists sit and American opinion is dominant, stopping those announcements? Is not that very undesirable?

The Prime Minister: No, Sir. The interchange of information between the two countries is working extremely well. As regards the precise character of the information, it is very important to make sure that in making announcements information of military importance is not given.

Oral Answers to Questions — RADIOACTIVE FALL-OUT (RESEARCH)

Mr. Mason: asked the Prime Minister what is the Government's annual expenditure on research in radioactive fall-out of atom and hydrogen bomb tests.

The Prime Minister: It is not possible readily to distinguish between expenditure on research into radioactive fallout and expenditure on research into the general hazards of radiation.

Mr. Mason: Is the Prime Minister quite satisfied that sufficient work is being done in this field where there is urgent and most pressing need for us to find out about the effects of radio-strontium 90 on young children? Is he prepared to publish a White Paper outlining our research work in this field, adding a section on the monitoring system we have for checking the waste fission products from atomic energy stations?

The Prime Minister: That is quite a different question from the one on the Order Paper. I will, of course, look into that, or into any other Question the hon. Member puts on the Order Paper.

Oral Answers to Questions — COFFINITE DISCOVERY, CORNWALL

Mr. Hayman: asked the Prime Minister whether he will make a statement on the discovery of coffinite by surveyors of the Royal Geological Survey at Ponsanooth, Cornwall.

The Prime Minister: Specimens of coffinite—[An HON. MEMBER: "What is coffinite?"]—that is a sinister word, but I understand it is a material named after


the gentleman who discovered it, a certain Mr. Coffin, and has no other implications—have recently been found at the disused Roskrow United Mine, near Ponsanooth, in Cornwall, by officers of the Geological Survey. This is the first time this mineral has been found in the United Kingdom and the discovery is therefore of considerable scientific interest. So far as can be estimated at present, the discovery has no economic importance, but further investigations are being carried out.

Mr. Hayman: Would the Prime Minister bear in mind that Ponsanooth is close to a highly metalliferous mining area, which can become a great national asset and would be a great local asset as well because in my constituency at present there is a very high rate of unemployment?

The Prime Minister: These officers have just made this discovery. As I say, it is not thought at present likely to have an economic value, but, of course, that question will be pursued and investigated.

Mr. Mellish: In view of the fact that the Prime Minister said this material has no economic value, I should have thought the discoverer was Lord Hailsham.

Mr. Nabarro: Very poor indeed.

BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE

Mr. Gaitskell: May I ask the Prime Minister whether he will state the business for next week?

The Prime Minister (Mr. Harold Macmillan): Yes, Sir. The business for next week will be as follows:

MONDAY, 24TH FEBRUARY—Supply [4th Allotted Day]: Committee.

Civil Estimates and Estimates for Revenue Departments, Vote on Account, 1958–59, which it is proposed to take formally.

There will then be a debate on Unemployment in certain localities, which will arise on an Oppositin Motion.

TUESDAY, 25TH FEBRUARY—Committee stage of the Ways and Means Resolution relating to the National Health Service contributions, which it is hoped to obtain by about 7 o'clock.

At 7 o'clock, opposed Private Business has been set down for consideration by the Chairman of Ways and Means.

WEDNESDAY, 26TH FEBRUARY—Debate on Defence, which will take place on a Motion inviting the House to approve the White Paper.

THURSDAY, 27TH FEBRUARY—Conclusion of the debate on Defence.

Report stage of the Ways and Means Resolution relating to National Health Service contributions, when the necessary Bill will be brought in.

FRIDAY, 28TH FEBRUARY—Consideration of private Members' Motions.

Mr. Oram: Has the Prime Minister anything to say about implementing the decision of the House on 31st January to set up a Select Committee on Procedure?

The Prime Minister: I am informed that it is hoped to put a Motion on the Order Paper early next week.

Mr. Frank Allaun: Has the Prime Minister's attention been drawn to a Motion in the name of Lancashire Members condemning the sending of police dogs to a trade union meeting? As it is believed that this is the beginning of an experiment in the use of these dogs to control public meetings, which was regrettably repeated in London this week—and which, for a progressive Home Secretary, is a very provocative action—will the Prime Minister grant time for a debate on the matter?

[That this House deplores the sending of police dogs, plain clothes dog handlers and uniformed police to a meeting of 200 Manchester and Salford trade unionists and their officials at Carrington on 4th February; believes such provocative action likely to cause industrial unrest; and urges that such measures should be discontinued in future.]

The Prime Minister: I do not think that it would be possible to ask the House to give time to debate this Motion, but I have no doubt that the hon. Member will pursue the subject, if he so wishes, with my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary.

Mr. Woodburn: Has the Prime Minister decided on the terms of reference of the Select Committee on Procedure? Will they be limited in any way, or will they be fairly extensive?

The Prime Minister: We hope, as I have said, to put down the Motion next week. I think that the intention is to have wide terms of reference.

Mr. Royle: May I be permitted to support the appeal of my hon. Friend the Member for Salford, East (Mr. Frank Allaun) concerning the use of police dogs and the opportunity to discuss the matter in the House? This would appear to be a completely new method of police activity. While we all understand the necessity for the use from time to time of mounted police, there is the hidden suggestion that these dogs might be used to attack people who are taking part in public demonstrations. Cannot my hon. Friend's request be reconsidered?

The Prime Minister: The giving of time to the Motion is not necessarily the only way in which the matter could be raised. It could be raised on the Adjournment. In any event, I am quite certain that my right hon. Friend would be willing to discuss the whole situation with Members who feel strongly about the matter.

Mr. Gordon Walker: In the circumstances, would it not be best for the Home Secretary to take an early opportunity of making a statement, so that we could get the facts of this important matter clear?

The Prime Minister: I have no doubt that if a Question were put down, my right hon Friend would be very happy to answer it.

Mr. Rankin: In view of the fact that the proposal to set up the Select Committee on Procedure originated from a back bencher's Motion, will the Prime Minister think about appointing a back bencher to the Select Committee?

The Prime Minister: I hope that when the Motion is put down, it will be found satisfactory both as to the character of the membership and terms of reference.

Mr. Lipton: With a view to reducing the number of frustrated back benchers, will the Prime Minister consider an extension of half an hour or an hour for the defence debate on Wednesday night?

The Prime Minister: I would have thought that the House would regard two days as suitable for this debate.

UNIVERSITIES (EXPANSION)

The Chancellor of the Exchequer (Mr. Derick Heathcoat Amory): With your permission, Mr. Speaker, and that of the House, I wish to make a short statement about the expansion of the universities.
The House was informed on 21st November, 1956, that proposals had be en made by the universities which would increase the number of students from 84,000 in the academic year 1955–56 to 106,000 by the mid-1960s; but that the Government believed that the universities should be encouraged to expand even more and that they were giving further thought to this in consultation with the University Grants Committee. Meanwhile, the Government approved proposals for the starting of buildings up to the value of £10·4 million in 1957, £ 2 million in 1958 and £12 million in 1959.
The existing economic situation imposes upon the Government the need for great restraint in this as in other fields of public spending. The Government are satisfied, however, that if the country is to get the increased output of graduates which is needed, and is to secure the full benefits of future advances in science and technology, the current rate of university building programmes must be not only maintained, but increased.
After considering recommendations made by the University Grants Committee, I have given authority for a programme to be prepared on the basis that university building projects will be started up to a value of £15 million in each of the four years 1960–63. This programme must be of a provisional nature and subject to review if the economic situation changes substantially. In saying this, I do not exclude a possible increase in these figures if the economic situation improves and the need can be shown.
It would be difficult to put a precise figure on the increase in the number of university students which will be made possible by a building programme of £60 million over four years. The discussions which took place between the University Grants Committee and the universities were based on an increase to about 124,000 students by the mid-1960s, with the possibility of a further temporary


increase of 10 per cent. in the second half of the decade, and it should be possible to achieve at least that level with the programme envisaged.
The universities are, in fact, expanding faster than had been expected, and though the future rate of increase cannot be assessed with any confidence the increase beyond 124,000 foreseen for the late 1960s may well prove to be permanent. This will call for great flexibility in planning and will present a challenge to the public spirit and resourcefulness of the universities which I am confident that they will be prepared to meet.
The Government, for their part, will keep this question under review. Meanwhile, in deciding on a provisional total programme of £60 million for new university building in the four years in question, they have taken account of the possibility of larger ultimate expansion.

Mr. M. Stewart: While welcoming this statement, which, I am sure, will be received at least with relief and certainly with gratification in many quarters, may I ask the Chancellor of the Exchequer these questions?
First, he said that he has given authority for the preparation of a programme of the nature which he has described. Approximately when and in what form will the details of that programme be available?
Secondly, would the right hon. Gentleman agree that admirable and, indeed, essential as university expansion is, the country cannot get the full value from it unless it is matched by a corresponding improvement in education at an earlier age and that even with this projected expansion of university students, we still shall not be providing university education for everybody who could, with advantage to himself and his country, receive it?
Thirdly, is it assumed that the expansion of the number of students can be obtained solely by the expansion of existing universities, or is any consideration being given to the establishment of a new university?

Mr. Amory: This expansion will enable the University Grants Committee to go forward with their planning with the universities. In due course, the pattern that results from that planning will

emerge, but I cannot say, at this stage, when and how, because this is rather forward planning.
We entirely agree, of course, that the results that are to accrue from this depend on what happens in the earlier stages of education. The Government have given very high priority indeed to educational development as a whole. Apart from the capital expenditure involved in this expansion, this programme will involve a very substantial increase in current grants to universities, when the time comes.
Apart from existing universities, this programme envisages the early building of, I think, a University of Sussex.

Mr. P. Williams: My right hon Friend will be aware of the vital par, played by technical colleges. Can he give an assurance that this development will in no way militate against them and that, in practice, the technical colleges also will be able to advance at a greater rate?

Mr. Amory: My hon. Friend has raised a very important point. The contribution that we expect from the technical and technological colleges in this same direction is very substantial. They have a very important part to play in expanding the number of scientists and engineers for whom we are budgeting. This programme, plus what the technical and technological colleges are to produce, should enable us to reach the figure recommended by the Committee on Scientific Manpower, that is, a doubling of the number of scientists and engineers. That programme is receiving the highest possible priority.

Mr. Peart: Is the Chancellor aware that the last Report of the University Grants Committee on the number of students entering the different faculties showed that there was still a high proportion of arts students in universities as against those studying pure science and technology? Will the Minister give a special directive, if necessary, to the University Grants Committee that the expansion must be in the field of applied science and technology, and not arts?

Mr. Amory: I think that, on reflection, the hon. Member will feel that it would be wholly wrong to give a direction, but, from his point of view, I think that the


position is not unsatisfactory. At present, about 43 per cent. of students are arts students, but it is expected that about two-thirds of the expansion will relate to science and technology.

Sir G. Nicholson: Am I right in assuming that this expenditure, together with the existing university grants expenditure, will be the affair of the Treasury? Does not my right hon. Friend think that the time has come to return to what might be the more correct financial procedure of all expenditure originating in non-Treasury Departments and then being scrutinised by the Treasury? Is he satisfied that the Treasury should continue to be a spending Department?

Mr. Amory: My hon. Friend has raised a very broad question indeed. I think that the present arrangement, that the University Grants Committee should deal direct with the Treasury, is the best that can be devised. We do not want to treat the universities as a Government Department.

Mr. Woodburn: Am I to gather from the right hon. Gentleman's reply that there is to be no restriction on the diversion of this money to Latin, Greek and other academic subjects? And is there any intention of building a technical university which will give this country an opportunity to catch up with Germany and other countries that have technical universities?

Mr. Amory: The right hon. Gentleman, again, has raised a very wide subject, and one that I could not answer now in reply to a question, but we belie re that the combined programme of the expansion of technical and technological colleges and the universities will achieve a very satisfactory increase indeed in the output of qualified scientists and technologists.

Mr. G. Thomas: While welcoming the right hon. Gentleman's statement, may I ask whether the Chancellor will bear in mind that it is impossible to have an expanding education service at university and technological levels if there is to be a contracting service at the primary and secondary levels? Is he further aware that his right hon. Friend the Minister of Housing and Local Government has already told the House that it is the Government's intention to stabilise education expenditure on the other levels? If that is so, does he realise that unless he has an expanding service on those levels also, he will be undoing the good work?

Mr. Amory: I am very conscious that the education Estimates are to be £25½ million higher next year.

Several Hon. Members: Several Hon. Members rose—

Mr. Speaker: Order.

ADJOURNMENT

Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn. [Mr. Heath.]

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

3.46 p.m.

Mr. Aneurin Bevan: Before this week, the last time that this House had a foreign affairs debate was on 20th December, so that two months have gone by since it has been possible for the Government to assemble on the Front Bench, in one debate, both the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary. On that occasion, I took the opportunity of telling the House that we considered that international affairs had taken on so grave a tone that we were not anxious even to appear to be doing anything that might seem to be taking a party advantage of the situation; that we would much prefer to see a policy coming from the Government that we could support, rather than to hear of one that we would have to oppose.
In fact, on that occasion we made what might be regarded as a bi-partisan offer to the Government in this matter. It will be within the recollection of the House, however, that the speech that was delivered by the Foreign Secretary after I had spoken was so disgraceful, and seemed to be so lacking in any adequate regard for the facts of the case, that we found it necessary later to divide the House.
Since then, as I say, these months have gone by, and yesterday we had a speech from the Prime Minister which, on first hearing, appeared to be most satisfactory, but which, on reflection, was cloying in its effects. He indicated that the delay in approaching the summit talks was not the responsibility of Her Majesty's Government, but was due rather to the necessity of getting all the members of the caravan to move together. Now, this caravan is moving so slowly that it looks more like a cortege than a caravan, with Mr. Foster Dulles, the Foreign Secretary and M. Pineau occupying the rôles of chief mourners.
The Foreign Secretary told us that the Government rested their main case upon the strength of N.A.T.O. forces. We have now been told in the White Paper on Defence issued a few days ago that
the overall superiority of the West is likely to increase rather than diminish, as a consequence of the advent of medium-range ballistic rockets. … The possession by Russia of

rockets of equal range will not, for reasons of geography, afford her any corresponding strategic advantage. It would be of no use to her to attack Western Europe unless she could simultaneously knock out the vital strategic air bases in the United States. She could at present have no reasonable hope of achieving this with manned bombers, and it will still take her several years to complete the development of an accurate intercontinental rocket and produce it in sufficient numbers.
If we are to accept the White Paper as a truthful description of the present balance of power, it rests with the Western Powers and not with the Soviet Union. In other words, if positions of strength are necessary to get international negotiations going, such a position exists at present, and has existed for the last two months. Why, then, has there been this delay? [Laughter.] I am not sure where the hilarity comes in in this matter. If that giggle represents a failure to appreciate the gravity of the situation, it is not shared outside.
Why, then, this delay? The United States has responded to the situation of Western superiority by enormous new increases of military expenditure. It looks as though the Government have been failing to bring sufficient pressure to bear upon the United States. We are even told in this morning's Press that Mr. Robert Murphy, American Deputy Under-Secretary of State, said in Washington yesterday that world opinion in favour of a summit meeting seemed to be tapering off. He added that such a decline seemed to have come about in Britain and thought that the Soviet propaganda which had been pressing for the conference might have been overdone.
Here we have a statement from Washington, by an official of the State Department, that there appears to be a decline in the demand in Britain itself for a Summit Conference. How he could have gathered that conclusion, I do not know. On the contrary, it may be the Foreign Office which has that view, because there is a great deal of difference in the speeches which come from the Foreign Secretary and the tone of the speech of the Prime Minister yesterday. They might enter into correspondence with each other, or it may be that we could expose the Foreign Secretary to the same civilising influences which have recently influenced the Prime Minister. If the Foreign Secretary wants to go to India for a few weeks, we can easily put up with his absence.
It is time that there was some relationship between what the Prime Minister says and what the Foreign Office says. The Prime Minister made a broadcast on 4th January in which he said:
We can start by a solemn pact of non-aggression.
I emphasise those words:
start by a solemn pact of non-aggression.
He added:
This has been done before. It can do no harm. It might do good.
Hurriedly came the clarification from the Foreign Office, hurriedly to put the Prime Minister right when he seemed to be getting rather too enthusiastic on the eve of his journey to more civilised climes. The Foreign Office said:
This passage in the Prime Minister's speech should be read as a whole. It is the relationship between words and deeds he was seeking to bring out … if it would assist at arriving at agreement to have a non-aggression pact, when the Government would feel that such a pact to complement the agreement might do some good.
The Prime Minister did not say "pact to complement the agreement". He said that we could "start" with it. A start is a beginning, not the end.
There has been so little correspondence between the thinking of the Foreign Office and that of the Prime Minister in this matter that the Foreign Secretary had to issue a statement which was almost like a rebuke to his right hon. Friend the Prime Minister. Of course, it is apiece with what we have been having from the Foreign Office recently. We had a speech from the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs last night which detracted very largely from the atmosphere created by the Prime Minister in the afternoon. It was a speech after the character of that delivered by the Foreign Secretary last December. It is necessary that we should get our ideas clear in this matter.
Over and over again there has crept into Ministerial speeches and into publications like the Defence White Paper the suggestion that it is one of the objectives of Her Majesty's foreign policy to prevent the spread of Communism. Since when has -that been an objective? It is necessary that in foreign affairs we should not use language which is ambiguous and which might, in some ears, have a very sinister import.
I understood that the objective of foreign policy, or what should be the objective, as first to uphold the rule of law in relations between nations and to try to foster and promote the authority of the United Nations as the most effective instrument to that end; secondly, to deter any nation from acts of aggression; thirdly, to form such limited alliances as may be necessary to promote peace in definite areas. I thought that those were the objectives of foreign policy. It is not the objective of foreign policy either to oppose or promote any particular ideology, because once that is done one is inducing a condition of endemic civil war.
There are Communists in Great Britain. There are Communists outside the Soviet Union. In the United States of America there are large numbers of people, debauched by McCarthyism, who equate Communism with Socialism. If it is to be regarded by the United States as a part of its foreign policy, in conjunction with ours, to contain Communism, then the more Socialists there are in Britain the more depressed and frightened the United States becomes. In other words, once the objectives of foreign policy are stated in ideological terms, one is unable to think clearly about the international situation.

Sir James Hutchison: Would the right hon. Gentleman also apply that doctrine to the conference of Communist countries, who declare that their enduring policy is to bring down democracy in the West by force if necessary?

Mr. Bevan: We are not now dealing with what may be the aggressive intentions of Communist nations. As I have said already, we regard it as a part of the objectives of British foreign policy to resist and discourage aggression. But we desire to resist and discourage it from wherever it comes, because it is aggression and not necessarily Communist aggression.

Miss Jennie Lee: Or Fascist aggression.

Mr. Bevan: Or Fascist aggression. I am always ready to take advice, from whatever source it comes.
It is largely because this has been the posture of American foreign policy that


we have the lunacy of the continued exclusion of China from the United Nations. If we were considering the position entirely on realistic grounds, and secular grounds, if I might use the term, China would long ago have been in the United Nations. But once it is decided that one of the objectives is to contain Communism, or to fight the ideological pretensions of Communism by national policy, there is hardly any end to what we do.
As I said earlier, and I repeat, it involves the possibility of endemic civil war, because these are ideas that not only divide some nations from others, but divide peoples inside nations. There are many people who, while they loathe many of the features of Soviet Communism, nevertheless consider some of their features to be desirable. The capacity for maintaining economic stability will become increasingly attractive as the consequences of Government policy in the industrial sphere are seen more and more clearly.
I am alarmed at the delay in entering into discussions with the Soviet Union. It might easily happen that when the Summit Conference is held it will be held against a background of industrial depression in the West. That would not be a favourable climate in which to have negotiations with the Soviet Union. I therefore implore that when we think and write about these matters we drop this language. If we do not, we shall not be clear about our objectives.
It was one of these considerations that led to a certain amount of embarrassment for me at the last Labour Party Conference. If it is decided to renounce the use, manufacture or testing of the hydrogen bomb on moral grounds, then it must immediately follow from that that we could not rely upon our friends possessing the hydrogen bomb and sheltering behind it. When I said at Brighton that a British Foreign Secretary ought not to go naked into a conference with other nations, I was not referring to the hydrogen bomb. I do not believe that the possession of the hydrogen bomb is worth while from the point of view of negotiation, because it has always been agreed that the possession of the hydrogen bomb can never be an instrument of negotiation.
An instrument of suicide can never be an instrument of negotiation. Even the

right hon. Gentleman the Member for Woodford (Sir W. Churchill) told us long ago that it was not an instrument of negotiation, but a deterrent. That is not the same thing at all. One cannot leave the conference chamber and say, "Unless I get my own way I shall commit suicide."
There is a very strong argument for the possession of these hideous weapons as deterrents. But there is no argument for them as agencies of negotiation. Against the background of a deterrent, negotiation might be facilitated; but that cannot be a counter in the negotiations. If hon. Members opposite do not realise that, then they are not clear about this matter at all.
I repeat that when I said that we ought not to go naked into an international conference, I meant that we could not possibly throw aside all our allies, all our obligations and all our friends and negotiate with other nations, with Great Britain having no friends anywhere in the world.

Mr. John Eden: Nonsense.

Mr. Bevan: I thought that I had made my meaning clear. I said that one could not repudiate the possession of the hydrogen bomb and still shelter behind allies having the hydrogen bomb.

Mr. Eden: Mr. Eden rose—

Mr. Speaker: Order.

Mr. Bevan: The case that I am putting is that we ought not to renounce the hydrogen bomb on high moral grounds, because that involves implications going far beyond the bomb itself. Therefore, we hold an entirely different view. Nevertheless, it might happen in the course of negotiation, if some progress is made towards political settlement and disarmament, that to facilitate further progress in the same direction it might, on practical grounds, be desirable to renounce the use of the hydrogen bomb. But I make a clear distinction between renouncing a weapon on high moral grounds and renouncing it as a means of facilitating negotiation. I do not expect to carry hon. Gentlemen opposite with me, and I shall leave them even further behind shortly.
One of the other reasons why we found the Prime Minister's speech not very


satisfactory yesterday was this. After these months of delay we are supposed to be satisfied, even to be attracted, by the statement that the Prime Minister is in favour of summit talks and would like them to be a success. We are expected, after all this delay, to regard that statement as making progress. If the Prime Minister had said the opposite, if he had said that he was not in favour of summit talks, what would have been the reaction of the House and the country?
The nation, in the last two or three months, has been deeply moved by the opportunity presented by the Russian overtures and has been anxious for the Government to take advantage of them at the earliest possible moment. We therefore consider that to be told now, after all this delay, that we are in favour of summit talks, and would like them to be a success, is not, in our view, sufficient progress in the time that has been available.
The next thing that we want to know is this. Will the Foreign Secretary tell us, when he speaks, when the summit talks are to be held? My right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition said yesterday that they ought to take place in May or June—

Mr. Hugh Gaitskell: At the latest.

Mr. Bevan: If they are to be delayed still further then there will grow up once more a suspicion in the mind of the public that the Government are dragging their feet. If these preparations are to be so long prolonged there will be a growing sense of dismay throughout the country because they will feel that a great opportunity has been lost and that we have not taken advantage of the Russian mood at the time when it appeared to be most favourable to us.
We on this side of the House also consider that there is something remarkable about a debate in which all the positive remedies and schemes are put forward from the Opposition and none at all is forthcoming from the Government. Is is the traditional rôle in this House that the Government are responsible for the formulation of policy and the Opposition are responsible for submitting it to

detailed scrutiny and criticism, but the opposite has been the case here. My right hon. Friend outlined yesterday a whole series of proposals, spelt out in detailed, concrete terms. There has been no response, except the long speech last night from the Minister of State attacking one of the main proposals. We had nothing from the Prime Minister beforehand. Are we to have anything from the Foreign Secretary?
We have said here—and I repeat it, because we believe this to be the opinion of the vast majority of the British people and, indeed, of the vast majority of the human race—that Great Britain should set the example to the rest of the world by immediately declaring the suspension of hydrogen tests. I believe that to be the view of the vast majority of the British people, and if hon. Members opposite do not believe it they can easily test it. The Soviet Union has itself declared that it is ready to do that. If, therefore, we do it, it will be very hard for the Soviet Union not to follow suit. Why not try it? We have to try to break this deadlock somewhere, and surely it would be to the credit of this country if it set the example.
Secondly, we have said that in our view it is essential that in the present circumstances we should not proceed with the construction of missile sites in this country until we have seen, first, what arrangements can be made with the Soviet Union. We think that it is unnecessarily provocative to proceed with the construction of these sites immediately before the talks are held, especially in view of the statement in the Defence White Paper that we already have enormous superiority in ballistic missiles and in hydrogen bomb delivery methods. We therefore say to the Government that what we should like to hear from them this afternoon is whether they accept that proposition. That is the second concrete proposal which we make.
The third, outlined by my right hon. Friend yesterday, was that we should enter the discussions with the Soviet Union and be ready seriously to negotiate on areas of disengagement in Europe. I will not go into that, because it was very thoroughly explored yesterday. In the meantime, there have come fresh proposals from Poland, in which it is suggested that there might also be not only


nuclear-free areas but the withdrawal of forces and the introduction of systems of control and inspection. Although it might be correct when President Eisenhower said that the clearance of an area from nuclear weapons does not necessarily alter the relationship between the nuclear nations because of these intercontinental ballistic missiles, nevertheless there must be merit in an agreement by which the two sides agree to withdraw from certain areas, where pioneer experiments in inspection and control could be carried out.
It does not necessarily matter one little bit that there is no military advantage to either side, or that there may be some small military advantage to one side from a proposal of that sort. The essential condition is that we should be able to reach an agreement with the Soviet Union by which both the Soviet Union and ourselves could, for the first time, co-operate and not quarrel with each other. These are deeds, not words. These are proposals for definite deeds. They have been offered by the Soviet Government now ever since 11th December, in one fashion or another. We implore that we should have from the Government more positive reaction to proposals of this sort instead of their shouting one down after the other and creating a sense of dismay and defeatism throughout the country.
When I was in the Middle East last year I was very impressed by the rapid changes that are taking place in the structure of Arab society, changes which, in some respects, can be quite disastrous for us. If a nation earns services and goods from abroad by its own exertions, then it changes its own economy naturally in the process. In other words, if it earns money, then, in the process of earning it, there is a healthy and wholesome change in its own social and economic structure. But if the changes in its structure are a consequence of spending money which it gets from abroad without earning it, then the changes are a consequence upon the way it spends it.

Mr. Cyril Osborne: That is true internally, too.

Mr. Bevan: It is true internally, but it is very true in the Middle East.
The outstanding fact about the Arab States at present—and I am speaking

particularly about the oil States—is that the whole of their structure is being transformed by the way in which they spend the oil royalties obtained from outside without any exertions on their part to earn them. These changes are extremely serious for us. They are taking place in countries which are traditionally agricultural and pastoral.
As a result of the way in which this money is being spent, an excessive urbanisation is growing in the Arab States. The phlegmatism and lack of communications which are characteristic of rural life are being transformed into large urban aggregations, volatile, easily accessible to each other and capable of being aroused by nationalist feelings, or others, very quickly. This is especially true of nations like Iran and Iraq.
It is of significance, and it is nothing at all for us to be pleased about, that, in the last three years, of a nation of 5½ million people, 460,000 cultivators have left the soil in Iraq and become urban dwellers in Bagdad. Although it is true that the Iraq Government has been the most enlightened, the most far-sighted and the most energetic of all the Arab States, nevertheless such is the attraction of the city for the rural dweller that this migration from the country to the city is going on all the time with increasing rapidity. The same thing is true elsewhere.
I am anxious that right hon. Gentlemen opposite should realise that if this process goes on much longer without being corrected our oil supplies will depend on areas so politically volatile, so undependable, so unstable that Western Europe will not be able to rely upon her supplies with any certainty. That is why I beg that there should be some initiative now.
When I was in the United States recently I met some representatives of industrial, insurance and oil interests and I suggested to them that it would be a good plan if the Western nations offered, of their own volition, an increase in oil royalties to be paid into a pool, not for the oil States alone but for the development of the whole area and invited the Arab oil States to make their contribution to the pool.
I suggested that they could be presented by definite schemes of cultivation, which are known to most of them, and that this


would change the arguments in the bazaars and the streets and elsewhere from arguments whether they should drive Israel into the sea to arguments about the merits of the Western proposals, which would be proposals made at the sacrifice of some Western interests and which would offer some chance of progress in their own nations.
I pointed out that in the absence of that, what would happen would be that the Arab oil States, influenced by the more favourable oil arrangements made between Italy and Iran, through the services of Mr. Mattei, of Italy, would seek to improve their oil contracts and ask for them to be renegotiated. This has already happened since then with Kuwait, and it will happen with one oil State after another. In other words, the end of the story is the loss of the money without any scheme of improvement at all for the area as a whole.
I know that it has been the Foreign Office point of view that we should expect the initiative in this to come from the Middle East. How can it come from the Middle East? I know that the initiative has been expected to come from Iraq. How can it come from Iraq? Is it not more desirable that we should use our present leverage and advantages to stabilise the whole area instead of letting it drift from one crisis to another? These are plans which have been present in many minds for some years past, but nothing is being done.
In the meantime, apparently, the only contribution that we can make towards the stabilisation of the Middle East is the Bagdad Pact, but the Bagdad Pact rests literally upon sand. There is no strength in the Bagdad Pact, but that Pact may stand in the way of any agreement with the Soviet Union because, as we are under an obligation to supply arms to members of the Bagdad Pact, we are unable to accept the Russian offer to ban arms to the Middle East. Therefore, we are erecting barriers against success in the area.
These are not things that can be neglected and about which we can drift around. These are matters on which we should take the initiative. Everybody knows, on that side of the House in particular, because hon. Members opposite have said it over and over again, that the reason why we cannot have a sensible

settlement in Cyprus is our position in the Middle East. Yet we make no attempt to have any long-term policy in the Middle East. On the contrary, we have from the Government highly ambiguous statements about the readjustment of the Israeli-Arab border.
We want to hear from the Foreign Secretary today what he means by that. We understand, and have understood all along, that there is agreement among the Israelis for rectifications of the border where it is foolish. Those rectifications, in some cases would be at the expense of neighbouring Arab States and, in other cases, at the expense of Israel, but it has never been understood by us that we regard the readjustment of the frontiers as involving substantial loss of territory to Israel. As long as we hold out a possibility of that being done, we are always fomenting trouble between Israel and the Arabs.
Therefore, when the Russians invite us, as they have invited us, to consider the reduction of tension in the Middle East, have we any plans? Are our minds prepared? Are we ready to renegotiate the Bagdad Pact if we can substitute something more worth while in its place? Are we ready to discuss with the Russians any agreement on their part to guarantee peace in the Middle East? We have heard nothing from the Government. The only thing that is in the Middle East at the moment is the Eisenhower doctrine, and that doctrine, to the Arab understanding, simply substitutes American imperialism for British imperialism. We have heard nothing from the Government about that.
Leaving the Middle East for a moment, we heard yesterday from the Prime Minister the argument that we could not agree to any reduction in nuclear power unless it was accompanied by a reduction in conventional weapons. The Russians have offered it. A resolution of the Supreme Soviet speaks of a "significant reduction" of armed forces by the three Powers.
Each one of these proposals about which we have been agitated is there on the agenda, or on the suggested agenda. I know that the Prime Minister has said, and it has been said by others, "Why is it that we should accept only the Russian proposals for the Summit Conference and not put proposals forward


on our own?" I understand that the Russians have not refused that. The Russians have agreed to look at our proposals, but is this a conference aimed at agreement or is it a conference aimed at disagreement?
I am afraid that the accusation is against the Government here. [HON. MEMBERS: "Oh."] Let us see. At least, I should like to modify that. It is on the American side that there is an apparent attempt at disagreement—because President Eisenhower put forward as his alternative agenda the liberation of Eastern European States. He knows very well that in present circumstances that is impracticable. [HON. MEMBERS: "Why?"] Really, no one is here arguing for a moment or defending Russian policy in Eastern Europe. We are seeking to find ways of reaching agreement which will make further agreement easier.
We believe that there are definite proposals which, if adopted and carried out, would of themselves loosen Russian administration in Eastern Europe. We think that that is the right way to go about it, not to encourage people in Eastern Europe to rise against the Russians and then stand on one side and see them slaughtered. It is, in our opinion, criminally irresponsible to keep on conducting propaganda for the liberation of people in Europe, and then, when they respond, to stand on one side. If we do not intend to help, then let us not incite. We know, realistically, that if we are called in we would not go.
If that be the case, those who really want to see these people liberated ought to be prepared to take even the most modest steps that make it easier to bring that about. That is why we earnestly believe that these Soviet proposals, along with the proposals of an analogous kind that we can put forward, will make a very valuable contribution to that end. It is no use the United States talking about the liberation of Eastern Europe when, of course, the Russians, or some of them, have already retorted, "What about Spain?"

Mr. S. O. Davies: What about Britain?

Mr. Bevan: Does my hon. Friend mean "What about Wales?"
One can quite easily answer, "What about Spain?" Of course, one can say

that Spain is not being held down by a foreign Power, but she is being held down by a Government established with the help of foreign Powers 20 years ago. It is also true that if the Spanish people wish to obtain freedom now they can do so only by revolting, and there are American bases in Spain, so that the Spanish people could only get freedom by creating conditions of political unrest around American bases in Spain, which would not be agreeable to America. It is no use making these charges and countercharges. What we desire to do is to try to take advantage of the offers which have been made by the Soviet Union.
There is one more point. It has been said that the Soviet Union, in advancing these proposals, is merely engaged in propaganda, but, as my right hon. friend said yesterday, why should the Russian propaganda be more effective than our own? It has been said over and over again, as though it is a truism, that it is far better not to have a conference at all than one that fails, but who would be responsible for the failure? Would it be us? If so, the responsibility would rest upon our shoulders. If the Russians, the Russians would have to bear it. It seems to us that there is something tragically at fault in this reluctance to try to take steps to lift this horror from the hearts of man, as it is at present.
I myself believe that the Russians are anxious to have some sort of agreement. I believe that the Russians do not want to see the possession of the hydrogen bomb extended to other countries. I believe that they feel that if that were so the levers of international action might fall from their own hands, and they are anxious to keep them there for as long as possible. They therefore wish to reach agreement with the West to prevent that state of affairs from being brought about.
I also sincerely believe, as I have said earlier and as the Prime Minister quoted yesterday, that the Soviet Union has been brought to see that a third world war provides no political opportunity for it, and that the Soviet Union cannot benefit by it as it did benefit by previous wars that, for the first time, therefore, there has been accomplished a common interest binding both Communist nations and non-Communist nations, and that is to see that a third world war does not break out.
What we on this side of the House cannot understand is why there has been such apparent reluctance by us to take advantage of these offers. One would have thought that if there was any nation in the world that would be eagerly keen to meet the Russians where there was the slightest possibility of agreement, it would be the people of Great Britain.
I think that this House is losing touch more and more with feeling outside. If my postbag goes for anything, it shows that increasing numbers of people in Britain are becoming deeply suspicious of the intentions of the Government. This is a very dangerous state of affairs. It would be a very bad thing for a British Government to enter into international negotiations with the feeling that their own people were not behind them. It is essential that there should be a feeling in the country that the House of Commons articulates the people's wants and desires, but there is not. That feeling does not exist. There is a consciousness of a growing gulf between what the people want and what the Government are doing.
To some extent, the Opposition might share in that guilt, unless we make it quite clear that we do not consider that the Government are following the right course in present circumstances. Whether we divide against the Government or not this evening depends entirely upon whether the Foreign Secretary does not repeat his behaviour of last December. If he is able to give us an assurance that in the immediate future summit talks are to be held with a genuine intention on our part to reach agreement with the Soviet Union, then he can be assured of support from this side of the House, but if we are to have a repetition of delay, if we are to have further evasions, if we are to have what we have had so often in the past—ambiguous generalisations about what we think about the Russians and what they think about us—if we have nothing else but a negative policy from the Government there will be nothing left to us but to divide against them and show our displeasure.

4.37 p.m.

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Mr. Selwyn Lloyd): I want to deal at the beginning of my speech with one or two topics which did not come

into the main stream of the debate yesterday.
First, Tunisia. Ever since the tragic bombing of Sakiet we have been in constant touch with both the French and Tunisian Governments, and have continually urged upon them the importance of restraint. The Government of the United States have been taking similar action. I think that the noticeable easing in tension which occurred may be regarded as partly due to these efforts, but we must realise that there is still plenty of cause for anxiety.
As the House knows, both the Tunisian and French Governments have accepted our offer of good offices, and that of the United States, and it was for this reason that the Security Council decided, on Tuesday, to adjourn consideration of the Tunisian and French complaints indefinitely.
There are certain matters which must obviously be dealt with by the French and Tunisian Governments if they are to re-establish a harmonious relationship, and I will mention two of them. There must be a settlement of the question of the French troops now in Tunisia, and there must be agreement about an efficient method of supervising the frontier between Tunisia and Algeria. With regard to the latter matter, perhaps the best solution would be a mixed Franco-Tunisian Commission.
On the other hand, it may prove desirable to introduce neutral elements, and I think that the help and experience of the United Nations in the matter of observation along the frontiers might also prove useful. There is so much genuine common interest between the two that it is very much in their interests, and, indeed, that of other countries, to get these matters settled. It will take time, and we hope that our good offices will help towards a general settlement.
It has been said that the problems between France and Tunisia derive from the military operations in Algeria, and that no lasting solution can be found until an agreed settlement of the Algerian problem has also been achieved. There is a great deal of truth in that, but first things must be tackled first. I think that the immediate problems to which I have referred are those which require first consideration.
I want to say one final word about Tunisia. I see that in some quarters in France it has been suggested that even in our offer of good offices we were seeking to advance a purely British interest either in the Sahara or in Bizerta. I want to give the most categorical and emphatic repudiation of such a suggestion.

Viscount Hinchingbrooke: Why not?

Mr. Lloyd: I think that it would be a very poor way to treat our friends and allies, the French, under the guise of an offer of good offices to seek to get some personal advantage for ourselves.
I want to say a word about the dispute between Egypt and the Sudan about certain areas lying to the north of the 22nd Parallel. An appeal has been made by the Sudanese Government to the Security Council and I expect that hon. Members will have an opportunity of reading the terms of the letter which they have addressed. Of course, one must not attempt to prejudge the outcome of that procedure, but these areas have been administered by the Sudan since the very early days of the Condominium, in fact, for more than half a century. So far as I know, this arrangement has worked entirely satisfactorily, has never aroused any protest or complaint from Egypt and, indeed, the inhabitants of these areas voted in the Sudan elections in November, 1953, and those elections took place under the supervision of an electoral commission which included members from Egypt as well as from the United Kingdom.
As the Sudanese Deputy Prime Minister has said, whatever the rights and wrongs of the claim to the territory may be, what the Sudan Government really object to is the timing and the manner of the Egyptian claim. This, he said, was a question which obviously needed study and careful consideration, based not only on the documents but also on ethnographical grounds. I think that there is much force in this. It is a matter which should be settled calmly by negotiation, and a settlement should take account of the rights of both countries and of the inhabitants of the area.
I was asked some questions about the Middle East by the right hon. Gentle-

man the Member for Ebbw Vale (Mr. Bevan). I can sympathise—I think there has been continual sympathy on the part of successive British Governments—in the desire of the Arab world for greater unity. It is for the Arab peoples themselves to decide how that should best come about. It is too early, I think, for us to say whether the geographical, historical and economic differences can be overcome by the union of Syria and Egypt. We shall have to wait and see how that turns out.
The Arab Union of the Hashemite Kingdoms of Iraq and Jordan, now announced, seems to be a natural grouping, designed to bring a more prosperous and settled future to the peoples of the two countries concerned. I was glad to hear several hon. Members on the opposite side of the House yesterday refer to this second union in favourable terms. I believe that they were thinking particularly of the economic conditions in Jordan.
I was asked one question on this matter. I do not believe that this new union will result in a greater risk of war in the area, in fact, rather the contrary.
The Leader of the Opposition suggested that we should take certain steps to improve the situation in the Middle East. It is easy to say what we would like to happen. What is much more difficult is to see that it does happen. One matter which the right hon. Gentleman suggested was that we should guarantee the existing frontiers between Israel and her Arab neighbours. I think that a guarantee of the existing frontiers would be bitterly resented and resisted by all the Arab neighbours of Israel. [HON. MEMBERS: "Oh!"] Is it really suggested that we should seek to impose such a guarantee of permanent frontiers with the help of the Soviet Union? At present, these are armistice lines and, of course, the Tripartite Declaration refers to them.

Mr. Bevan: Mr. Bevan rose—

Mr. Lloyd: May I deal, first, with this statement? Our position about a settlement is as stated by Sir Anthony Eden, in his Guildhall speech. I was asked about this matter yesterday with reference to what was said in another place, and


I will read Sir Anthony Eden's actual words:
The position today is that the Arabs on the one side take their stand on the 1947 and other United Nations resolutions—that's where they are. They said they would be willing to open discussions with Israel from that basis. The Israelis on the other side, they found themselves on the later Armistice agreements of 1949 and on the present territories which they occupy.
Now … between those two positions there is, of course, a wide gap but is it so wide that no negotiation is possible to bridge it? It isn't right, I agree, that United Nations resolutions should be ignored, but equally can it be maintained the United Nations resolutions on Palestine can now be put into operation just as they stand?
The stark truth is that if these nations want to win a peace, which is in both their interests and to which we want to help them, they must make some compromise between these two positions.

Mr. Bevan: This is an extremely serious statement. The right hon. and learned Gentleman has heard debate after debate on this question. Does he mean that this might involve a substantial loss of Israeli territory, or does he mean that it is a mere rectification of frontier anomalies? If he means the latter, I think it satisfies opinion here and in Israel. If it means the former, it is highly dangerous.

Mr. Lloyd: The right hon. Gentleman and I had considerable exchanges on this matter in the debate which took place last March, when this ground was covered. What I said then was that I have always refused to put any gloss upon these words. There are several elements in any settlement—frontiers, refugees, the Jordan waters, access and other problems—and the more one party gives on one issue I think it is reasonable that it should be expected to give less on another issue. Therefore, it is wrong for anyone here to pronounce upon, or formulate, a settlement as to how much it would mean and whether it would be substantial or not. The point in that statement which should be emphasised is that it must be, first, a matter of negotiation and, secondly, it must be a matter of compromise.

Mr. Frank Beswick: The Foreign Secretary said that it must be a matter for negotiation. In that case, what is the possible argument against a guarantee of present frontiers by both

Russia and the Western Powers against a change of the frontiers by force?

Mr. Lloyd: That is exactly what the Tripartite Declaration of 1950 is meant to cover, which we have said we still consider to be in operation, certainly as regards Israel. We have said that this is the guarantee, or the protection, of the existing armistice lines and that there should be no change by force. The question I was asked was whether we should guarantee something as a permanent solution. What we have said on that is that the permanent frontiers must be a matter of negotiation.

Mr. Bevan: The Tripartite Declaration was a declaration to preserve the existing armistice lines until there was re-negotiation. The right hon. and learned Gentleman, in taking up his present position, is really conveying the impression that it might be possible for Israel to agree to the abandonment of substantial pieces of territory.

Mr. Lloyd: The situation is now governed by certain armistice agreements. I thought that it was the desire of both sides of the House that these armistice agreements should be turned into a peace settlement. Until they are turned into a peace settlement, the Tripartite Declaration applies. To get a peace settlement, as anyone with any knowledge of the interests involved would realise, there must be, on some of these issues—I am not saying to what extent on any of them—a compromise whereby one side will give something on some and the other side on others. That must be—on these issues.

Mr. Gaitskell: There is a very large measure of difference between mutually agreed frontier rectifications, in which the Arab States make some concessions and Israel makes other concessions, and a proposal which by its very nature involves the cession by Israel of a substantial amount of territory. The Guildhall speech said, in effect, that the ultimate frontier should be somewhere between the present lines and the 1947 Resolution lines. Somewhere between those two must mean a substantial concession by Israel.

Mr. Lloyd: I have not used the word "substantial" at all. What I have said is that it is the wish of all parties, I


thought, to convert the Armistice Agreement into a peace settlement and that that must be done by negotiation, and our feeling is that must involve some compromise in the position taken up by both sides.

Mr. Stephen McAdden: Does my right hon. and learned Friend not think that it might lead to clarification of misunderstanding, genuine or manufactured, which exists on this matter if he were to make it clear that the Guildhall Speech, which has been so much criticised on both sides of the House and about which there has been misunderstanding on both sides of the House, when it referred to a change in these positions, referred to positions of points of view and not positions on the ground and that, therefore, half-way between these two positions does not mean an alteration of positions on the ground?

Mr. Lloyd: I think that when the whole of Sir Anthony Eden's speech is read the matter will be correctly understood.
The question of economic development in the Middle East was raised. Of course, we agree with the right hon. Gentleman that economic development is a desirable and, indeed, an essential objective in the Middle East. The question is the method. A great deal of development has been undertaken by Iraq with a considerable amount of help from this country on the technical aspects. We are engaged, under the Bagdad Pact, also in substantial schemes of development. One of the most reassuring things about the last meeting of the Bagdad Pact was the importance that all the members attached to the work of the Economic Committee. I know that it is not very glamorous to talk about particular forms of technical assistance, and so on, which are taking place, but the Report of the Economic Committee of the Bagdad Pact about the work being done in those four countries is well worth while reading by all hon. Members.
I discussed this matter a few weeks ago with Mr. Hammarskjöld, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, and he said then that the Secretariat and the staff of the World Bank are studying certain technical aspects of the economic problems of the Middle East countries. That

does not amount to a cut and dried development plan, because if there is to be a development plan I still believe that it must come about through the co-operation and consent of the countries principally concerned. I do not think that a development plan can be imposed on them from outside, but where we can help we are doing so.
I come to the main theme of this debate, and that is the relations between the Communist States and the West. We heard yesterday many hon. Members with different views expressing what, if I may with respect say so, seemed a broad and constructive approach. I think that the emphasis was upon the common ground between the two sides of the House, the wish for security, the wish for freedom, from the fear of war. There was much discussion of possible courses of action.
My right hon. Friend the Prime Minister dealt yesterday with the pacifist solution, with the renunciation of nuclear weapons by the United Kingdom alone, with the renunciation of nuclear weapons by the United Kingdom and the United States alone, and the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition also referred to that. I think there was agreement of opinion that this would not produce security. The same, I think, applies to nuclear disarmament by both sides if it is confined to nuclear disarmament, because even if it were possible to control it—and I do not think that it is possible—it would bring no freedom from fear of a global conventional war and in some ways might indeed invite it. Therefore, on the disarmament aspect, I believe that the general view is that balanced disarmament is the best way to approach it.
Before I say more about disarmament I would refer to the question of alliances. Support of them is a basic factor in Her Majesty's Government's foreign policy, and I rejoiced, if I may use that word, to hear the remarks of the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition about N.A.T.O. He made a very clear and definite statement on behalf of the Opposition:
We support N.A.T.O. and the Atlantic Alliance. … Nor do we believe in neutralism. This must mean, as, indeed, the Prime Minister said, either sheltering behind the United States, or the destruction of N.A.T.O. and neither of these things commends itself to us. … Nor do I believe in the possibility of a so-called


third force or new power bloc. … Nor do we favour unilateral disarmament."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 19th February, 1958; Vol. 582, c. 1233.]
Therefore, I think that on these matters we have a bi-partisan position, and I am glad, because some doubts were caused by some of the remarks made by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Ebbw Vale at Brighton. [HON. MEMBERS: "When?"] The remark about alliances was the one to which I was referring. I think that a common position between the parties on this matter does make the position of the Government of the day stronger in dealing with other countries.
But I must say this, that this robust endorsement of N.A.T.O. has this corollary: it means we have to bear in mind the views of our N.A.T.O. allies. There is an evolution going on, because no longer is it enough just to give information to the allies in N.A.T.O. or to have perfunctory, brief consultation. There is now taking place a sustained effort to work out a common policy. That was shown in connection with the Western proposals on disarmament, which were worked out in considerable detail in close consultation with the N.A.T.O. allies. There is no question of domination by one country of all the N.A.T.O. allies. They are entitled to state their opinion and to formulate their policy.
The Leader of the Opposition, with the detachment of opposition, stated his position, and it is quite right that he should do so and it is helpful that he should do so, but membership of an alliance imposes on the Government of the day the need to make sustained efforts to reach agreement on procedures and policies before a public announcement.
The Prime Minister's statement about the summit meeting was, I think, regarded as satisfactory. I think that even the right hon. Member for Ebbw Vale impliedly admitted that. But it has taken weeks of consultation and discussion before my right hon. Friend could be in a position to speak as he did. That, as I said, is part of the price of working through an alliance, but, of course, the fact that we do believe in collective security and work with our allies is, in our belief, more than compensation for that possible delay.
Much reference has been made in the debate to disengagement and a variety of plans have been put forward. I think that they all require careful examination. I do not believe that disengagement is a kind of creed in which one either believes or does not believe so that one is either a believer or an unbeliever. There is a classic example of disengagement, I think, in this Chamber—the red lines upon the Floor—though not a verbal disengagement, I agree. Sir Anthony Eden put forward in 1955 the first disengagement plan. It was one to come into effect as part of a plan for German reunification. The hon. Member for Leeds, East (Mr. Healey) has written a book or, raher a tract—Fabian Tract 311—about a neutral belt. In it, I think he endorsed what I have just been saying, because he said that it was a great mistake to use words like "disengagement" or a "European Security Pact" without trying to work out in detail what was meant. I think that he has done a service in working out a concrete plan.
The hon. Member for Leeds, East, rejected the idea of neutralising Germany alone. He said that he believed in a larger neutral zone. He rejected the withdrawal from Europe of United States and United Kingdom troops; they were to stay, and there should be bases for military operations against a possible military violation of the neutral zone by the Soviet Union. He said that he believed in the capacity for limited nuclear retaliation against violation from these air bases in Western Europe and also, possibly, from missile bases in Western Europe.
The hon. Member thinks that there should be substantial conventional forces of the neutral countries in the neutral belt strong enough to defend those frontiers against local infraction which is not serious enough to call for extreme intervention but large enough to prevent a fait accompli by the Soviet Union, able to start the fighting and keep it going long enough if a Soviet invasion takes place.
The picture that the hon. Gentleman presents in his plan is of a neutral belt—

Mr. K. Zilliacus: What about the Foreign Secretary's plan?

Mr. Lloyd: I am dealing with the plan advanced by the hon. Member for


Leeds, East, because it was really endorsed by the Leader of the Opposition and, therefore, binds hon. Members opposite, I suppose. I should have thought that this question of disengagement is sufficiently important to merit the kind of consideration which the hon. Gentleman did try to give it in his pamphlet.
The hon. Member's idea is a neutral belt in Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia—[An HON. MEMBER: "Hungary."]—and Hungary perhaps—with powerful conventional forces, the belt being backed and guaranteed ultimately by nuclear weapons. He thinks that that will reduce the risks of spontaneous combustion in Central Europe.
The arguments against a scheme of that sort were put by the right hon. Gentleman himself, during his speech. He spoke about the pressure for reunification going on, about the possibility of an East German riot or minor revolution, about West German forces going to the rescue of their East German comrades, about further movements in the satellites, about the Hungarian rising, and a possible Polish revolution.

Mr. Denis Healey: Would the right hon. and learned Gentleman allow me to—

Mr. Lloyd: May I just finish dealing with this point?
It seems to me, in view of those facts in the present situation and those risks, that to have a belt with substantial conventional forces backed by nuclear weapons from outside would be to ask for trouble. It would be, I think, a trail of gunpowder laid across the centre of Europe. There is a passage in the pamphlet where the hon. Member for Leeds, East, talks about where the fighting may take place. Would it take place on the frontier of the Soviet Union and Poland, would it take place on the present dividing line, or would it be more likely to take place on the other frontier of Germany? None of the problems of the use of nuclear weapons would be solved.
The hon. Gentleman said in another article, about two years before, under the engaging title, "When Shrimps Learn to Whistle", that the main danger of war now lies in the possibility that one side or the other will gamble wrongly on its opponent's failure to resist a local

advance in a "grey" area. The confrontation of American and Russian land forces on the Iron Curtain is the best guarantee against such a gamble, at least in Europe.

Mr. Healey: I am much obliged to the right hon. and learned Gentleman for giving way. I am flattered that he should regard my proposals as the main topic for his speech today. I hope that he will forgive me if I attempt to comment, in one or two sentences, on the points he made.
I answered his last point in the first page of the pamphlet, as he is well aware. The Hungarian revolt showed that there were dangers in the present status quo which were not apparent before the Hungarian revolt, and I am sure that the Foreign Secretary will agree that neither he nor anyone else expected that type of explosion until it in fact occurred.
Secondly, because of the failure of the Western Powers to provide an alternative to massive retaliation, as I recommended that they should seek to do in my article three years ago, so long as the two sides confront one another directly with atomic weapons, a Hungarian-type explosion could produce an unnecessary world war. [An HON. MEMBER: "Is this an Oxford Union debate?"] With respect, the Foreign Secretary gave way, and I believe that he was expecting me to comment upon his remarks.
I dealt at considerable length with the political problems which require solving in order to reduce the dangers of disengagement, and so did my right hon. Friend, in the debate yesterday. Of course, it would be necessary to carry this proposal out by stages. Of course, it would be necessary to solve the major political problems, and I believe that it would be possible to do so—

Colonel Tufton Beamish: On a point of order. The hon. Gentleman has already made one long speech yesterday. Is it in order for him to make another speech today?

Mr. Deputy-Speaker: It is quite in order for him to make a second speech today, but not, I think, at this particular moment.

Mr. Lloyd: The reason for my dealing with this matter was, as I said, that the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition adopted this plan and put it forward yesterday. I should have thought that it would be reasonable to consider for a moment or two the disadvantages of a plan put forward by the Leader of the Opposition.

Mr. Harold Davies: What about the advantages?

Mr. Lloyd: Just because a plan is a bad one, that does not mean that it should go forward, for that reason.

Mr. Zilliacus: What is the Government's plan?

Mr. Lloyd: On the question of disengagement, I still believe that the best plan for disengagement which has been put forward is that of Sir Anthony Eden. This plan faces the question of German reunification. The right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition, in his alternative course, says, also, that it is necessary to deal with the problem of German reunification, and he produced a plan which also is dependent upon the Soviet Union accepting the reunification of Germany. But I believe that the best plan put forward for a form of disengagement is that submitted by Sir Anthony Eden.
One reason against the reunification of Germany, or against expecting the Russians to accept it, which was put forward by the right hon. Gentleman yesterday, was, he said, that it would mean that the military frontiers of the West would come up to Poland. That is what he said. I think that that pays no heed at all to what the German Chancellor has said on that matter. He said that, if Germany is reunified, he is prepared to have the East German zone a demilitarised zone.

Mr. Healey: He may not be the Chancellor.

Mr. Lloyd: He may not be the Chancellor, but that is the present policy of the German Government. That, also, is a form of disengagement which has a great deal to be said for it.

Mr. Sydney Silverman: I am sure that the right hon. and learned Gentleman no more wants to make this debate a purely academic discussion of academic ideas than anybody

else, but is he really telling the House that if the Government go to a Summit Conference in Moscow they will not be prepared to discuss any form of disengagement unless it is linked with German reunification? Is that what he is saying?

Mr. Lloyd: I shall come to the question of the summit meeting in a moment, but I do not believe that any topic should be excluded. As for the way in which we should deal with the question of disengagement, that is a matter upon which we shall have to work out a common line with our allies. That is the essential part of being a member of the alliance.
I have pointed out some of the dangers in the plan proposed by the hon. Member for Leeds, East and some of the advantages of the Eden Plan. I have also pointed to a third plan, which is that of the German Chancellor himself, and which also involves disengagement. In the course of the debate yet another plan was referred to, namely, the Rapacki Plan.
That plan was amended by an announcement on Monday, and I understand that there has been a further Soviet pronouncement upon it this morning. The Leader of the Opposition put forward certain objections to it in the course of his speech. We certainly do not exclude the consideration of that plan, but it is coming out in driblets, and we shall have to see the nature of it and discuss it with our allies.
On the subject of disengagement plans, I would say that the anti-surprise attack measures contained in the plan put forward by the Western countries in the Disarmament Sub-Committee also provided something which could lead to a form of disengagement. They involved aerial and ground inspection either of a large area of Europe or a more restricted one. The getting into position of the inspection mechanism and the control to guard against surprise attack would itself have been a step on the way to what is called disengagement. But I do not think that disengagement is a creed; it depends entirely upon the practical advantages and disadvantages of any scheme.

Mr. Beswick: Having now told us all the possible permutations of plans, does not the right hon. and learned Gentleman agree that the country ought to know


what plans the present Government are proposing to put forward at the Summit Conference?

Mr. Lloyd: What we now have to do is to try to work out with our N.A.T.O. allies a common policy and plan. That is the whole point of the alliance, and it has been one of the criticisms made of N.A.T.O. that not enough effort has been made to work out a common policy. That has to be done, and done privately, before it is publicly announced.

Mr. Bevan: The right hon. and learned Gentleman started his speech by saying how pleased he was that there was common ground between the Government and the Opposition upon certain points. How is that to be continued if we are not to know what proposals the Government will put forward with their allies? Are not we to be privy to these discussions?

Mr. Lloyd: Certainly not. The idea that before we have any diplomatic exchanges with our allies upon a matter of considerable difficulty the Opposition and the public should be told exactly what is happening is a fantastic conception.

Mr. S. Silverman: On a point of order. I do not know whether you heard what the right hon. and learned Gentleman has just told the House, Mr. Deputy-Speaker. We thought that we were having a debate about the Government's attitude to a most important proposal made at a most critical moment in world history, and considering whether or not hon. Members on this side of the House could support it. The right hon. and learned Gentleman has just told us that he has no intention whatever of telling us what is in the Government's mind about any of the matters that we are discussing. In those circumstances, would it be in order to move, "That this House do now adjourn"?

Mr. Deputy-Speaker (Sir Charles MacAndrew): That is exactly what we are talking about.

Mr. Lloyd: I did try to point out some of the pros and cons of the scheme suggested by the hon. Member for Leeds, East, but I still believe that the Government must retain the right to have confidential discussions with their Allies upon a matter of such importance as this.
The right hon. Gentleman mentioned the question of a non-aggression pact,

and made some comments upon the Prime Minister's broadcast. This, at last, is a matter upon which without doubt we shall be on common ground. The Leader of the Opposition said that a pact of itself would be of little or no value and the right hon. Member for Ebbw Vale said that
A pact of non-aggression by itself, without any other definite and concrete agreements, may, in fact, do more harm than good.
There is, therefore, agreement that although a non-aggression pact is a form of words, it needs to be accompanied by deeds. If my right hon. Friend's broadcast speech is read again it will be seen that that was the purport of his remarks.
The Leader of the Opposition stated that the narrowest difference between East and West concerned the suspension of the tests, but he agreed that a cut-off was desirable—and essential in the long run. That is the point with regard to what the right hon. Member for Ebbw Vale said, namely, that without not only the suspension of tests but also a cut-off we shall never get the other countries to abandon their nuclear programmes. That was made absolutely clear during the course of the meetings of the Disarmament Sub-Committee.
The other countries engaged upon or contemplating nuclear programmes want the cut-off as well as the suspension of tests. They want a suspension of tests, and an agreement in principle upon a cut-off. The scheme can easily be worked out in detail afterwards. The Soviet Union has not accepted that, but that is the only way to prevent the development of fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh and eighth nuclear Powers, and I think that we are right to insist upon those two matters being associated.
But that is not the point of smallest difference between East and West, and I do not think that that is the view of the majority of those of our allies who have approved our proposals. The area of least difference is in relation to the anti-surprise attack measures. The right hon. Gentleman asked for some initiative. In these matters we are prepared to nominate forthwith a delegation to discuss with the States concerned an inspection system to enforce the suspension of tests. We are also prepared to nominate forthwith a delegation to discuss practical matters involved in the


setting up of a system of aerial and ground inspection against surprise attack.
The right hon. and learned Member for Rowley Regis and Tipton (Mr. A. Henderson) suggested the latter possibility in the course of his speech. That would be very good work to get going, so that the results could be considered at a summit meeting. I am not unhopeful of agreement upon disarmament. There was a time last summer when such an agreement, of a limited nature, seemed possible.
In discussing disarmament the Leader of the Opposition referred to the question of missile bases. His suggestions were that we should have an effective veto on the use of these bases. That has never been in dispute. Of course, their use must be by joint decision, which means that we have a veto and the United States have a veto. His second point was that no physical preparation should be made for the installation of missiles until the summit talks had taken place with the Soviet Union. I do not think that that suggestion is a good one, because there is no difference in principle between these missile bases and the bomber airfields or the development of bombers themselves.
To hold up work on one or the other would be a fundamental mistake. In any case, the missiles themselves will not be here for some time—[HON. MEMBERS: "How long?"]—and I think that it is a complete misunderstanding of the Russian psychology to think that this delay would make them more amenable. I believe that it would have the contrary effect. I doubt very much whether the right hon. Gentleman believes in the wisdom of this course. It could be little bit of coming events of the next week casting their shadow before.

Mr. Bevan: Is the right hon. and learned Gentleman aware that he must not only think of Russian psychology in this matter, but of British psychology? There is deep feeling in many parts of the country that we should not take steps for the physical establishment of these bases until talks have been held with the Russians. There is a very deep feeling about this, however irrational the Foreign Secretary may think it to be. As the right hon. and learned Gentleman says that the missiles will not arrive for a long time, and we hope that the summit

talks will not be long delayed, there seems no reason to rush ahead.

Mr. Lloyd: This is only preparatory work. I do not see any difference in principle, nor did the right hon. Gentleman, between having these missile bases here and airfields for a strategic bomber force.
The right hon. Gentleman talked about the importance of our foreign policy and referred to the pursuit of peace and the preservation of the rule of law. We certainly remain firm in that purpose. We have to try to maintain and gradually to deploy the strength and resources of this country, but not allow an excessive amount to any particular area. That is one reason why we do not believe in a kind of Maginot Line complex in any particular part of the world. We have to maintain our alliances and their effectiveness and try to improve the speed at which the operate. It is easy to be critical, but after all, Government Departments take quite a long time to make up their minds on a common line; and if we have 15 Governments, with their Foreign Offices, Ministries of Defence and Treasuries to be consulted, it takes a considerable time. But I think that we can improve on the present procedure.
We accept the conception of the rôle of the United Nations set out in the Secretary-General's last Report. My right hon. Friend the Prime Minister spoke yesterday about the Commonwealth and I wish to say a word about our attitude to the Soviet Union. I think that where progress is possible is in the improvement of the nature of our public exchanges of propaganda and things of that sort. I believe that we can speedily make progress by having more contacts. The present contacts are minute compared with the populations involved. We believe that more trade is possible and that it is of great psychological importance that we should have successful negotiations which end in a real agreement upon something.
At the N.A.T.O. meeting, in December, the idea of a Foreign Ministers' meeting was proposed in the hope that they might agree at least on how to resolve the procedural deadlock over disarmament talks. We felt that from that modest beginning further agreement might be possible. But now that we have accepted either preparations through


diplomatic channels or by a meeting of Foreign Ministers, we are ready to examine on their merits the various plans for disengagement or partial disarmament.
We stand by our Western disarmament proposals, but not in a spirit of complete inflexibility. We said in the N.A.T.O. communiqué after the December meeting that we were prepared to discuss proposals from whatever source. We think those are profitable areas of discussion. But the final question is the method; how we come to a meeting with the Soviet leaders. About that, the Leader of the Opposition said, "Why do you not say 'Yes' at once?" It would be in accordance with our national instinct to say "Yes" at once to an invitation to a conference of any sort. There is a strong temptation to say, "Right, we will meet at Geneva in a fortnight's time." But we have to remember the point made in the Prime Minister's speech, that positive disillusionment might be more dangerous than the preservation even of some tenuous expectation.
I quite agree that we have not to be so timid as to refuse to go unless there is a certainty of success on every point. On the other hand, complete failure—I should have thought all hon. Members would agree—would do a great deal of harm. A psychological success is needed, otherwise tension may increase. Therefore, our position is that we want a summit meeting, a fruitful meeting. We in Britain have everything to gain from the relaxation of tension and from a genuine agreement. But I would remind the House of what I think were the very wise words of Dr. Lange, the Foreign Minister of Norway—and there has been talk about Norway having been more advanced towards a summit meeting and that we were lagging. He said:
We do not find the level at which a meeting takes place the most important factor. The decisive thing is that before the meeting we must have the certainty of results through confidential contacts. A new meeting between East and West with a negative result can create only pessimism.
The right hon. Gentleman spoke about a regrettable confusion over the purpose of the conference. He said that there were two possibilities, the apex type, which is setting the seal on the work already completed, or the ice-breaking

type, which was the beginning and not the end of the process. He thought that the preparatory work should be about where, when and who should participate and the agenda. There is a third type of conference between those other two for which there should be a reasonable amount of preparation. Although nothing would be excluded from the agenda, as a result of the preparatory work the heads of Government would have a good idea of the fields which are most profitable for discussion. We do not want another Palais Rose over the question of the agenda.
I believe that for the success of the meeting, it would be of great benefit to have a genuine attempt at preparing areas where agreement is most likely. I think it the general view that these meetings would be very much better if attended by as few as possible, and we certainly should be ready to support that. During the visits of Marshal Bulganin and Mr. Khrushchev, in 1956, there were long meetings of that sort. True, they did not result in any agreement, but the speeches were more frank and useful.
There is a feeling that a meeting designed for propaganda purposes should be resisted. Carefully prepared speeches, made in strict rotation for public consumption, will not help. Therefore, our view is that preparation should proceed at once on the question of a place of participation and with regard, as the Prime Minister put it, to
disentangling the points of disagreement, and revealing, perhaps, the most prominent areas of a possible agreement."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 19th February, 1958; Vol. 582, c. 1227.]
As to the fixing of the date, there are two arguments. If the date is fixed, it might be said that there is no incentive to do any preparation at all—[HON. MEMBERS: "Why?"]. There are two arguments. The first argument is that if the date is fixed, and where the meeting is to take place, there need not be this genuine endeavour beforehand to disentangle the issues. The second argument is that if you do not fix the date you can delay preparations indefinitely. I think that it is six of one and half-a-dozen of the other. [Laughter.] Hon. Members opposite have to realise that the sanction for genuine preparation may be not to fix the date—the only way in which you are going to get genuine preparation, without which I believe the meeting


would not be the most useful, is not to fix the date. Our view is that this is a matter which must be discussed with our allies before a decision is taken. [HON. MEMBERS: "Oh."] Certainly.

Mr. Bevan: Before the right hon. and learned Gentleman leaves that point, and because we have to make up our minds whether to divide tonight against the Government—

Mr. S. O. Davies: We have made up our minds.

Mr. Bevan: —may I put this to him? Up to now it has been argued that it would be a good thing to fix the date precisely, because by that announcement there would be an incentive to make effective preparation quickly. If you do not fix the date, all kinds of recriminations will take place—that we are responsible for the delay—and the atmosphere will be poisoned. Would not the right hon. and learned Gentleman agree that in the circumstances it would be far better to fix a date which would be a target for all the preparations?

Mr. Lloyd: That is a point which we have to consider. I tried to put it perfectly fairly and to put the arguments on each side. This is a matter which must now be pursued with our other allies, who have strong views upon this matter and about the importance of there being a genuine preparation before the meeting takes place.
In spite of this issue about the date, upon which we have not pronounced one way or the other, I think that the House is generally closer together about a summit meeting. I think that we have to balance between us not to raise false or premature hopes and, on the other hand, not to be so cautious as to become completely immobile. We have also to remember that it is easy to be carried away by emotion in these matters. We have to realise that the summit meeting is not the end in itself. There are broader issues.
Perhaps I may quote Lord Attlee, who made a speech in 1950 on a similar topic:
The difficulty does not lie in the method nor in the choice of persons to discuss these high matters. All that is required is the will. We on this side of the Iron Curtain have the will to discuss and settle with the Russians.

Whatever may be said, for any purposes, by way of misrepresentation, misstatement or misquotation, we on this side of the House firmly have the will to meet the Russians and to try to settle these issues.

5.33 p.m.

Mr. A. Blenkinsop: I think the Foreign Secretary has sat on the fence for so long that the rust has entered into his soul. Surely, on both sides of the House, we must have been deeply depressed by what we have had to listen to over the last half-hour. It is not merely a matter of the House but of the whole country.
No one who has been sitting on these benches watching the look of despair on the faces of his nominal supporters behind him could have failed to realise that the time has long passed when action should be taken for the right hon. and learned Gentleman to move out of his office and for someone else to take his place who can give the leadership which, I am sure, the country is longing should be given. Not only was his speech dull and unimaginative, but he seemed to be incapable of giving any kind of coherent picture of future policy to which people both inside and outside the House could look forward. It is a tragedy for the country that we have to endure this kind of speech.
There were some among my right hon. and hon. Friends who, I am sure, welcomed the signs of what one might say was conversion in the Prime Minister's speech yesterday. There were at least indications that the visit to India and elsewhere had done him good. It was valuable and encouraging to hear him make his references to the position of India. One had hoped that the Foreign Secretary might have followed on that speech and given coherence, vitality and life to some of the unexceptionable principles the Prime Minister expressed. Instead, the only positive suggestions have come from this side of the House, and it must be evident that the sooner hon. Members on this side of the House are given a chance to translate their views into practice the better. The sooner this side of the House has an opportunity to take part in these international discussions, the better for the country.
I wanted to deal in a brief intervention with one aspect only of these vital


questions. References have been made, both by the Prime Minister and my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition, to the vital part which India will play in the future—not only India, but the other new, free countries of the Commonwealth in whose freedom we all glory. I hope we can now include the Prime Minister in that statement and that he can join us in glorying in that freedom.
But, if the Prime Minister's cautious but helpful references to India and the uncommitted countries are to be translated into something more and are to be given some reality, surely it is for us on our side to recognise that there is a very clear economic implication in our support for the position of India and the other uncommitted countries. It is no use our merely recognising India's position unless, together with others, we are able to play a fuller part in the economic assistance which we can give.
It is well known that India has played a leading rôle in trying to urge the countries of the world to join together in international schemes of economic aid under the United Nations—schemes such as S.U.N.F.E.D. and others which have been put forward. Unhappily, this country and the United States have always appeared to be dragging their feet on these issues. They have always said that it was an unpropitious time to bring forward these major schemes of economic development.
We know how critical is the position in India and similar countries. India holds on to her democratic processes, and I am sure that we pay a sincere tribute to the way in which she does that; but she is under very severe pressure, and unless greater economic advance can be assured to her, there is no doubt that her democratic position is in danger.
It is therefore of the most critical importance that we in this country do everything we can to try to give leadership for the development of economic schemes, instead of, as it appears, giving the impression to the world that we are doing what we can to block them. I am aware that the United States have recently made new offers for what, in a sense, amounts to a new scheme of technical aid, and I am sure that they will be very valuable.

Mr. Julian Ridsdale: Would not the hon. Member agree that, in the last ten years, we have given no less than £1,000 million in technical aid, private investment and other ways to the Commonwealth and the Colonial Empire?

Mr. Blenkinsop: I was about to make it clear that I do not deny that we have done valuable work in our Colonies, but we must admit that for a long time we relied very much upon the contributions of our Colonies to our sterling balances. Although the position may have changed in some respects in the last year or two, there is that other side of the picture. The net investment we have made has been very small—one knows the difficulties. The United States have put forward new proposals, which at least offer some chance of expansion, but, in the view of most of us, they in no way meet the real needs of the situation.
The crucial point is to be able to provide enough capital for what has been described by one economic expert as a "peaceful infrastructure". In the past, we have talked about an infrastructure in N.A.T.O. for defence, but what is needed here is a complex of social services and basic provisions which would make it possible for industrial development to take place later. Without those basic provisions, in practice, very little can be done. We argue that now is the time when we must try desperately to give more reality to these international economic schemes of development. Unhappily, our Government appear to have taken up a position of rejection of those proposals. We on this side of the House are committed to a vast expansion of this provision, but we recognise that in all probability it cannot take place without some sacrifice on the part of our people at home. We have said so in our statements and documents.
We also recognise that our people have to be educated to understand how vital those issues are. Those of us who, like the Prime Minister, have recently had the opportunity of being in India, understand the kind of problem there is there—the appalling condition of poverty and misery, and the way in which the gap between our standards and theirs is getting larger rather than smaller. It is hopeless to imagine that we can develop


peacefully in the world so long as that condition continues.
We recognise fully that we have a job to do to bring these issues home to our own people, to make them understand how vital they are and how necessary it is for all of us to make sacrifices to enable this capital to be provided. What I want to know from the Minister of State tonight is what action the Government are prepared to take to encourage the education of our people on this issue. The United Nations Association put forward one proposal—no doubt one amongst others—for consideration by the Foreign Office. It is a modest but practical proposal, which suggests that, under the authority of the International Bank, trustee bonds at a low rate of interest should be issued, to which private people and organisations could subscribe. That money could be used for the assistance of community development projects in India and elsewhere. That is not an attempt to solve the basic economic problems, but to educate opinion in this country. So far, we have not had an answer to that very useful proposal.
I assume that my right hon. Friends will be in Government very shortly. It would be a graceful thing if the Foreign Office were to help the transfer of power in this country by educating popular opinion on the kind of developments that I think everyone—on both sides of the House and in the country—would like to see go forward. I am convinced that in the country there is a great reservoir of opinion, especially among young people, wanting to see this kind of approach made. They are prepared to face some personal sacrifice. As my right hon. Friend the Member for Ebbw Vale (Mr. Bevan) said, it is one of the tragedies that in many ways the House of Commons has become divorced from youthful, live opinion. One of the ways in which the House could be brought back into touch would be provided if this kind of leadership could be given. What makes the divorce between the House and popular

opinion even more certain is the kind of approach we have had from the Government this afternoon.
Another point is related to this. It is clear to most of us that talking about economic development and economic aid to under-developed territories does not make much sense if our trade policy denies to those territories any kind of security in the prices of their raw material products. There are many examples of that. Many of us have been abroad and seen for ourselves the way in which plans for many countries—for example, Burma—are affected by sudden drops in the price of the raw materials, such as rice in one case and tea in another—

ROYAL ASSENT

5.45 p.m.

Message to attend the Lords Commissioners:

The House went:—and, having returned;

Mr. SPEAKER reported the Royal Assent to:

1. Post Office and Telegraph (Money) Act, 1958.

2. Import Duties Act, 1958.

3. Consolidated Fund Act, 1958.

4. Trustee Savings Banks Act, 1958.

5. Entertainments Duty Act, 1958.

6. British Nationality Act, 1958.

7. Isle of Man Act, 1958.

8. New Towns Act, 1958.

9. Cayman Islands and Turks and Caicos Islands Act, 1958.

10. Forth Road Bridge Order Confirmation Act, 1958.

And to the following Measures, passed under the provisions of the Church of England Assembly (Powers) Act, 1919:—

Church Funds Investment Measure, 1958.

Church Schools (Assistance by Church Commisisoners) Measure, 1958.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

6.0 p.m.

Mr. Blenkinsop: Before this House went to the House of Peers, I was calling attention to the fact that economic aid schemes to the under-developed territories were not enough in themselves, and that catastrophic and sudden falls in prices of the raw materials on which many of those under-developed countries depend could be of the most serious character.
There are many examples of this. Any of us who has been abroad, in India, Burma and elsewhere, knows precisely how these falls can destroy good economic planning over a whole period ahead. Although efforts have been made in the past to secure some kind of sanity in world prices, they have failed. The tragedy is that, in recent answers to Questions on this subject, Her Majesty's Government have shown no sign of their willingness to explore this field further, although we all recognise how vital it is and how even a modest agreement would be of value.
In trying to put forward constructive proposals, I would ask whether consideration has been given, for example, to the modest suggestions in Mr. Grondona's recent book on the preparation of raw material reserves and the development of the reserves in this country. It is a modest proposal which does not, by itself, satisfy many of us, but if some agreement could be got from the Government about that proposal, it would be something which would make a contribution that might well be a starting point for something more.
The real trouble that we face all the time is our inability to get from Her Majesty's Government any sign of leadership in these fields, even of a modest character. We have had a few blinks of light during the course of this debate, a few indications that suggest that the completely rock-like attitude of December is breaking slightly. After tremendous pressure in the country, and from this side, there is some sign of movement, but that is the most we can say. There is no kind of sign of that vision for the future

which is what our people are asking for at present. It is for that reason that I believe so very sincerely that the sooner this Government get out the better it will be for the public good and for the possibility of advance. The longer this Government continue their present attitude, the more tragic is the situation for the world at large.

6.3 p.m.

Mr. W. T. Aitken: Although I was very interested in some of the remarks of the hon. Member for Newcastle-upon-Tyne, East (Mr. Blenkinsop), I am sure he will appreciate that if I do not follow him on this occasion it is because we all have our own subjects we want to discuss in this debate. No one seems to have dealt so far with that very important sector of international affairs, Cyprus. I have either taken part in or have followed most of the debates on this subject, and I also had the advantage of serving for a period as a United Kingdom delegate at the latest session of the United Nations. I think there is a good deal more appreciation at the United Nations of the fact that Cyprus is really more of an international matter than has appeared from some of our discussions in this House.
Public opinion is now beginning to realise that Cyprus is not merely a matter between Greeks, Greek Cypriots and a Conservative Colonial Secretary. I have always thought that many hon. Members opposite have consistently failed to appreciate the very strong position of the Turks, although I except from that the hon. and learned Member for Northampton (Mr. Paget). The best illustration of that failure to accept the position of the Turks came in our last Cyprus debate. The hon. Member for Dagenham (Mr. Parker), in a very interesting speech, said, in effect, that the Turks ought to be easier to negotiate with and would probably be more willing to make concessions than the Greeks, because the Greeks were more politically minded.
Recent tragic events in Cyprus would seem to underline the crowning irony of the present situation. The only way in which E.O.K.A. can possibly win is for Britain to turn against her staunchest and most faithful friend in that part of the world, possibly with a clash of arms. That means that the possibility of Enosis is more remote than ever before, because I


do not believe that any British Government—and I fully expect that in two or three years' time it will be the same Government as now—could visualise a situation in which Britain would have to enforce a settlement with the disagreement of the Turks.
It is understandable enough that there is some confusion in many people's minds about the real issues in the Cyprus question, because public opinion in this country on the whole is sympathetic to the aspirations of the Greek Cypriots. It is very hard to argue that a man is not of the race he passionately believes himself to be. The majority of the inhabitants of Cyprus certainly fulfil Venezelos' description of a Greek. He said, "The definition of a Greek is Greek-speaking, Greek-feeling, Greek-thinking." That is also the definition of a French-Canadian as being French-speaking, French-feeling and French thinking—and, I am glad to say, French-eating, too.
The other factor that has further confused the public mind regarding the international importance of Cyprus, rather than the purely British-Greek aspect of the problem is that in this country we take great pride in the fact that self-determination is one of the moral justifications for our present colonial policy. In our last Cyprus debate, the right hon. and learned Member for Newport (Sir F. Soskice) was asked to state something about the Opposition's Cyprus policy.
His statement was most revealing, and well worth repeating. He said:
We on this side of the Committee have said that it is our policy, and we repeat it, that there should be a period of self-government. During that period, political parties will grow, governmental institutions will develop, Cypriot Ministers will assume responsibility and gain experience of government. At the end of that period it is quite unthinkable that, if they have the interests of Greek and Turkish Cypriots at heart, they will ever think for a moment in terms of trying to split the country up into divided loyalties and broken friendships and divided lives, for that is what it would mean."—[OFICIAL REPORT. 15th July. 1957; Vol. 573, c. 879.]
That is a very important point of my argument. The Greeks and the Byzantine priest-politicians realise that, too. They know perfectly well that a period of self-government in Cyprus, perhaps a lengthy one, would mean the end of Enosis, because all experience has proved

what the right hon. Gentleman described as a possibility is the natural evolution which results in men's minds and hearts when they set about governing themselves. Of course, there is nothing in the whole of our Colonial policy and the guidance of subject peoples to independence which precludes self-determination when they have achieved that end. We are not even denying the prospect of eventual self-determination to the Cypriots; we are simply asking them to go through the drill which will equip them better to judge what form of independence or future links they may want. All this makes it extremely difficult for many quite well-informed people in this country to realise that Cyprus does not present a situation which, somehow in some way ought to be settled between the Colonial Secretary and Archbishop Makarios.
It seems to me that there is very solid ground for Turkish concern, and I cannot really understand why this is not more appreciated by hon. Gentlemen opposite. Do they realise that, but for British rule, there would be no question of Enosis in Cyprus now, because there would be very few Greeks there? The hon. and learned Member for Northampton, in a very remarkable speech in 1956 at the Council of Europe, pointed out that, when Britain took over the administration of the island in 1878, there were found there 20,000 Greeks and 60,000 Turks. It is not always realised either that, in that part of the world—excluding the behaviour of Hitler who was in a class by himself—people have behaved worse within living memory towards each other than at any time since the days of Genghis Khan. In the Graeco-Turkish war of 1922, when the Greeks invaded Turkey with the express purpose of taking over the Greek-occupied territories in Asiatic Turkey, they were beaten. There followed a ruthless exchange of population, the Turks of Macedonia being ripped from their ancient homeland, and the Greeks in Anatolia shifted to Greece. The Greeks in Cyprus, if it had been under Turkish rule, would certainly have shared the fate of their kinsmen on the mainland, and Cyprus would today be as ethnically Turkish as Smyrna.
This is not forgotten in Ankara It is not forgotten that our sovereignty dates only from the Treaty of Lausanne, after the 1914–18 War. Any radical alteration


of the status quo established by that Treaty must naturally be regarded by the Turks as a threat to their security, quite aside from the fact that our position is desired in the island for exactly the same reasons as it was desired by the Turks in 1878, that is to say, as some form of nearby allied assistance in the case of invasion by Russia.
The Greek point of view on this is simple and straightforward. It is simply the old doctrine of "No" to everything. The Greeks have rejected absolutely the idea of the partition of the island. They have rejected the N.A.T.O. offer of mediation. They have rejected the Radcliffe proposals. This is another example of the old problem of an irresistible force moving toward an immoveable object. But it is perfectly clear that the Greeks are a good deal less irresistible as a force than the Turks are immoveable as an object.
The view of the Greeks—and this is, to my mind, the most unfortunate aspect of the whole mess—is to expect the irresistible force which will aid them in their objective is to come from a change of Government in this country. There were some very harsh things said during the last debate on Cyprus when that point of view was expressed, and I think that the hon. Member for Cardiff, South-East (Mr. Callaghan) and the right hon. and learned Member for Newport did a good deal to elucidate in more detail what the Labour Party's policy would be. Nevertheless, rightly or wrongly, the Greeks have had the idea, since the very beginning of this trouble, that a change of Government would result, within four or five years, in the transfer of the island to Greece.
The N.A.T.O. argument has been frequently introduced into these discussions—that is why I have no hesitation in raising this matter in an international affairs debate—because some hon. Gentlemen opposite have claimed that, because Turkey and Greece, with ourselves, are members of the North Atlantic Treaty family, they are now supposed to be friends one with another. The Turks realise that this does not take cognisance of the facts of international life, nor, I think, does take cognisance of what goes on in some families either. Anyone who knows of the banked up fires in that part of the world knows that the status of

N.A.T.O. partnership of Greece and Turkey has no relationship whatever to their unhappy traditional relations with each other, or, indeed, their current feelings towards each other.
It is hard for us in this country not to like the Greeks and their lovely country, but no one in his senses could possibly say that it is a stable country politically, Greece has had over twenty-three Governments since the end of the war, and no one knows this better than the Turks. Turkey has a very long coastline. With the exception of two major ports in Eastern Anatolia, Mersin and Alexandretta at the Cyprus end, it is surrounded and strategically enclosed by Greek possessions, all within a very short distance of its mainland.
The whole history of unhappy relationship between these countries shows that both the Turks and the Greeks have good reason to fear each other, and particularly to fear for their minorities. To the Turks, therefore, partition is the only possible solution. It is not an ideal solution we all accept that. Probably the Turks themselves accept that it is far from an ideal solution, too, but they know or they hope, that part of the settlement will result in an enclave on the island within which British force is available.
The cardinal factor in the situation now, which we must accept is that the fundamental principle in any possible settlement must now be, in the light of event during the last few months, based on Greco-Turkish agreement. I should have thought that, about a year or two ago, the Greeks were on quite a good bet. It looked very much, as Lord Salisbury said, that their policy was to edge us—that is Britain—long from point to point in a series of bilateral negotiations which would end in ethnic self-determination for Cyprus and the presentation of a fait accompli to the Turks. That is really why the Greeks rejected the offered N.A.T.O. mediation. Their rejection was designed to emphasise their view that the future of the island was a sole matter between the Greeks and Great Britain.
We know now beyond any doubt, and so do the Greeks—and, I think, hon. Gentlemen opposite—that the Turkish position is more adamant than ever, and any one who takes a realistic view of the


situation knows that there can be no settlement of the Cyprus problem that is no solution which makes any sense, without agreement between Turkey and Greece. That is why, after making my own deductions from the Ankara-Athens meeting, and as the Foreign Secretary indicated yesterday at Question Time, there is some hope of the beginning of a move towards some common ground. There is no question, however, that if Britain should concede Enosis, now, or later, which is all the Greeks so far have said they will have, if any Government should do that, if a Socialist Government should do that, they will have to consider whether they are prepared to deliver the body, at a cost, perhaps, of an armed clash with our best and staunchest friends in that part of the world.
Without our aid, Greece's chance of achieving Enosis in the foreseeable future seem to be slim. It may be that someone will suggest that there is the possibility of the threat of Russian intervention. That, of course, would produce an American counter-threat. Even if it led to war, I doubt whether the Greeks would gain anything.
I believe, as the situation has developed, we shall be in Cyprus for a long time. The priest-politicians of the Byzantine Church, and their sinister rôle in their own country, is not understood here. It is well understood by the Turks; and it is understood by Greeks. They must realise now what they have been led into by Archbishop Makarios. They must find their own way of dealing with the Archbishop if they wish to extricate themselves from what is obviously an impossible position.
Now I come to the main point of my intervention in the debate. Although I do not agree with many, if any, of the Opposition's criticisms against the administration of the island and various happenings there, it is perfectly right and proper for them to make these or any other criticisms they feel are justified. But there is one thing that we have never really been able to get down to—and our friend Walter Elliot called the House's attention to it in one of his speeches—and that is that there has been a sort of dualism in these discussions. We have not discovered what the Labour Party's policy is on this funda-

mental point of Turkish-Greek agreement.
The last debate elicited some information on the question of self-government and self-determination, but surely now is the time when it is in the general interest of the country that the Opposition should make clear to the Greeks that there can be no diminution of British authority in Cyprus until there is a Graeco-Turkish agreement. If it can be made clear to the Greeks that all parties believe that a Graeco-Turkish settlement is essential before we can contemplate any change in the British administration of the island, the Greeks, and most important of all the Greek opposition, will surely realise that no British Government of whatever political complexion is likely to allow itself to be manœuvred into an impossible international situation. If we cannot, however, agree to some extent among ourselves on the presentation of these objectives of British international policy, I think that the Government must take every possible measure, far greater and more vigorous measures than they have ever taken before, to bring home to this country and to the world the international character of this problem.
This is well understood in the United Nations. I do not say that the Government have had an entirely easy passage there, but the recognition of the fact that this is a fundamentally international problem is far more widely appreciated in the United Nations than it appears to be here in the House of Commons. It must be made clear to the world that this is not merely a question of Enosis, or self-determination between Britain and one of her colonies but a question of international security which affects the whole of that vital part of the world.
I believe that the gap between the Opposition and the Government is really not as wide as might seem on this issue. What a good thing if the right hon. Gentleman who is to wind up for the Opposition could give us an indication as to what is the Opposition's attitude towards the fundamental question of agreement between the Greeks and the Turks on Cyprus. There are many solutions which would give both the Greeks and the Turks, not all that they want—very few of us ever get all that we want—but most of what they want. This is the fundamental problem with which we are


faced in our relationship with the Greeks and Turks. Not only the Government but Parliament as a whole should make it clear to the Greeks that no settlement can be reached until the Turks and the Greeks reach an agreement. Then and only then can we in Britain bring about a settlement which will leave the Cypriots in peace in their own land.

6.26 p.m.

Mr. J. Idwal Jones: I listened, as I am sure most hon. Members did, to the Prime Minister yesterday and felt some relief because I thought that a step forward had been taken from the position assumed on 20th December last. I do not feel so confident about what the Foreign Secretary said, but I felt last night, after listening to the Prime Minister, that we had moved forward in the right direction.
As has been pointed out by hon. Members on both sides, this is a very momentous debate. We are living at a momentous point in the history of humanity. After all, the human race at the present moment is standing at the crossroads. We are face to face with this fact, and it will be admitted by all, that the development of science as a means of human destruction has brought humanity to this position: either we must abolish war or war will abolish humanity. That is a simple proposition which, I think, will be accepted by all hon. Members.
We have created a monster—a terrible monster which is ready to gulp us up at any moment. Not only have we created this monster, but we nurture it. We feed it and give it a name, and the name that we give it is "deterrent." We spend our treasure upon it, but we all know—and there is not one hon. Member tonight who will deny this—that in the event of an emergency we stand entirely and absolutely defenceless. That is not only true of Britain or Western Europe. It is true of Russia and the United States of America. We have been hypnotised, and we feed a monster, and delude ourselves that it will protect us, whereas at the same time we know in our hearts that it means our destruction.
Yet we have been witnessing in the last six or seven months nations pitching argument against argument across the Iron Curtain. We have witnessed the diplomatic game of ping-pong. The tragedy of the ping-pong game is that it

has been played on the edge of the crater of an active volcano. That is the seriousness of the present situation.
I found a measure of encouragement in the Prime Minister's speech, not merely in what he said but in what he left unsaid. I was very pleased personally because he did not say certain things, and I was of the opinion that it was time that certain things were not said in the House by people holding responsible positions. It was very refreshing that no reference was made in the Prime Minister's speech last night to the necessity for a change of heart among the leaders of the Soviet Union, because we have heard it repeated too often that we wanted evidence of a change of heart and of integrity on the other side before negotiations could start. That, I am sure, is the wrong approach because it is Pharisaical. It is not conducive to the production of the cordiality which the present situation demands and needs.
Moreover, I was struck by the fact that yesterday the Prime Minister steered clear of the tendency to regard the present struggle as a moral struggle between the West and the Communist States. There has been a very well-marked tendency in the past few years, and especially in the past few months—this is particularly true of America but it is reflected here—to try to over-simplify the situation. The suggestion has been that the Western Powers stand for the spiritual way of life whereas the Communist States stand for the materialistic way of life and that the struggle is between the spiritual and the materialistic ways of life.
I am very pleased that the Prime Minister did not launch that argument yesterday afternoon. That was very refreshing because, personally, I am of the opinion that morality and moral values cannot be fought or decided by carnal weapons. Truth, moral values and the spiritual way of life cannot be defended by nuclear weapons which by their nature are diabolical in essence and diabolical in their consequences if they are applied. If we are to win in the field of spiritual values, then the battle must be fought not in blood and not by means of nuclear weapons but in the field of thought, philosophy, logic and practical way of life.
Although the situation bristles with difficulties, as we all admit, and although we have been brought face to face with the possibility of complete and utter disaster, there is still hope. There is hope, I believe, because of the general sense of uneasiness and disquiet which is to be found in different parts of the world at present. For me, that is a ray of hope in the gloom of the present situation. We are all uneasy about things as they are. That is felt in this country, in the rest of Europe, in America, in the Commonwealth, and also in Russia.
The Russians are uneasy. The Russian leaders are uncomfortable and they have a feeling of disquiet because they have nothing to gain from international conflicts. They have a régime and an economic order to protect. They have built that economic order painfully over forty years and they are anxious not to see that economic order, which is unique, with which perhaps we do not agree, but with which they agree, go down in ruin or be irreparably damaged in a few hours or a few brief days of nuclear conflict. It stands to reason that they have nothing to gain by going to war. For their own welfare and good, for the preservation of what they believe to be right, and for the economic order which they wish to preserve, it stands to sense that they do not want war. Consequently, I think we are on safe ground in assuming that Russia is uneasy and uncomfortable at the international tension which exists at present.
I think that we are right when we say that Russia is uneasy also about her satellites in Eastern Europe. It may be difficult to believe this, but I think that events are beginning to prove that the satellites are becoming liabilities to Russia. Who knows but that, if we could get into the minds of the Kremlin, we should find that they would be only too glad of an excuse to rid themselves of this liability? It seems to me only logical to conclude that they are uneasy with the present situation.
Let me also turn to a point mentioned by the Foreign Secretary in the debate on 20th December when he said that Russia is anxious to overwhelm the world with Communism. That has been said again today. Let us assume that that is true. It follows from that premise that

Russia cannot achieve even that objective by starting a nuclear war. All the evidence, therefore, seems to point in one direction—that there is uneasiness and disquiet not only in this country, in America, in the Commonwealth and in the rest of Europe but in Russia, too.
We therefore have a common denominator and a community of interest among the rival groups. This community of interest should be exploited to the full by wise statesmanship not to the advantage of a group, not to the advantage of the West and not to the advantage of Communist Russia, but to the mutual benefit of the whole of humanity. One thing seems to me to be absolutely clear: this mad arms race must be reversed and this mad endeavour to reach the so-called position of strength must be brought to an end. Indeed, I am of the opinion that the first function that we on both sides of the House are called on to perform is to bring this mad endeavour to an end.
Countries seek a position of strength but the amazing thing is that no Power ever seems to reach a position of strength, If Powers think they have done so, they are not sure that they have reached it; and if they have reached it, they are not sure how long they can hold that position. It is a very elusive situation. Speaking in absolute terms, the position of strength is never reached and can never be reached. According to the White Paper on Civil Defence, we do not know whether we are in a position of strength or not. Russia does not know. We do not know where we are. It is a very uncertain position.
It reminds me of the man in a fair who was climbing the slippery pole with the hope of reaching the top and, having done so, winning a pig as a prize. He never got to the top. Indeed he was never in the same position on the pole for very long and eventually he slithered down, to our entertainment, but to his own mortification, and he returned home without the prize at all.
That is exactly what is happening between the nations. That has been the experience of the Powers. The West thought they were in a position of strength. What happened? We were unable to make a diplomatic gain or advantage of any sort. The days when America had the monopoly of the atom


bomb were the days when Molotov was repeating his "no" without a break. We were not able to move him a single inch, although we were in a position of strength. The same applies today.
Let us assume that Russia is in a position of strength today. Does that bring us one inch nearer to the Communist position? We are all the more determined to resist Communism simply because the Soviet Union is in a position of strength. As these groups struggle to a position of strength the division between them is widened. The gulf is deepened. Far from bringing the nations to talk this seeking for a position of strength makes talking more difficult.
The problem today is not how to accumulate more power or how to gain ascendancy in this struggle for strength. As we on this side of the House see it, the problem is how to bring this mad race to an end. If it is not brought to an end, we all know the inevitable consequences. Our civilisation and all that it inherits shall dissolve, leaving not a wrack behind; not even a wrack of liberal democracy or of social democracy or of Communist dictatorship.
The tragedy is that as individuals we all know that this is true, yet as communities, groups and nations we founder in the bog of suspicion. Unfortunately, this mad endeavour is interwoven and intertwined with such complex considerations. We have, for example, the ideological, the philosophical, the political and economic complexities. I suggested earlier that we should forget the ideological and the philosophical and concentrate on the political and economic complexities of the situation, especially the political complexities in Central Europe and the political and economic complexities in the Middle East.
The task, therefore, is to unravel the problems, to disentangle the various items in the bundle, sort them out and settle them one by one. It would be better for us to have small successes than large failures in Europe. We have two alternatives from which to choose. Either we retain the status quo and decide to live along with tension with a risk of the collapse of Europe in a nuclear war, or we can seek agreement on a disengagement policy and suspension of nuclear tests.
Here is a prospect full of promise and possibility. According to today's papers, Russia is prepared to agree to inspection of an atom-free zone, and she is prepared to suspend nuclear tests. We talk of risks and, of course, there are risks. Life itself is full of risks. War is full of risks, and so is cold war. Whichever way we turn we meet with risk. A treaty of security guaranteeing the inviolability of a neutral belt would be far less risky than the maintenance of the status quo and the continuance of tension. I know that this is only one step and that more steps will have to be taken in future, but it is a great step and, speaking for myself, in the dangerous situation of the present day,
 … I do not ask to see
The distant scene; one step enough for me
if it is a step in the right direction.

6.44 p.m.

Mr. Gilbert Longden: If the hon. Member for Wrexham (Mr. Idwal Jones) will forgive me, I will not follow him in his remarks, except to say that he delivered a most agreeable speech which was full of sweet reasonableness, but he tended to underestimate the fact that over the last ten years we in the West have made ourselves strong. He might have made that speech in 1945, and if he had had his way it would have been very much the worse for all of us. It is because we in the West have made ourselves united and strong that we are in a better position to get round the table with our opponents, which I hope is what we shall do.
I sought to be called in the debate because I had the honour of being a delegate from this country to the Twelfth Session of the United Nations, and I thought that it would be a good opportunity to make a few comments on some of the issues which were there discussed. I have returned with at least one conviction, which is that it is very much better to have this great forum of world opinion than not to have it. Perhaps that might seem not to be saying very much, but I say it because, although we all support the principles and objects of the Charter, there is some scepticism about the work and effectiveness of the United Nations.
This is well illustrated by a rather sad little story which was going the rounds at


the United Nations about two Hungarians in October, 1956. One of them said to the other, "We may be delivered either through normal means or through miraculous means. If St. Michael and all his angels were to come down to earth and deliver us, that would be normal. If the United Nations did anything about it, that would be miraculous."
But it is worth reminding people of these words of the Secretary-General:
The Charter does not endow the United Nations with any of the attributes of a super-State … The United Nations is rather an instrument for negotiation among Governments … an instrument which, added to the time-honoured means of diplomacy, can concert action by Governments in support of the goals of the Charter.
That is what the United Nations attempts to do, and that answers the question put by the right hon. and learned Member for Montgomery (Mr. C. Davies) yesterday about consultation with the smaller nations.
Consultation with the smaller nations and ascertainment of their views go on every day at the United Nations, and I think that the United Nations is also the father and mother of all non-aggression pacts. I could not understand why the right hon. and learned Member for Rowley Regis and Tipton (Mr. A. Henderson) was so passionate in his appeal for a nonaggression pact. We could not have a bigger or better non-aggression pact than exists already in the Charter. Its ineffectiveness, where it exists, is due to the veto which can prevent the decisions of the Security Council being enforceable by sanction. President Eisenhower recently suggested that the five permanent members of the Security Council should surrender the right to veto recommendations made by the Council for solving disputes peacefully. In the present state of political sophistication of the majority of members of the United Nations, it probably would not be wise to go further than that yet. But even that has been rejected by the Soviet Union.
Other critics of the United Nations say that its only use is to act as a sounding-board for Soviet propaganda. Why not? The more the uncommitted world can see for itself the difference between Soviet words and Soviet deeds the better. Soviet propaganda often misfires, as was very well illustrated in the fabricated emergency which was brought to the General

Assembly over Turkey and Syria. As the speeches in that debate were made, it became more and more obvious to everybody that this was a pure fabrication. It very shortly became known in the lobbies of the United Nations as another U.N.E.F. or "United Nations Emergency Farce".
The right hon. Member for Ebbw Vale (Mr. Bevan) said that the West, too, can make its viewpoint clear on this sounding board, and I believe that this country did that during the debate on disarmament. I am sure that anybody who takes the trouble to read the speech of my right hon. and gallant Friend the Minister of State will have a better understanding of this complex isue and of all that the Western allies have tried to do to resolve it. As a result of that debate, proposals which would have led to a farreaching start with genuine disarmament were endorsed by 57 out of 81 participating members, and only the nine members of the Soviet bloc voted against them. It is not quite fair to say that we have missed every opportunity of putting forward proposals.
These proposals were endorsed by the overwhelming majority of the nations, and it was in that debate that the Polish Foreign Minister made his proposal for disengagement—a theme since repeated with variations by Mr. George Kennan (though repudiated by Mr. Truman and the Democratic Party) and by several hon. and right hon. Gentlemen opposite. All these proposals, of course, are worthy of serious consideration and discussion, if necessary at the summit, but it seems to me that they would have the effect, by neutralising Germany, of destroying the existing shield of N.A.T.O. troops on the ground in Western Europe. As I have asked in the current issue of World News, how many Austrias can Europe afford at the present moment?
Moreover, so far as we can judge from what my right hon. Friend the Minister of State last night described as a "literary bombardment", it is precisely the status quo which the Soviet Union wishes to see maintained in Eastern Europe, including Eastern Germany. I was glad yesterday to hear the hon. Member for Leeds, East (Mr. Healey) say:
The instability of the present status quo, above all in Central Europe, is now recognised,


I think, by nearly everybody, as a real danger to peace."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 19th February, 1958; Vol. 582, c. 1324.]
Therefore, we all want to change it. But we want to change it for a better status all round.
Will disengagement help? The danger, as I see it today, is not the likelihood of a third world war, which, to my mind, has never been more remote. What the West has to defend itself against today are three other dangers. The first is that our economic and social systems, based as they are on the disciplined freedom of the individual, will prove to be less successful, in open and perfectly legitimate competition, than the Soviet system of State capitalism which denies such freedom. That is the first danger. Mr. Khrushchev is always boasting that that will inevitably happen, and that he does not care how long it takes.
The second danger is that of internal subversion of a State, such as happened in Czechoslovakia. The third danger is open military intervention on, and eventually across, the borders of some presently free State. It is against the latter danger—the danger that the Iron Curtain will creep westwards—that we need to retain a shield; otherwise, we shall be faced with the dilemma either of letting a fait accompli ride or of rectifying it by unleashing the nuclear "sword".
I was glad to hear the hon. Member for Leeds, East state categorically that the party opposite believes that nuclear weapons have a deterrent power which should be made use of in Western defence policy. I am bound to say that I have no sympathy with the hysterical "ban the bomb" brigade, and I am also bound to say—I am sorry that the right hon. Gentleman is not now in his place—that I do not think I have ever been enveloped in so thick a metaphysical fog as I was when I heard the right hon. Member for Ebbw Vale describing his present position with regard to nuclear weapons.
I think it would be better to rely, in the first place, upon the non-nuclear shield, and I fear that if Germany were neutralised, there would no longer be sufficient depth for that shield to be effective. I may be wrong here, and I know that some hon. Gentlemen opposite do not agree, but, in my opinion, it is as certain as it can be that both American

and British troops will leave the Continent, that there will not be sufficient depth left, and that, therefore, for all practical and, above all, psychological purposes, the European circle of N.A.T.O. will cease to exist.
As things are at present, I consider that Germany has just as much a duty to defend our Western civilisation as any other Western nation. I also believe that she is a safer neighbour, as much of the Soviet Union as of any other continguous State, if she remains a member of a purely defensive alliance, bound as she is by treaty not to arm beyond a certain ceiling, not to manufacture nuclear weapons and not to seek to enlarge her present boundaries by force.

Mr. John Stonehouse: I am obliged to the hon. Gentleman for giving way. He is developing a very interesting argument. Can he say what is the point of the conventional arming of Germany if the policy we are attempting in paragraph 12 of the Defence White Paper applies, that is, an all-out nuclear retaliation in the event of any major attack, even with conventional arms?

Mr. Longden: It is a perfectly fair and valid question which the hon. Member has put to me. I am sorry to tell him that I have not studied the Defence White Paper as closely as I should have done. My own impression is that N.A.T.O. strategy or tactics are as I have described them—to be able to use a shield of ground troops without the strategic nuclear weapon at all.
To continue, I was extremely disappointed, if not shocked, to hear the suggestion from the hon. Member for Newcastle-upon-Tyne, Central (Mr. Short), who spoke yesterday, that we should now recognise East Germany. In my opinion, it would give a tremendous fillip to the puppet régime at Pankow, and a great slap in the eye to our allies in the Federal Republic. It would perhaps be another thing if the Government of the Federal Republic decided to recognise the Government at Pankow, but that is a matter for them, and I certainly do not think that this country should.
None of this is to say that there should not be a meeting of heads of Government. Let us have one, and I suggest that it should be in London. Let there be no ore-conditions. It is only common


sense that a good deal of hard work in the valley and on the slopes will be necessary first, if only to discover what can profitably be included on the agenda and what not. I do not think, with great respect to the Opposition, that the phrase "icebreaking" was a very good description of this process, because if ice is broken, someone generally falls into the water, and then who rescues whom?
It appears that it would not be possible to put on the agenda the subject of free elections in East Germany or in the satellite States. I think that both Marshal Bulganin and Mr. Khrushchev have made that clear, so we must be careful, if we go into summit talks excluding these issues on the agenda, that we do not dishearten the people behind the Iron Curtain, because it remains our purpose, short of war, to do what we can to rescue them from their present state of dependence on and slavery under Russia.
Summit talks would be a good thing, if only, as the right hon. and learned Member for Rowley Regis and Tipton said, to test the sincerity of the Russians. Why do I doubt that sincerity myself? It is not because we like to doubt it, because we would like to believe in it. These are the reasons.
First, the Russians have rejected President Eisenhower's proposal for a partial surrender of the veto and for co-operation to ensure the peaceful use of outer space. These two suggestions by President Eisenhower have been rejected. Now the Russians have rejected our proposals, of which the right hon. and learned Member for Rowley Regis and Tipton did not seem to have heard, that we should appoint international teams of experts to be set the task of ascertaining precisely how a disarmament agreement, when reached, can be made effective. Surely, nothing would be lost, and much might be gained, by all parties if those suggestions were accepted? I think we should agree with our allies—all of them—about what else can safely be offered, then offer it and await the reaction.
Another issue which was debated has been referred to by my hon. Friend the Member for Bury St. Edmunds (Mr. Aitken) namely, Cyprus. It was debated there with advantage, because nobody in the world today, not even on the benches opposite, can suspect that

the Turkish attitude to this issue is the creation of perfidious Albion. It must surely be clear now, even to the Greeks, that if we were to walk out of the island tomorrow, it would be the Turks and not the Greeks who would walk into it. We have been extraordinarily patient in the face of most grievous and, to my mind, unforgivable words and actions of the Greek Government, and I think the time has come when we must be ready to impose what we consider to be a just solution.
Now may I say a few words to the House about three other issues in the United Nations with which I was particularly concerned. They all concern our co-partner in the Commonwealth, the Union of South Africa. I said just now that there were 81 participating members of the United Nations. That is, unfortunately, because the eighty-second member, the Union of South Africa, walked out last year and retains only a token membership. She walked out because, year after year, resolutions are put down on the agenda about apartheid, about South-West Africa and about the treatment of Indians in South Africa.
On all these occasions when the debate on apartheid is held in the United Nations we hear hon. Gentlemen getting up from the other side of the House and accusing Her Majesty's Government of siding with South Africa on the question of her racial policy. I assume that those questions are put out of sheer ignorance, because if hon. Gentlemen opposite took the trouble to read what was said they would find this was not so.
In a speech I said:
Our vote in this matter is in no way influenced by any opinion we may hold on the merits or demerits of the Union's policy on racial segregation. Our only reason is that the Charter contains Article 2 (7)—'Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorise the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any State.'
If the racial policies of a Government are not within this domestic jurisdiction, I do not know what is. We believe that that Article precludes discussion. We may wish it was not there, but we also know that if it had not been there many nations would not have signed the Charter. In any case, the attitude of Her Majesty's Government has been consistent ever since the question was first raised in 1946.
About South-West Africa, here again I said:
The United Kingdom has never sought, and does not now seek to defend conditions in South-West Africa.
We want it to be placed under the international trusteeship system but that can only be clone with the consent of the Union. So we have contrived something to try to break the impasse, the formation of a "good offices committee", consisting of this country, the United States and Brazil, and I am glad to say that our representative on that committee is Sir Charles Arden-Clarke. I appeal to the Union of South Africa to co-operate genuinely and wholeheartedly with this good offices committee.
In conclusion, I apologise to the House for speaking much longer than I intended, but may I record that in my humble opinion we are exceedingly well served in New York by Her Majesty's permanent representative, Sir Pierson Dixon, and his staff. I can at least acknowledge gratefully that in a novel, and at first somewhat mystifying situation, they were of the greatest help to me and to my hon. Friend.

7.4 p.m.

Mr. John Stonehouse: The hon. Gentleman the Member for Hertfordshire, South-West (Mr. G. Longden) rendered at least one service to his own side of the House in saying a few words in favour of the United Nations organisation, which we on this side of the House were glad to hear. Any recognition of the part which the United Nations can play in world affairs has yet to come from the Ministerial Front Bench in this debate, although we hoped that we should hear a clear explanation of the part which the United Nations can play.
I, like many of my hon. Friends, was impressed by the spirit in which the Prime Minister approached the debate in his speech yesterday. The right hon. Gentleman seemed relaxed and refreshed after his Commonwealth tour. No doubt India made a great impression on him, because the right hon. Gentleman paid many compliments to India and to the part she is playing in world affairs. Through those remarks the right hon. Gentleman also paid an indirect compliment to Lord Attlee and the part he played, when he was Prime Minister, in

creating the Commonwealth countries of India, Pakistan and Ceylon as free and equal partners with the other, older members of the Commonwealth. What would have been the position today if those nations had had to struggle for their freedom in the same way as the former colonies of France have had to struggle for theirs? There is no doubt that the policies followed at that time by Lord Attlee and his colleagues are now much appreciated in the world, and we are glad to know that they are appreciated by even the Ministerial Front Bench.
Unfortunately, in his speech today the Foreign Secretary lowered the standard of this debate deplorably. I remember that some years ago I participated in a debate on steel with the Foreign Secretary at a university students' union. I was reminded of it this afternoon, because I thought the right hon. and learned Gentleman had to score cheap points in the manner of a students' debate. We had expected him to state the Government's policy in the present stage of world affairs, but instead of doing so, he skated around the real problems and only attempted to make debating points.
It appears that the West, because of the various alliances that have been created, is inflexible in its foreign policy today. It may even be true that the Communist bloc is more flexible than the West. If we have to wait until every one of our allies is advised as to our innermost thoughts, if we have to sort out every stage of negotiation with our allies, we shall suffer in the end from a sort of paralysis. Yet it appears that Poland is able, by putting forward the Rapacki Plan, to signify at least some independence from the Soviet bloc. That is a hopeful sign, and I hope that the independence of Communist countries in Eastern Europe and also of China will become more evident as time goes on.
I was particularly glad that the Prime Minister recognised the part to be played by India as a third force in the world, though there has been much criticism in past years of the third force idea. Every country was once expected to join one or other of the power blocs, and everybody thought there would be greater world security if there were increasing polarisation. Now, thank goodness, we are moving away from that idea. We


can see that if there is a neutral bloc in the world it can actually add to stability, and can help to ease the tension between the two Goliaths on either side.
I hope that this idea of a third force can develop as a real and effective stabilising buffer between the world giants, and also as a bridge between East and West. I endorse what has been said already from this side of the House, that India has a very special part to play in forming that bridge. It justifies her having a place in the forthcoming Summit Conference.
My hon. Friend the Member for Newcastle-upon-Tyne, East (Mr. Blenkinsop) referred to assistance to underdeveloped countries. This is certainly one of the ways in which the richer countries of the West can help not only to raise the living standards of the backward peoples but make a contribution towards removing tension from world affairs. If these backward countries have an opportunity of doing constructive things to improve their way of life there is much less likelihood that they will turn to Communism or dictatorship. If they feel frustrated in their efforts to advance it is certain that dictators and others who appeal to that frustration will be able to win power—and that will not be in the interests either of stability or of the progress of the people living in those countries.
The assistance which Russia gives to under-developed countries is every bit as valuable as that which we and the United States can give. We should welcome willingly any assistance which Russia gives to the backward areas; indeed, if we encourage her to give that aid we shall help to defeat the very objects of Communism. The building up of the basic standard of living of the under-developed countries is in itself one of the weapons which will defeat Communism. The fact that the U.S.S.R. is today building a steel mill in India is a contribution to India's economy, and to the strength of the Congress Party of India. It is also a handicap to the success of the Indian Communist Party. Like that which the more advanced countries of the West can give, the aid which the Soviet Union can give to other under-developed countries, such as Syria, provided that it is not military aid, helps

to remove the causes of instability and frustration which are the seeds of Communism.
At the recent conference in Cairo the Soviet delegate offered to provide aid without strings. It may be that that was simply a propaganda gesture, but we should take it up and endorse that offer by telling the Russians that we shall be only too delighted if they will give this aid without strings, and we should follow it up by informing the new organisation created as a result of the conference in Accra that we will guarantee aid to the under-developed countries so that they can go ahead with their own development. I support what my hon. Friend the Member for Newcastle-upon-Tyne, East said about our support for S.U.N.F.E.D. and the other organisations, which should be developed in order to channel this aid.
The Foreign Secretary made a most disturbing reference to the Middle East. His remarks about the frontiers between Israel and the Arab States will be received with absolute dismay and disgust. Rather than adding to the stability of the area they will tend to add fuel to the fires of suspicion. They will be of no assistance in relieving tension in the Middle East. I welcome the unions which have taken place between Egypt and Syria, and Jordan and Iraq, because both can add to the stability of the area. That is particularly true of the union between Jordan and Iraq, because it will help to relieve the problem of the refugees in Jordan. They will be able to find employment in Iraq, and that country, with her oil revenues, will be able to assist the more backward parts of Jordan.
As my right hon. Friend the Member for Ebbw Vale (Mr. Bevan) said, in a truly remarkable speech, the more fundamental problem in the Middle East concerns the production and supply of oil. Britain and the West are lagging behind in this matter. They have not yet brought forward any realistic plan for the oil industry of the Middle East. Unless they do, the opportunity will be lost. A plan must be brought forward within the next few years, through the United Nations, for proper control of the production and distribution of oil.
In this connection, the International Co-operative Alliance has put forward a


very interesting plan for an international oil convention, under the United Nations, which would supervise the operations of the oil companies and lay down certain safeguards in the interests both of the producing and consuming countries. There is everything to be said for the Government's looking at that plan again and seeing whether it is not the best sort of plan to consider with the object of getting some sensible approach to the organisation of the oil industry, rather than leaving it to chaos and the sort of international competition which exists today, and which can lead only to trouble in the future.
This is especially important in view of the fact that not only are we a consuming country, which needs the oil, but we have a lot of capital tied up in the oil industry. It would be in our own interests to protect that capital and secure some international safeguards in respect of the new oil pipeline now being constructed through Turkey at tremendous expense.
The Middle East should be one of the items on the agenda of the forthcoming Summit Conference. We ought to consider what other items the Prime Minister should take in his knapsack as he climbs towards the summit. We do not want to put in too many items, or the knapsack will drag him down. We should consider not only what positive items should be placed on the agenda, but what items would be better left off.
One of the things at which the Government must look again before the Prime Minister goes to the Summit Conference is the White Paper Report on Defence, which was published a few days ago. This is a most provocative document. It is a pity that the Minister of Defence has issued it at this juncture, just before a Summit Conference is to be held. I refer in particular to paragraph 12, which says:
it must be well understood that, if Russia were to launch a major attack"—
on the West—
even with conventional forces only, they would have to hit back with strategic nuclear weapons.
That is a disastrous and lunatic policy. It does not make sense in itself, because it is liable to so many interpretations.
The Minister of Defence may think that he is talking from a position of strength

in saying that, but I am afraid that he is simply revealing to the world his weaknesses—and that is a dangerous thing to do. This is the sort of statement that is liable to lead us into a sort of MacArthurism—the situation which prevailed when General MacArthur and some of his colleagues during the Korean War advocated an all-out bombing attack on China in order to bring a localised war to an end. Thank goodness the then Prime Minister flew to the United States to prevent America from taking this step of bombing China which certainly would have engulfed us in a world war. At that time there was a localised war in Korea.
Is the Minister of Defence suggesting—this is a foreign affairs matter as well as a defence question and that is why I raise it—that if there is, for instance, an attack by Russia on, say, Turkey we should automatically react with a nuclear attack on Moscow? If that is the case, it is a suicidal policy on our part. It needs to be clarified, and I hope it will be clarified before the Prime Minister goes to the Summit Conference. He cannot very well go with this sort of policy in his pocket if he sincerely believes in negotiation and more realistic plans between East and West on a basis of faith, because this sort of thing would destroy faith altogether. Certainly, if any local war broke out, for instance some frontier dispute between the U.S.S.R. and Turkey, or even an attack on Berlin, it would be much better for the world as a whole if such local disputes were dealt with by conventional arms rather than involving the world in a hydrogen bomb holocaust.
Another thing which I think the Prime Minister should think about before he goes to the Summit Conference, and something which he should not insist should go on the agenda, is the question of German reunification. Pressure has been brought on him over this. It was even raised in the debate yesterday by the hon. Member for Windsor (Sir C. Mott-Radclyffe). I hope that the prospect of success at the Summit Conference will not be jeopardised by insistence that German reunification should go on the agenda. There are many other more important things to discuss which deserve the attention of the world long before the question of German reunification is considered.
We should respect the opinions of the Poles on this matter. They have been expressed fairly strongly. What would be the position if reunification were forced on a reluctant East and West Germany? The tension which would be created in the centre of Europe would be much greater than exists today. Instead of having a stabilising force in the centre of Europe we should have Germany trying to reconcile two opposing systems both in economics and politics. It would be an impossibility for that to be achieved in the present state of Europe. I submit that before German reunification can take place there must be a lowering of the tension on both sides, and that may take some years. It would be better if German reunification were attempted after tension has relaxed rather than before. If we force the pace now, we are liable to create more tension and instability in Central Europe than exists at present.
We have also to consider the effect on the other Eastern European countries should German reunification take place. If it succeeded, which I doubt, we should have a powerful Germany building up again in Europe. What would the effect be on Poland, Czechoslovakia and other Eastern European countries? They would fear Germany and would be forced towards the East. They would feel that they had to rely on the protection of the Soviet Union against this new threat building up in the centre of Europe.
The greatest hope for the achievement of peace and security that we have is the development of national Communisms. We do not want a monolithic Communism stretching from Berlin right over to Pekin and Vladivostok. That would be a danger to the world. We want Russia and the other Communist countries to develop their own approaches to international affairs.
If we had a reduction of tension, which would result from the policies advocated by my right hon. and hon. Friends, I believe it possible for Poland, Czechoslovakia, China and the other Communist countries to develop their own approaches and gradually, as their internal standards improved, for the people to develop a liberal outlook. That is the greatest hope for world peace. We shall never achieve real stability if we

carry on with the present policy which is being foisted on us by the American State Department, and apparently taken up by our own Foreign Office, of all-out ideological war against Communism. That will not carry us anywhere.
I hope that the spirit portrayed by the Prime Minister in this debate, so much of which my right hon. and hon. Friends have endorsed, will pervade widely through the Government Front Bench and percolate even to the back benches, and find its way down through the Tory Party. I hope that there will be an end to the Suez complex and to Tory Imperialism and as a result that we shall be able to get a better foreign policy and an opportunity provided for Britain again to play a respected part in world affairs.

7.27 p.m.

Viscount Lambton: There has been a noticeable difference in the atmosphere of the debate during these two days. Yesterday we had a striking contribution from my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister, and the Leader of the Opposition also made a constructive and interesting speech. At the end of the day, the Minister of State put forward some logical and interesting ideas, even though one might not go the whole way with him. But, today, there seems to be simulated irritation on the benches opposite, and we now hear there is likely to be a Division tonight. That seems to me a great pity and hardly the way to work towards the high ideals which have been spoken of. It is a pity that this debate which started so well should end by a Division.
I do not wish to speak about what other hon. Members have said, but to refer to the changing face of the Middle East and a subject which has not yet been fully aired, the merging of Syria, Egypt and the Yemen and the rising of Nasser once again like the Phoenix from the ashes after we thought we had seen the last of his popularity and prowess. It is interesting to judge how this resurgence of Nasser has occurred. There can be no doubt that in a large degree this is due to the curious policy which has been followed in the Middle East during this last year by the American State Department.
It is interesting to see exactly what they have done. First, it was decided


just over a year ago that, by economic pressure, we should teach Egypt and Syria the dangers and penalties of association with Communism. For such a policy to succeed, it had to depend on two things; first, that there was not created by isolation two blocs of such potential value to each other that they would unite; and, secondly, that the logical consequence of such a policy, the turning of the countries to the Soviets for aid, should be faced with equanimity. It is worth reflecting how much better it would have been, if it had been decided to isolate Egypt, to have helped Syria, or, if it had been decided to isolate Syria, to have helped Egypt, and not to have forced both countries closely together.
At any rate, the Americans, having decided upon this policy, should have been prepared to carry it through to its logical conclusion. Directly the inevitable happened and the turn was made to the Soviets, they were so frightened at what they had done that they became associated internally in the régimes with some of the most tactless moves in the history of diplomacy. This resulted in the anti-Westernism of the two countries and helped to create the bloc which, however anti-Communist it may become. is yet so anti-Western that it can still carry out the Soviet purposes.
It is curious, as an hon. Member has said, that it was not realised that the Suez intervention, whatever its rights or wrongs, was the last chance for direct intervention in the countries' régime. We can only hope that the American State Department will have learned by the mistakes it has made and that they will not be repeated. I regret that it was necessary for our foreign policy to follow so blindly behind that of America. Can we really not in future decide to agree if we consider it is to our advantage to disagree?
I should like to pose this question: What is our future policy going to be towards Nasser? What we have done during the past year is ineffectually to undermine him while we are dependent upon him. It cannot be said to have achieved any other result than to press him towards his present extreme courses. It is easy to citicise, but it would be impossible to imagine an area with more difficulties than the Middle East at the present time. Whichever way our

Foreign Minister turns, he is faced by them. There is no doubt that he is so overwhelmed by the problems of today that he has very little chance or time to look at the future. There is a very great danger that by concentrating alone on today we are mortgaging tomorrow.
The whole of the Middle East is in a state of flux. Countries after centuries of poverty have suddenly found themselves rich beyond understanding. The discovery of oil has thrust the whole civilisation and idealism of the West, with all its alien ideas and conceptions of equality, into a feudally-ruled society. What will happen can be guessed only by the past history of the world. When a country becomes rich, its people wish to share in the riches and, when they have shared in the riches, they wish to share in the Government. While the transition from feudalism to democracy took hundreds of years in this country, and even then was not achieved without bloodshed, in the Middle East circumstances make it almost inevitable that similar changes will take place in a few years.
How is our foreign policy preparing to meet this vast social change? If we have to continue a hand-to-mouth policy which is based only on the support of the status quo, we are risking finding ourselves hopelessly on the wrong side of the fence in twenty years' time. Can we really doubt that there will be a wider distribution of power, or believe that the unlimited authority of kings and sheiks will remain as they are at present?
Indeed—and I pose also this question—do we really desire to have connections only with the heads of Governments who rule in a manner long outdated by Europe and the new world? Do we wish to appear in the East as a symbol of opposition to the rights of representative government which we ourselves believe in and practise and which, by our very presence, we introduced?
Let me be plain on one point. We have no alternative but to support existing authorities at the present time, but what is needed is a concept of imagination which can allow us to support the authorities at the present and at the same time draws us as closely as possible to those who will at some future date in all probability achieve a share in their country's Government. We should try to see, difficult as it undoubtedly is,


whether it is not possible to provide some kind of bridge between the present feudalism, with all its artificial frontiers, and an association of representative Governments closely knit together to the general advantage of the Middle East.
It is worth while mentioning how important the Middle East is to us. The oilfields of the Middle East are as important to our development in the next thirty years as were the coalfields in the Industrial Revolution. Surely it is worth spending money to establish what amounts to a good relationship between ourselves and the future.
Without direct intervention, there are only two ways left open to us of infiltrating into the Middle East. They are trade and education. Have our trade relations with the Middle East been encouraged? Has enough been done to forward an increased volume of trade? The committee which was set up recently under the Minister of State, Board of Trade, was a step in the right direction, but there is all the difference in the world between setting up a committee and getting advantage out of it. We need a demonstration of earnestness from the Government that they are prepared to push ahead and see what can be done. It is somewhat alarming to realise that it is four years since a trade mission last want to the Middle East.
Let us make no mistake about it; we have lost great opportunities by such tardiness. Germany is thrusting her interests forward in a way and with a success that can only alarm us. A few months ago a car in which I was travelling broke down a mile or so outside Beirut. I had little to do but count the passing cars. Of the first 15 cars that passed me, 14 were German. In the last year we have hardly done anything to forward our own interests there. However high the costs may be, whether it is by the granting of credits or in other ways, we must do so. The money which we spend will be modest compared with the benefits which we shall get in the area.
The other way we can use to spread our influence is by education. One of the aspects which strikes anyone who has been to the Middle East in the last year or two is the intense desire for knowledge shown by the ordinary Arab.

The whole Arab world is crying out for education. All our universities at the moment are full to overflowing, but it is rather alarming that there are now only 50 more Arab students at our universities than in 1950. We can be certain that if we do not offer educational facilities they will be offered in precisely the places most calculated to do us harm. We have only to examine the infiltration of local Egyptian teachers into the body of the Middle East to see what we have to combat.
It is true that British Petroleum has an educational scheme, which is encouraging, but that is not enough. By partial control of that company, the British Government have a unique opportunity of furthering our best interests in that area. If they were to devote a portion of the income from the investment they receive annually from British Petroleum in extending educational facilities, that money would be indeed well spent.
I do not know whether many hon. Members know that there was a plan a few years ago to set up a British public school in the Lebanon to which Arabs were to go. That was a good scheme. None of the pupils could be stigmatised for having been educated in England, and later, it would have ensured that a large number of students would have been adequately prepared for our universities. Why was that scheme not revived after Suez, and extended?
Even more than in the Lebanon, there is need for a public school in the Gulf, for at this time the position of Gulf students who come to this country is unsatisfactory. They have inadequate education behind them. They lead an unsatisfactory life here, attached to schools or crammers and so on, never reaching university standard. Consequently, they miss all the advantages of university life and carry back to their countries a certain sense of frustration and disappointment. So obvious are the opportunities of providing education that I would rather leave the details to greater experts than myself and merely suggest that a far more strenuous approach should be made. If the British Government were to seize the initiative, the other oil companies would most likely be persuaded to follow that example.
There is, however, one way in which, without great expense, we in this country


can extend our indirect influence. That is by making available to more Army cadets opportunities to receive their military training in this country. I should like to cite two examples which, I think, show that we are not doing as much as we easily could.
Four Iraqi students were admitted to Sandhurst in 1950. In 1955, in 1956 and in 1957, only five were admitted each year. Why do we not provide an increase in military places? Here again, was an opportunity whereby we could extend our influence. Criticisms are always made of the French and their short-sightedness in colonial rule, but it is worth noticing that, when they left Morocco, one of the things they did was to provide no less than 40 military students' places each year at the Military University of St. Cyr. It seems to me that we could follow that example to some extent.
Perhaps more unimaginative than anything has been our approach to the problem of Jordan. When General Glubb was so unceremoniously hustled out of the country two years ago, it was obvious to everybody that that was the end of the close military liaison which had existed between the Arab Legion and ourselves. The Army is now purely nationalistic and there are no British officers left in it. Nevertheless, I am sure that the majority in this House will agree that, despite the recent merger, the Arab Legion stands alone between the King and chaos on the Israel-Jordan frontier and, consequently, should be helped as much as possible.
Having lost our direct influence, we should have done all we could to see that our indirect influence—which must be the basis of all our relations—was as great as possible. We should have granted to many more Jordanians the opportunity of receiving their military education here. Up to 1957, it was the custom to provide two places only at Sandhurst for Jordanian cadets, but on 1st January that year the number was reduced to one. In spite of protestation, that decision has stood.
If that were an isolated case, it would be alarming enough, but it is not an isolated case. It is merely an example of neglect of an opportunity which is fast passing. It would seem worth while providing many more places for our Arab friends who wish to get their education in this country. The Foreign

Office could once again lead the way. The oil companies, by the production of scholarships and educational facilities, could follow that lead. Could we possibly have a better opportunity than the present merger to make some gesture of this kind?
There is justification for a policy of infiltration in this matter. We have prime justification for it in our treatment of India. Had we not made available facilities for education for the most intelligent of young Indians, I think there is little doubt that the chaos which would have followed the British leaving of India might well have turned that country to the Soviet bloc. Precisely because we had educated them in our methods, India chose to remain with us. As a result, they have had all the moderating and constitutional advantages of association with us.
When one considers how far more tenuous are our relations with the Middle East, how much more we depend upon them than we ever depended upon India, as there are none of the deep-rooted antipathies brought about by Colonial rule but only an intense desire for education, it would seem nothing but sensible by every means in our power to promote a closer association between these advancing countries and ourselves.
In a wider sense, also, that is the right policy for us to follow. We have not the strength by violence or force to maintain our old position in the world, so if we can no longer be a Rome, let us at least determine to be a Venice and not just have a policy zigzagging indecisively between the two, without particular advantage to ourselves.

7.46 p.m.

Mr. Herbert Morrison: The noble Lord the Member for Berwick-upon-Tweed (Viscount Lambton) has drawn some contrast between the proceedings in the House today and the proceedings yesterday. I agree with him that it is a very different debate today in many respects compared with yesterday. If the debate had been a one-day debate and yesterday had been the day, it is probable that there would have been no Division, but, having heard the Foreign Secretary, I said to myself, "Well that settles it. Inevitably, there will be a Division."
I really cannot see why the Foreign Secretary should not try to be more clear and decisive in the speeches he makes. He speaks of this consideration and that consideration, and finally tells the House nothing except, "We will consult our allies about it." It is true that on some matters that is a fair reply, but it is not a fair reply to give on everything. I have not heard officially what the decision is, but my guess is that after that speech a Division is inevitable.

Mr. Ede: Do not go home too early.

Mr. Morrison: The debate was opened yesterday, I thought admirably, by the two Front Benches. I do not want to commit myself to agree with everything the Prime Minister said, but it was a good speech that lifted the subject on to a higher level than had been done for some time. The speech of my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition was serious, constructive, positive and worthy of an Opposition which I think wishes to be helpful to the country in these difficulties. As my right hon. Friend the Member for Ebbw Vale (Mr. Bevan) said, we are not disagreeing about foreign affairs for the sake of doing so. My right hon. Friend, in fact, said that he would have a bias in favour of no Division if things could go that way.
Unlike domestic affairs such as, for example, the Rent Act, foreign affairs are serious and difficult and can lead to dramatic and grave results. Therefore, my own view has been that on foreign affairs we should not artificially try to disagree with the Government, but that if the Government were wrong, we must disagree with them and say so, if necessary by voting. If, however, the Government are right, we ought to have the courage to say that too. That seems to me to be the right attitude to foreign affairs.
In democracy, there must be free debate in Parliament. There have to be—the Prime Minister made a fair point—consultations with allies and with the Commonwealth, and this takes time. There have to be consultations, among others, with the United States of America, and I imagine that that is not always positively easy.
During my visit to the United States in the autumn of the year before last, although it was my seventh visit it was the first time I had visited that country with a Republican Government in power. It smelt different and it was different. It is the Americans' business what Government they have, but I think it is easier for us as Governments to get on with Democratic Administrations than with Republicans. Whether that will do the Democrats any good or harm, I do not know. Any way, I say again that it is their business.
There is a curious Government in the United States. Mr. Eisenhower is a likeable man. Those of us who knew him here and have met him in Washington like him very much, but he is easy going and he has behind him the pulsating, energetic Mr. Dulles, who is undoubtedly a person of great power. But he is, I think, a person of great unreliability and uncertainty as to where he will be from hour to hour.
What interested me in the course of that long visit to the United States, meeting as I did all sorts of audiences of varying character, was that I never met a single American who had a good word to say for Mr. Dulles. I met a number of audiences who tried to incite me to attack him, but I said, I am only a poor foreigner from England. I cannot do that. Anyway, he is in hospital and it would not be fair." My worry about Mr. Dulles is that if he says one thing, one does not know whether he may do something else. Therefore, I imagine that the consultations with the United States of America are somewhat more difficult than they were when Dean Acheson was in office as Secretary of State. He was a very good Secretary of State.
We have all these complications of Parliamentary debate and consultation, not to mention the difficulties of the Government agreeing within their own ranks. I am not making any party point, because it can affect anybody or any Government. All these things have to be squared up. In a dictatorship, however, if it is a one-man dictatorship, a dictator does not have the troubles of a Cabinet. There is no trouble with the Press, with Parliament or with broadcasting. Even foreign broadcasting is jammed, as we are experiencing.
There are the two systems. Whether in the long run the dictatorship is better off than a free democracy, I am not sure. After all, Hitler had a very great dictatorship, and a very hot one, but it did not prevent him at last from coming to a sticky end.
During the war, all of us hoped, first, that we would work in cordial co-operation with the Soviet Union during the war, and with the United States, which it was vital that we should, and it is vital now; and as a whole, we did. There is a book about to be published from which I will quote a little about the Stalin correspondence with the right hon. Member for Woodford (Sir W. Churchill), Lord Attlee, Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Truman, which, unless I am wrong, will cause a certain amount of excitement on both sides of the Atlantic. Nevertheless, during the war the effort was made and as a whole, although there was friction and some frank speaking from Moscow now and again, we got on fairly well in the prosecution of the war. We had a genuine feeling that we wanted, not only in war, but in peace, permanently to be friends with the Soviet Union. I am sure that the same was true of President Roosevelt and of the general body of American citizens at that time.
If there are people in the Soviet Union who think that either in our Government, whether Labour or Conservative, or even in the American Government there are people who want war with the Soviet Union, I would venture to say to them that they are wrong and are making a great and dangerous mistake. I do not believe it to be true. On the contrary, we felt that when the war had finished the United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United Kingdom could between them take care of the peace of the world. Indeed, while the war was on, this was evidently the feeling of Mr. Stalin as well.
This is what Mr. Stalin said in one of the telegrams in the book which is to be published next week. I suppose I am guilty of a little professional irregularity. I have to review it for Forward. Publishing date is not until about Friday of next week. Never mind, I do not see why I should not say this in the House of Commons. Mr. Stalin, in a message to Mr. Churchill, as he then was, on 30th September, 1944, said:

I share your conviction that stable harmony between the three leading Powers is an earnest of future peace and it is in tune with the hopes cherished by all peace-loving nations. The consistency of our Governments in this policy in the post-war period, like that achieved during this great war, will, I believe, be the decisive thing.
That was a very true observation and we would all agree with it, and yet, unhappily, it was not to be.
I was not only a Member of the War Cabinet, but, like others, a Member of the Labour Government that followed. I am absolutely confident that the late Ernest Bevin approached his task at the Foreign Office with a similar desire to have peace with the Soviet Union. He had trouble with them. Even then, he was patient for at least two years, because he thought that these difficulties might pass and things would be all right. Unfortunately, however, it was not to be. Then, he went on to the organisation of N.A.T.O. with the United States and others in order that there should be the elaboration of some form of collective security.
What the free nations want is, first of all, peace—that is the No. 1 thing—which also means security. That brings along the absence of fear, which is a great curse to the human race, because fear is a poisoning influence in international relations. I suggest, however, that we want not only peace; we want liberty and freedom as well.
Therefore, in the conduct of foreign affairs, whilst we must not be too emotional and drag in moral things in a humbugging way, nevertheless foreign affairs cannot exclude moral considerations of peace and freedom in the world. Our approach must be on the basis that the greater the number of countries and the greater the area of square miles which are occupied by free democracies, the better it is for the world; and the less that is occupied by dictatorships, of any sort, the better that is for the world.
I am perfectly sure that if in the years from 1933 to 1939 we Labour people, in denouncing Nazism and Hitlerism in Germany, had said that that was a matter the spread or otherwise of which was not a factor in foreign policy, we should have been richly condemned by our own people and others as well. Therefore, it is not illegitimate that in the pursuit of foreign affairs we should try to promote


the cause of freedom and liberty; but I still agree that the securing of peace and security comes first.
One of the big features of this debate has been the desirability of the summit talks. I share the desire of my right hon. and hon. Friends that those summit talks should take place. The Prime Minister has certainly come along. The credit for it has been given very largely to the Commonwealth, but I think that the Labour Party has had something to do with it as well. He talked in rather freer and more forthcoming language yesterday, but I must say that we all hoped that he would be quicker in coming along.
President Eisenhower is coming along as well—not quite so quickly, but he is coming along. If the President is coming along, presumably Mr. Dulles is coming along as well. Let us hope that Mr. Eisenhower will keep an eye on his Secretary of State to make sure that he is coming along, and to keep him under control.
If the summit talks take place let us also hope that they will succeed. I do not think it is wise to say that it is of no use putting this or that item on the agenda, because the Russians will not have it, and it would not be wise for the Russians to say the same thing about us. Nor must we say to ourselves, "Let us put on the agenda something that the Russians would not like." That would be wrong. I think that it is for each nation to put down what it thinks is wise, taking into account, of course, what is expedient and sensible.
Both the Prime Minister and my right hon. Friend have agreed on the principle of the summit talks, and they have both agreed on the necessity for some form of preliminary consultation with a view to preparing the agenda, making the arrangements, and so on, before the talks begin. That is an important element of agreement. It is interesting to know that the late Mr. Stalin agreed with both of them, not in connection with these particular summit talks but in connection with meetings of Heads of States during the war.
This is what Mr. Stalin said on 9th August, 1943, in another of the strictly personal and secret telegrams to the right

hon. Member for Woodford (Sir W. Churchill). As I say, this message related to a coming meeting of heads of State, and Mr. Stalin wanted a preliminary consultation. He said:
In order not to put off elucidation of the problems which interest our countries, it would be advisable to hold a meeting of authorised representatives of our states, and we could agree on the place and time of meeting in the near future.
Besides, we should agree beforehand on the range of problems to be discussed and on the draft proposals to be approved. Unless this is done the meeting can hardly yield tangible results.
When the Prime Minister, my right hon. Friend and the late Mr. Stalin are in agreement on such a principle, I think that it is a somewhat encouraging state of affairs.
We cannot, of course, be sure how long these preparations will take. They could, and should be expeditious. The Foreign Secretary referred to an experience I went through when I was Foreign Secretary, together with my hon. Friend the Member for Enfield, East (Mr. Ernest Davies). That was the meeting at the Palais Rose—which I always persist in confusing with the Villa Rose—in Paris, for the purpose of preparing an agenda for a meeting of higher-up people.
There was great argument about whether the Russians wanted the question of Germany to be put on the agenda. There is still argument about that. The Americans did not like it going on the agenda, but I thought that foolish, and said that if the Russians wanted it to go on we should let it go on. We put it on. Then the Russians thought of something else that presented difficulties, and matters went on for weeks and weeks. Of course, that was all in the days of Mr. Stalin, and it may be that things are better now in that respect. I hope very much that the preliminaries can be dealt with expeditiously, as I think they ought to be.
I agree with what my right hon. Friend the Member for Ebbw Vale said about the Middle East. Years ago I myself advocated the setting up of an economic and social board there. I must say that the Foreign Secretary was quite unsatisfactory today about Israel. He was against any guarantees, and said that it was a matter of rectification of the armistice line. The disgrace is that things


are still being run on an armistice basis at all. There should have been a peace years ago.
There is talk about compromises, in which I would prefer that neither our Government nor the American Government should have a hand. I think that flatters should be settled direct between the Arab States and Israel, though not on the basis of Israel giving up chunks of territory. After all, it is only the size of Wales now. But if there are bits of give and take here and there for the purpose of sensible rectification that is another matter. But I certainly hope that the Foreign Secretary will not let himself or his office run a subconscious anti-Israel line. That would be unfortunate and bad.
We now have this trouble about the Sudan. I must say I do not think that Mr. Nasser is a very nice man. I will not argue whether his view is right or wrong—nor will I argue the merits of the dispute, because we do nor yet know enough about it—but the brutal and intimidating way he has done things is really very bad indeed. I think he is an exceedingly difficult man to live with.
I come to Germany, and to the so-called argument in favour of what is generally known as disengagement in Central Europe. I have been through controversies about Germany at Labour Party conferences and the like. They were great controversies, with the party divided right down the middle. However, someone won at the end of the day, and in a minute I will say who it was.
Perhaps I may make the preliminary point that if we compare the treatment of Germany after the First and Second World Wars, and the outcome of the German conduct after each of those wars, we see a very great contrast. I am old enough to remember that those of us who were in the advanced Socialist movement after the First World War denounced with vigour and with bitterness the cruel way in which the Allies set about Germany. If anything, we had a better case for setting about Germany after the Second World War than after the first one.
However, both we and France set about her after the first war, and the result was that Germany was put into great difficulties and into economic queer street. There was inflation, and Germany

went to pieces. It must, of course, be said that part of those economic troubles were her own fault, because she almost deliberately sabotaged herself, in some respects, so as to command the sympathy of the world. Nevertheless, it was very largely the fault of the allies, and the rise of Hitler was in part—I go no further than to say that—the responsibility of the allies and a result of the Treaty of Versailles.
After the Second World War we were more sensible. We treated the Germans as fairly as we could, without spoiling them unduly. They have worked very hard to get themselves economically sound, and have met with an amazing degree of success. Compared with the Weimar Republic set up after the First World War, the Germans have this time run their Parliamentary democracy very well. They have made great economic progress.
If I may say so with respect, I think that it is a bit mean of the German Government to quibble about paying £50 million towards the British defence costs that we are incurring in Germany. They tried it on me when I went to Germany at the time I was a Minister. I said, "Look here, you have got to be defended. You cannot defend yourselves, partly because you cannot and partly because we will not let you. Somebody has to do it, and you have jolly well got to pay your contributions towards the cost of German defence. Otherwise, you would be reaping an economic and commercial advantage from the willingness of the British to pay". I appeal to the German Government to do the proper and decent thing and pay up. There ought not to be this foolishness about it.
The question then arose of whether Germany was to be treated as a sovereign Power. We decided in due course that she should be so treated. That was Labour Government policy, confirmed by the Conservative Government. But if one makes a country—in this case, Western Germany—a sovereign Power, certain consequences follow. It seems to me that such a country must be free to pursue its foreign policy and defence policy. It appeared that the Germans were willing to contribute to Western defence and to collective security. I feel that Western Germany has a right to do so if she so wishes. If she does not, that is another


matter. I want to see a Germany which is contributing to collective security, a Germany which is peaceful and not running policies of her own separately from associated democratic and peaceful Powers. I do not believe that the best results from a peaceful, constructive, co-operative Germany will be achieved if we treat the Germans as untouchables.
As I said, we had the great Labour Party debate, in which all sorts of other people joined—the peace societies outside contributed, the Communists contributed, as they always, do, whether they are wanted or not—and a good time was had by all. In the end, there was a vote, and my side just won. It was a very narrow victory, but we did win. If it had been the other side who won, they would have made even more noise than we did about this famous victory. I must say, however, that it was very narrow. I do not want to throw that hard-won victory overboard. That is what makes me a little disappointed about this business of disengagement in Central Europe.
Disengagement in Central Europe seems to be designed to throw clean overboard the victory we so narrowly achieved at the Labour Party Conference. Moreover, if we take the line that Germany is to be excluded from these matters, it follows that Germany is to be excluded from N.A.T.O. It strikes me as rather odd that we should build up a system of collective security and, having done so, then throw overboard one of our important contributors to the maintenance of collective security. That seems to be wrong. If it is desired that Germany should be a neutral Power—I am not sure that it is—then I think that that would be wrong; indeed, it was condemned by my noble Friend Lord Attlee. It would be wrong to deny the Germans' right to settle their own foregin policy.
Moreover, if Germany is excluded from N.A.T.O. and prevented from making her contribution to Western defence, the military consequences for Western Europe will be serious. I was a member of the War Cabinet, as Home Secretary, Minister of Home Security, and I can remember the nasty feelings we had when the Germans broke through Holland, Belgium and France, on to the Channels ports; and when they

got to Norway and Denmark. From all these areas we were subject to aerial bombardment and nearly subject to invasion. I do not, therefore, want it to be too easy for anybody else to pass through Europe right to the Channel ports. It seems to me that, if Germany, so to speak, is, in effect, demilitarised, then the area through which the vast Russian army would have to come is very limited, and it might be easy for it to reach the Channel ports.
Even if there be added Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia, this does not over-comfort me, though I am open to conviction upon it—we must all go on thinking about it—because it must be remembered that, behind the borders where the Soviet Union and its allies begin—presumably, Rumania and Bulgaria will still be there—there is an enormous area of Soviet country stretching right to the Far East. The Soviet Union, therefore, is in a position totally different from that in which we should be if we eliminated Germany from Western defence.
Some people think that we can bargain for German unity in return. In my view, if there is to be German unity, it must be a unity of a free country which can control its own destinies, its own Parliamentary elections, and elect its own Government. Otherwise, the whole show might go Communist, or there could be civil war. Moreover Germany has a right to unity. My hon. Friend the Member for Wednesbury (Mr. Stonehouse) was talking a little lightheartedly about it when he said, "Let them wait; there is nothing terrible about that". Let us imagine—it is very imaginary—that we had been invaded by the United States, and let us suppose that Scotland had been cut off and divided from England. The Scottish Nationalists would, perhaps, like that; but it surely would have been a legitimate British hope that our Scots brothers should come back and be amongst us again. In the East German analogy, they would not only have been cut off, but they would have completely lost their liberty of expression, their right to argue. If there is anything more precious to a Scot than anything else, it is the right to argue. These things must be taken into account. I think that it is right that Germany should have unity if she wants it.
Whether the Soviet Union would concede unification and withdrawal from Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia, I do not know. I do not believe that the Russians will go from East Germany and from the other countries to which they have gone until they want to. What I regard as more likely is that they will some day tire of holding down these other countries, especially if those countries less and less like being held down.
Collective security does not mean throwing away important allies. On the contrary, it means building up alliances; the more safe allies one has, the better for peace. Heaven knows, N.A.T.O. is weak enough without our deliberately making it weaker. I do not think that the Labour Party has yet collectively and officially pronounced about all this, and I thought that I would make my own few observations in order that they might go into the common pool for consideration and report.
Finally, as to the Bulganin letters and world public relations, I feel that there have been rather too many Bulganin letters. In my view, the last Eisenhower reply was one of the brightest yet produced, especially that bit which said that he did not think it was much good for us to go on throwing speeches at each other. It was rather good. Who the author was, I do not know; but I cannot believe that it was Mr. Dulles.
The truth is that the Soviet Union has been having considerable success in the battle of world public relations. They have impressed a large section of public opinion and a good many newspapers, and they must be congratulated on having achieved a fair amount of success. I wish I could equally congratulate the British, American and other Governments. We seem a dull lot in comparison. We have a vast horde of public relations officers, including the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, not to mention, in another capacity, the Lord President of the Council, but they never seem to study this business of foreign policy from the point of view of world public relations. That is the big battle which has been going on for months past. The Russians have been winning it and have learnt how to talk to the West. It took them years.
I have a serious explanation for that. This change in the capacity of the

Russians to talk in an understandable way to the West came soon after Mr. Burgess and Mr. Maclean arrived in Moscow. I have the utmost contempt for those two men, and I hope that no reputable politician or journalist will want to have anything to do with them. I think that they are a pair of rascals.

Mr. C. R. Hobson: Traitors.

Mr. Morrison: Near enough traitors to their country. I do not believe that in Moscow they have done anything in the way of espionage. If they did, they did it before they went. They ought to have been fired months before for conduct which had nothing to do with this matter at all, but something else. These gentlemen have helped the Russians in a vital way by advising them—editing, drafting, phrasing, and so on—on how to talk nicely to the West, and have made a contribution to the public relations battle. The West has had the worst of that battle. We have lacked initiative. We should have opened up subjects of discussion with the Russians which were legitimate in themselves, but which would have made the Russians think before they answered back, as we have had to do.
We must try to find a way of talking to the people of the Communist countries. I know how difficult it is, but we must try. It is terribly vital that we should manage to do so. The world should be able to live up to the watchword of the British Broadcasting Corporation—" Let Nation speak unto Nation."

8.23 p.m.

Mr. F. M. Bennett: Praise for a Labour speaker from the Conservative side is not always particularly welcome, but I think that the stature of the right hon. Member for Lewisham, South (Mr. H. Morrison), even in his semiretirement from the Front Opposition Bench, is of sufficient quality to stand up to a compliment from the hon. Member for Torquay.
Although I cannot agree with everything that he said, there was certainly much in his speech that we not only enjoyed, but with which many hon. Members on both sides thoroughly agreed. However, there was one feature which I would have found more convincing but for the speech of the right hon. Member


for Ebbw Vale (Mr. Bevan). When the right hon. Member for Lewisham, South began his remarks, like several preceding speakers on his side, he attributed the change of tone in the debate to what the Foreign Secretary said or did not say today. That may sound all very well on the face of it, but we on this side of the House recall—and HANSARD will record it tomorrow—that the first shots in the changed atmosphere were fired by the right hon. Member for Ebbw Vale before the Foreign Secretary had spoken.
Indeed, in his opening remarks the right hon. Member for Ebbw Vale said that his more critical attitude which he would develop today—and he received a certain amount of applause from hon. Gentlemen behind him—did not spring from the Foreign Secretary's comments. It could not have done so, because the Foreign Secretary had not spoken. It sprang, he said, from the fact that he had had an opportunity to look through the Prime Minister's speech and, on reflection, had found many parts which he did not like.
We on this side are left unbelieving at the sudden suggestion that the change in debate is due to what the Foreign Secretary said, because the very first shots in this matter were fired by the right hon. Member for Ebbw Vale who said that the greater criticism which he would develop sprang from a review of the Prime Minister's speech. It is not for me or any other hon. Member on this side to know what in the Labour ranks changed that attitude, but the evidence I have given has proved conclusively that it had nothing to do with what the Foreign Secretary said. It was due to a decision on their part, perhaps after such unexpected and unusual unanimity yesterday, that the debate should not be carried on in the same way on the second day. Hon. Members opposite are shaking their heads, but I am still waiting for an explanation of why the right hon. Member for Ebbw Vale began as he did, before the Foreign Secretary had spoken.
Leaving the right hon. Gentleman's rather complicated explanations about the present nuclear policy of the Labour Party, in summary what were the chief criticisms that he developed against the Government in the preparation for a Summit Conference? As I understood them, the first was that we should not

spend too much time on the preparations in trying to get an agreed list of items on the agenda for discussion. The right hon. Member for Lewisham, South said something with which I fully concur. Whether we can or cannot agree on the items, it would be folly to go to a Summit Conference and agree to discuss only what the Russians wanted to discuss or, for that matter, for the Russians to agree to discuss only what we wanted to discuss.
As I understood the right hon. Member for Ebbw Vale, he said that the Russians would never under any circumstances agree to discuss the freedom of the satellites and that, therefore, it was impracticable for us to put on the agenda any question about Eastern Europe. Thus, in summary, what the right hon. Gentleman said was that we should discuss only items on the agenda that suited the Russians, such as our entry into the Middle East, and should not discuss anything that offended them. That, the right hon. Member for Lewisham, South said, would be impracticable.
The other chief point of his criticism was that we ought to fix the date first because that would expedite the preparations. That would be the most foolish of all things to happen, the one fatal thing. We cannot go on having Summit Conferences, and this one, if it is to come about, must carry a measure of success. We must make sure that it is not used simply as a venue for propaganda, with all the disillusionment that would follow. I say that it would be a hundred times better to have no conference at all than to have an inadequately prepared conference from which disillusionment resulted, because it would be impossible to have another, better conference for a considerable time thereafter.
May I turn to a point which I do not think has been mentioned so far? All of us agreed with what the Prime Minister had to say about his Commonwealth tour and the impression that he got from it.
Nearly all of us would agree with what he said about India and about our understanding and appreciation of India's position, that although she is in the Commonwealth she does not wish to become militarily aligned with us. To say that we understand and appreciate it, however, is not to go as far as the


right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition appeared to go. I make this point because it is important for the record. In his contribution to the debate on this subject the Leader of the Opposition spoke of his trip to India, when he was seeking to justify Britain's participation in N.A.T.O. He said:
But I also endeavoured to make it plain that while we felt it necessary to belong to N.A.T.O., nevertheless we not only accepted but positively encouraged the non-alignment policy of India."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 19th February, 1958; Vol. 582, c. 1232.]
I should like to know whether in saying that, the Leader of the Opposition was giving the Opposition's attitude towards this matter or was purporting to give also the attitude of Her Majesty's Government, because I am afraid that I could not support that policy, for a simple reason which I will now seek to explain.
We have S.E.A.T.O. and the Bagdad Pact at the moment. Those of us who have travelled in Asia recently know that it is not easy for statesmen, politicians and other leaders in the Asian countries which belong to these Pacts to carry public opinion with them when there is a neutralist non-commitment trend abroad and a great deal of propaganda to that end. It is already difficult enough for them to stick with us in these Pacts, not only in the S.E.A.T.O. and Bagdad Pacts but also, for instance, in the defence arrangement with Malaya, and I therefore hope that Her Majesty's Government will be able to say a word this evening to reassure all of us that although we may well accept the reasons which guide India today, we do not encourage a non-alignment policy for her or anybody else.
If we do encourage such a policy, then the next logical thing for us to say straight away is that we encourage those who want to disrupt the S.E.A.T.O. and Bagdad Pacts, because we cannot logically say, on the one hand, that we encourage non-alignment for one Asian nation and then, on the other hand, praise the loyalty and the staunchness of those in the S.E.A.T.O. and Bagdad Pacts who are situated geographically and historically in almost exactly the same position as India. There are certain hon. Members opposite who probably would not mind seeing the Bagdad and S.E.A.T.O. Pacts disrupted.

Mr. Harold Davies: Hear, hear.

Mr. Bennett: That at least is a logical policy, but if we do not accept it—and, whatever individuals may say, I understand that the Front Bench opposite do not want to see the repudiation of the Bagdad or S.E.A.T.O. Pacts or our defence arrangements with Malaya—then I hope that we shall not for a moment give any impression that we do not highly value the staunchness and the loyalty which has been shown by the Powers throughout the Asian countries associated with us in these Pacts.
The only other point I want to make arising from the debate deals with our weapons and our defences. If someone coming from another world could have seen the Order Paper of the House in the last few months and the Questions dealing with the atom bomb, he would have found it hard indeed to discover what was in the minds of hon. Members, because out of the scores and scores of Questions which have been asked every one has been directed towards weakening the nuclear defences of this country and not one has expressed any fears or apprehensions about the weapons of our enemies. Day after day we have had objections to our allied planes flying with the hydrogen bomb, to rocket sites and to preparations for air bases, but never has there been a Question which urged greater defence on our part in order to counter the enemy's aggressive forces, both conventional and non-conventional, which we know only too well are being mustered behind the Iron Curtain. We all know about the 200 divisions which exist. The Russians never seek to conceal that fact. In addition, they never cease from boasting about their power to destroy this island by rockets at a moment's notice, or to destroy any of the countries which surround us, if it comes to a struggle.
This muddled thinking in which hon. Members opposite see more cause for worry in how strong we are than in how strong the enemy are is best exemplified in their apparent policy over the unilateral suspension of hydrogen bomb tests. Frankly, I do not understand what is the policy of Her Majesty's Opposition towards these tests or towards the development of hydrogen bombs, because we have had a series of variations on that theme, but at least I understand that the right hon. Member for Ebbw Vale


apparently committed them today to the statement that they would like the Government unilaterally to make the voluntary gesture of the suspension of the tests. In the right hon. Gentleman's words, this would serve as an example which the Russians would find it hard not to follow.
I am extremely suspicious about the capacity of Russians to follow examples, and I think the right hon. Member for Lewisham, South may agree with me here. They have never shown themselves impressed by voluntary gestures from the West. The most recent example is of a situation which we seem to have forgotten remarkably quickly, judging by the little reference which has been made in the debate to Hungary. It is only a few short months ago that all of us were filled with resentment and anger about the Russian treatment of Hungary. Ever since then, deportations, executions and imprisonments have been going on in Hungary. I remember perfectly clearly that when I last spoke about Hungary, in a short Adjournment debate, the right hon. Member for Derby, South (Mr. P. Noel-Baker) asked whether Her Majesty's Government did not realise that the best example which we could set to the Russians to persuade them to get out of Hungary was for us to get out of Suez. He said that it would be very difficult for the Russians not then to get out of Hungary if we first went out of Suez. That was many months ago. We gave the example, and so far the Russians do not seem to have been particularly impressed in what they have done about Hungary by that example.
I should have thought that if the Russians genuinely want a Summit Conference, if they really want public opinion impressed so much that Mr. Dulles or our own Prime Minister or the French Prime Minister would be carried willy-nilly on a wave of popular enthusiasm for a Summit Conference, it would be they that should now be making such a reciprocal gesture. If the Russians were to do something decisive about Hungary—we cannot expect them to hand it back to freedom for a while—if they even recognised even one of the twelve United Nations resolutions on the subject which they now defy, that would have a great deal more effect on public opinion and on the chances of a successful Summit Conference than any number of speeches

or of letters passing between Russian and Western leaders. It is in that hope, and because we ought still to be thinking of the people of Hungary, that I make this particular appeal tonight.

8.36 p.m.

Mr. Sydney Silverman: I hope that the hon. Member for Torquay (Mr. F. M. Bennett) will not mind if I do not follow him in his remarks, although some of the points he made offer obvious temptations to do so. I do not want to follow him in them, or to debate with him, for two reasons. One is that it seems to me, with great respect—and he put his point with great moderation—that he made the mistake which the Prime Minister avoided yesterday, namely, of repeating at this moment all the vituperative polemics which have bedevilled international relations for nearly a dozen years.
I am very far from saying that all the fault, or the main fault, for that lies with this country or with the West. Certainly it does not, but I am perfectly certain that if at this supremely critical moment we are to make any advance at all towards saving the world from what may well be ultimate catastrophe we had better keep our mouths shut on either side about the mistakes the other has made in the tragic twelve years now coming to an end.
My second reason is partly the same as the first, because I think that at this moment we had better concentrate on the efforts that apparently everyone wants to make to begin again and to see whether we can get out of the atmosphere of tension and excitement and away from the method of trying to maintain peace by stumbling on from crisis to crisis over a period in the hope that somehow or other somebody will step in to save us from the consequences of our own actions.
The hon. Member for Torquay said that he did not understand why the character of the debate had changed. I have no more information about it than anybody else but, having sat through the debate, it seems to me clear that the indications certainly are that most of my hon. and right hon. Friends will vote against the Government tonight. The hon. Member, and perhaps the House, may be surprised to hear, though I say it with the utmost sincerity, that I wish


with all my heart that we did not have to divide. I agree absolutely with my right hon. Friend that of all the matters on which we can disagree the one matter on which we ought to make the greatest effort not to disagree, and especially at this moment, is this question of foreign policy in the present context of international affairs. It did look yesterday, I am bound to say, as if perhaps we might be able to avoid such a Division at this moment, but how can we support the Government?
How can we go along with them if we do not know where they are? The Foreign Secretary refused to answer any single one of the questions which were put to him both yesterday and today, yesterday by my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition and today by my right hon. Friend the Member for Ebbw Vale (Mr. Bevan)—and, indeed, in the speech last night by my hon. Friend the Member for Leeds, East (Mr. Healey)—or to give one single indication of what is in the Government's mind about any one of the issues that the Summit Conference will be about.
I suppose it is just conceivable that the Government are right in not telling us, and, certainly, if they do not know, they cannot tell us. Let us suppose that they do know. I suppose it would be possible to make out some sort of controversial case for saying, "We will keep it locked in our bosoms. We will not tell anybody what we think is the right solution of anything, except our allies, whose agreement we hope to get, but, in the end, may not get at all." I think that would be a very foolish way of negotiating with our allies.
Suppose that there is a difference of emphasis, or a difference of point of view, between Her Majesty's Government and the Government of the United States of America upon the question of having a preliminary conference of Foreign Ministers. It is precisely because the Foreign Ministers have ended in deadlock that the whole question of a Summit Conference arises at all. If the Government want to do some particular thing about some particular issue, and if they are having difficulty in getting agreement with their allies on it, would it not be very much better to be able to say, "We have told the House of Commons what our

view is about this, we got the united support of the House of Commons for it, and what we are saying to you, in trying to work out a common allied policy about this issue, we are authorised to say in the name of a united House of Commons"?
Would not their hands be strengthened? Is not that a better way of getting agreement with our allies than by the Government's keeping their mouth shut and coming to the House of Commons with a fait accompli and asking the House of Commons in these supreme matters to act as if it were nothing but a rubber stamp? If they do not know, they cannot tell anybody; but they ought to know. They ought to make up their mind.
We could accept, and I accept myself, that if they are going as a member of a team, as one ally among other allies, it is eminently proper that they should try to work out a common policy and a common point of view if they are to negotiate with people elsewhere about matters over which there is difference. It is quite right to work it out, to make up their mind what their view is and see what support they can get for it. The Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary are not going to the conference as a Conservative Prime Minister and as a Conservative Foreign Secretary. The Prime Minister would have no right to go anywhere and say, "I am here because I am the Leader of the Conservative Party", any more than my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition, if the fortunes of political war were changed, would have the right to say, "I am going to the conference as the Leader of the Socialist Party of Great Britain"—the Labour Party here. They go as representing this nation.
Do the Government really believe that their moral authority in the country today is such that they are in a position to ignore the views of the Opposition in the House of Commons? Do the by-elections mean nothing to them? I am not saying necessarily that they ought to abdicate. The Government are entitled, if they think so, to say that they represent the country on the whole, but can they say they represent all the country? Would it not be wise to see if they can formulate here in the House of Commons a policy which is the policy of the House of Commons, the policy of the country?
If they do not tell us what it is they propose, how can we support them? They have not told us anything, but there are some negative indications. We understand that the Government have made an agreement with the United States of America about missile bases. My right hon. Friend the Member for Ebbw Vale asked the Foreign Secretary this afternoon what was the hurry. There are no rockets yet; they have not got any missiles. All they are proposing to do is to prepare some sites.
There is to be a conference. Presumably if there is to be a conference it will not be delayed many months. Suppose it is delayed for months, and suppose the conference broke down, or, if it did not break down, at any rate resulted in a situation in which the Government thought that they should go on with these bases. What would they have lost by waiting four months? On the other hand, if the conference succeeded to such an extent that the Government thought they could begin on a progressive—gradual if hon. Members like, slow if hon. Members like, but progressive—disarmament, perhaps they would not want to go on with this highly dangerous proposal for the bases.
It is not enough to say that it is the same in principle as bombs carried in planes. We are not talking about whether it is the same in principle. We are talking about whether, when we are beginning to discuss a relaxation of international tension, it will be helpful to leading the negotiations to success to choose that very moment for erecting new bases, with weapons pointed at the heart of every centre of power in the Soviet Union. If it were urgent, yes. If the conference were being postponed three or four years, yes. But what in the world would be the harm in waiting four months?
I cannot help suspecting that the reason of the Government is quite different. They do not want the missile bases any more than I do. This is the price that they pay, this is the result of attempting to get agreements and to make bargains with allies. The Americans have moved. They no longer insist on a meeting of Foreign Ministers before the Summit Conference takes place. Did they move for nothing or did the Government pay

a price? Is this what the Government agreed with the United States as a quid pro quo for their weakening on the insistence of holding a Foreign Ministers' conference first?
That is one negative indication that the Government are more anxious to present an appearance of not resisting a Summit Conference than of making certain that the Summit Conference succeeds, if and when it takes place. But it is not the only one.
They have chosen this moment to produce a White Paper on defence. I know that we are not debating it tonight. We shall have a debate on it next week, and there are several hon. Members who are far more qualified than I to discuss its strategic and tactical sides, but there are some elementary things about which we are all entitled to make up our minds. One of the things that the Summit Conference must necessarily discuss—I gather that this is not in dispute—is the suspension of nuclear tests. Everybody agrees that that is one of the things which must be discussed. Whatever argument there may be about the items on the agenda, this one will undoubtedly be on it.
There is not the slightest point in discussing a suspension of nuclear tests, however, except as a preliminary to a further discussion—perhaps not at the same conference—designed to lead to the complete abolition or banning of nuclear weapons. If we do not mean that, it is not a bit of good talking about the suspension of nuclear tests. If we mean that we must retain nuclear weapons as part of our necessary armament, for whatever reason, it is not very honest or sincere to invite people to discuss upon what terms the tests will be suspended. An invitation to agree about suspending tests is an invitation at least to begin a discussion about banning nuclear weapons; otherwise there is no point or sense in it.
What does the White Paper, Report on Defence, say? Paragraph 12 says—I cannot believe that the Government mean it—that if there is any substantial attack by the Soviet Union with conventional weapons we shall retaliate forthwith with nuclear weapons. The White Paper, like the one issued last year, makes it quite clear that we cannot defend ourselves against nuclear attack by other


people. That, too, is no longer within the realm of controversy; it is accepted that we cannot defend ourselves. We may be able to defend our nuclear weapon sites and bomber cases, but the attempt to defend anybody or anything else has been frankly given up, according to the White Papers of last year and this year.
In effect, we are saying to the Soviet Union, "If you attack anybody substantially with conventional weapons, we will retaliate at once with nuclear weapons, against which we could not defend ourselves if you attacked with nuclear weapons first." Do we mean this? If we do, it is a direct incitement to the Soviet Union, if ever they are minded to attack anybody, to begin with a nuclear attack. That is what the White Paper is inciting them to do. That is all that it can mean. If we cannot defend ourselves against nuclear attack, and if we say to the Russians, "If you limit yourselves to a conventional attack, we shall attack first with nuclear weapons", we are telling them not to be fools, and that if they want to attack they must attack first with nuclear weapons.
That is the only meaning which can be attached to that White Paper. If we do not mean that, why in the world do we choose this moment of all moments to say that we do? If we do mean it, how can we pretend that we want the Summit Conference to succeed on the subject of the suspension of nuclear tests as a preliminary to an agreement for the prohibition of nuclear weapons? This makes no sense at all. I do not want to believe it—I refuse to believe it—but the only sense it can possibly make is that we want to state in advance a position from which we cannot retreat to prevent the purpose of the conference.
It would have been possible for the Foreign Secretary to have dealt with some of these points and with other points which were put to him. The right hon. and learned Gentleman chose to say, "Certainly I will not tell you what is in my mind. It is nothing to do with the House of Commons and the Opposition. I will talk about it only to Mr. Dulles"—with the success that he has had so far in conversations of that kind.
All we know is, first, that the Government will tell us nothing about their mind on the issues at stake; second, that they

are going to begin right away, before even agreeing about the conference, the venue, the date, or the preparations for it, to force through preparations for the missile bases; and third, that they publish a White Paper making nonsense of any attempt to reach agreement about nuclear weapons. Any Opposition which fails to vote against a Government who have so lost all sense of responsibility ought to be impeached.

8.57 p.m.

Mr. G. B. Drayson: The hon. Member for Nelson and Colne (Mr. S. Silverman) devoted the major part of his speech to subjects which were more fitted for a defence debate. There might have been some advantage if the two days' defence debate to be held next week had been merged with this debate and we had had four days of discussion on the combined subjects. I know that in the defence debate we wish to talk about the individual problems of the respective arms, but that could be done under the various Estimates.
There has been far too much talk about the subject of defence and not enough about the various problems in the sphere of foreign affairs. We have all been aware that for some time the peace in the world has been kept because of a balance of fear. It is this balance of fear which the right hon. Member for Lewisham, South (Mr. H. Morrison) said was a poisoning influence. Not only has it poisoned the systems of mankind, but it has had a serious damaging effect on their nerves. Because the world is suffering from an acute attack of nervous tension, this debate has come at an opportune time. We all hope that it will lead to summit talks which will be fruitful.
Yesterday, the Prime Minister told us that he came back from his very successful Commonwealth tour with a determination to use the moral and material power of the Commonwealth for good. He went on to say that we could make progress in certain fields. He instanced that of disarmament and the possibility of non-aggression pacts. He said it was better to achieve peace by deeds rather than words. My right hon. Friend said there were other opportunities, such as trade and individual contacts, which could lead to a lessening of world tension. Germany was one of the major problems,


and the countries of Eastern Europe and Indonesia. He particularly mentioned these in the list he gave.
The trouble in Indonesia has its origins in the fact that in 1945–46 the British Government of the day and the United States were not prepared to make ships available to the Dutch to return their administrators to their former colonies in the Dutch East Indies. We know that the party opposite had the desire to liquidate the British Empire, starting with India, and that they were determined that the Dutch people should not be allowed to re-establish themselves in the Dutch East Indies, which they had administered so well and successfully for many years. Because we allowed a vacuum to exist in that part of the world, the Communist influence is now strong there today.
This was the first example we had of the fact that if we create a vacuum in the world the Russians will fill it. Where we have divergencies of policy between the United States of America and Great Britain and the two nations are drawn apart, leaving a vacuum, it is the Soviet Union which steps in.
The problem of Germany is one of unification. Whether this is one of the areas of possible agreement and progress, I do not know, but I was again impressed by one of the remarks of the right hon. Member for Lewisham, South when he referred to a telegram sent during the war by my right hon. Friend the Member for Woodford (Sir W. Churchill) suggesting that there should be preliminary discussions for a conference. Draft proposals which were to be put forward could then be approved. I imagine that draft proposals of how unification could be brought about would be discussed among the Foreign Secretaries in any preliminary conference before the summit meeting.
I am not satisfied that the proposals put forward in 1955 by Sir Anthony Eden are correct. They need to be modified. The Prime Minister said that in trade and individual contacts he thought progress could be made. That is a subject on which I have commented many times in this House. I have frequently said, with due respect to our Foreign Service, that businessmen are very often our best ambassadors. Recently I have taken part in an Adjournment debate in this House on trade with China, and we had a

very encouraging reply from the Parliamentary Secretary to the Board of Trade. In a recent discussion on Eastern Germany, the Minister of State was not so forthcoming.
There is one matter which we should try to eliminate from the area of discord. There is what I would regard as a pathological attitude towards Eastern Germany. I am reminded of the chorus in George Orwell's book "Animal Farm". Now it is "Grotewohl bad, Gomulka good". A few days later we might find that it is "Gomulka bad, Grotewohl good". There is nothing much to choose between them, and while we continue this attitude to Eastern Germany we are preventing 18 million people from playing a fuller part in the life of Europe.
I have read the remarks made recently by Mr. Dulles when the present difficulties and changes in Eastern Germany were brought to his attention. One got the impression—I may be wrong—that he was hoping there would be some further uprising in that country. There I agree with the right hon. Member for Ebbw Vale (Mr. Bevan), who said this afternoon that one should not incite if one is not prepared to help at the same time. Those people who publish newsletters or tend to encourage trouble in Eastern Europe and are not themselves prepared to go and help, carry a very great burden of responsibility. Of course, we would all like to see those countries return to what we call the free world, but I do not think that will be done by a series of uprisings such as we saw in Hungary just over a year ago.
I hope that all the obstacles, many of them petty ones, which prevent contact between this country and Eastern Europe will be removed so that we may get down to the main problem of dealing with the Soviet Union. There are a number of financial matters arising out of pre-war debts which prevent normal trade relations between this country and countries like Rumania and Bulgaria. How is it possible for those countries to pay their pre-war debts when they were occupied by Germany during the war and their countries were despoiled, and when since then they have been occupied by the Soviet Union who have extracted reparations from them? If anyone should pay the pre-war debts of Rumania, it is the German nation itself. It is entirely


responsible for the predicament in which Rumania finds herself at present.
I have no great details of the Rumanian problem—I have not been in that country—but I think it quite unfair to suggest that they should make good these matters when they are under the heels of the Soviet Union, and were literally placed there by Germany. Let us concentrate on countries nearer our own size. I welcome any progress that can be made to eliminate these small matters and lead to summit talks.
As I said in my opening remarks, the Prime Minister said that the material forces of the Commonwealth could be used towards world peace. I recall that one of the results of the N.A.T.O. Meeting in Paris in November was that Great Britain and America—America in particular—said that more funds would be made available for economic aid. We have heard very little since the N.A.T.O. talks about how that money is to be made available.
A suggestion has come forward, from, I imagine, responsible sources in the United States of America, that here is a possible area in which the United States and Great Britain could co-operate with the Soviet Union in what are sometimes called the uncommitted countries to work together on a project for improving the standards of living in those territories. Whether it be a hydro-electric scheme or some other scheme, it was suggested that, rather than have the East and West bidding against each other for the favours of the country in question and for the opportunity of helping it with economic development, there was a part which both sections of the world could play by coming together and working out the project. Thereby they could reach an area of co-operation in a minor way which might lead to greater co-operation at a later stage.
In reference to the summit talks, a constituent of mine told me a little time ago that one great asset of the Russian people was that they were the best chess players in the world. He went on to say that they never make a move unless they have thought out several other moves ahead, but that in the last few years we have not always anticipated their next move. We decide, for example, to establish a base in Cyprus. The Soviet Union then takes steps to see that that base is denied

to us or that our position in that part of the world is made untenable. This has been going on all over the world.
I hope that the Government have their eye on Aden, or any of the other possible trouble spots, and are anticipating what moves the Soviet might be contemplating in the future. We should also bear in mind what the Soviet Government are likely to do should the summit talks prove to be a failure, because I am sure that they on their side have thought that one out too. We on our side are determined to do nothing that will make the talks unlikely to succeed.
The Prime Minister finished by saying that we should have courage, faith and hope. We know that he has the first two, and it is we who hope that they will bear fruit.

9.12 p.m.

Mr. Kenneth Younger: This two-days' debate on the international situation has, I think most hon. Members would agree, followed a rather sad course. We started with the Prime Minister in a mood of expectation—I would almost say of restrained optimism. I entirely agree with what my right hon. Friend the Member for Lewisham, South (Mr. H. Morrison) said an hour or so ago about the change which came over the debate as a result of which we shall be ending it in a Division.
My right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition, who followed the Prime Minister, welcomed the change of tone in the Prime Minister's speech, which seemed to us to be a change from pessimism in December to relative optimism now. We had hoped that although he could not give us much indication in detail of the possible ways forward which he saw, the details would be filled in a little later by his colleagues.
When one boils it down, the optimism generated by the Prime Minister was based on a few very simple things. He said categorically that he wants a Summit Conference and he said that he wants it to succeed. When one asked oneself how the Prime Minister hoped to make it succeed, one found that he gave only a very vague hint. He said that
the general subject which seems to me to offer this chance of progress is that of disarmament in its widest sense."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 19th February, 1958; Vol. 582, c. 1228.]


The Prime Minister did not elaborate and, naturally, in the debate which followed we were anxious to probe that and see what it meant.
I confess to have been a little surprised at the Prime Minister's choice—and the way he put it—of the issue which seemed to him the most hopeful. Far be it from me to look any gift horse in the mouth, for we have had very few grains of hope offered us by the Government in this debate. If the Prime Minister really thinks that there is good hope here—and the Foreign Secretary repeated it—good luck to him. We hope he is right.
What we have learned of the disarmament side in the course of the debate is that those aspects of disarmament which seem to us to offer some hope of agreement apparently do not appeal to the Government. The only one that seems to appeal is one which, though important, seems to me to be one of the less important aspects, namely, the provisions against possible surprise. There, again, if progress can be made, we shall be delighted, but I certainly think that the Prime Minister might have referred to some more general political subjects as offering hope, not only because that has been the opinion of very many of the most informed commentators who have been discussing this subject in recent weeks—British, as well as those of other nationalities—but also, to some extent, because that is the view that seems to appear from the White Paper, Report on Defence.
In paragraph 17 of that document, under the general heading of "Disarmament," there appear these words:
The first step towards disarmament is not necessarily a disarmament agreement If some progress could be made towards the settlement of one or more of the outstanding political problems, big or small, it would help to create a more favourable atmosphere …
and so on. That is not a very strong expression of opinion, but it led us to hope that the Government would see some prospect of success at a Summit Conference, not merely in a general discussion on disarmament, but also on some political problems which we on this side have been suggesting should be discussed.
When I had finished listening to the Prime Minister, with my pencil poised to

note any particularly important things that he might say, I was reminded of something that was said to me only a few days ago by a distinguished diplomat, now in London. He told me of an occasion when, as a very young official, he went to Geneva. He listend to the speech of a very fine, well-known European orator, and was much impressed by it. When it was over, he remarked to the experienced head of his delegation what a magnificent contribution he thought that was, and his senior said, rather dryly, "All right, you draft the telegram." The young man went away to draft the telegram to his Government, and, after chewing his pencil for a long time, found that all he could make of the substance of it could be put in two or three sentences. There were only two or three sentences of substance in the Prime Minister's speech, but I would not worry about that if the gaps had been filled in by his colleagues.
We had been hoping that they would say something about the substance of the Conference, which at this stage, of course, means about an agenda, which could justify the tone of the Prime Minister's speech. We had some discussion yesterday, in relation to the agenda, on the question whether Mr. Bulganin was, in fact, claiming a veto and insisting that only the things that appeal to the Soviet Union should be included. I do not think that it is profitable to pursue the discussion in that precise form, but I think that it is a fact that will be agreed by anybody who has read the correspondence that, at the point we have now reached, there are two rival lists.
There is an American and there is a Russian list of items for the agenda, and, speaking very broadly, they are, at any rate as regards their more important items, mutually exclusive. I think that much of the Soviet Union's list, whilst perhaps not actually objectionable, lacks reality, in the sense that all the Russians ask for is some kind of declaration of good will, declarations of non-aggression, things that are uncontrollable. Therefore, in my opinion, they do not contribute very much to a settlement.
Of the American list I would say, principally, that it strikes me as a not very businesslike proposition as a working document, and certainly not businesslike as a starting point for negotiations. They


seem to have put in the maximum; all the things that they would like to get at the very end of a long period of negotiation. We must realise that a great many of those things will make it much more difficult to get discussions started at all.
Surely, in those circumstances, our job—and by "our job" I really mean the job of all the Western allies—is to pick on some of the subjects which the Soviet Union appears to be willing to discuss, and to see whether we can adjust them, or widen the terms of reference in each case, so that we, too, in addition to the Soviet Union will be able to make our legitimate points under these headings.
That is exactly what my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition did. I do not want to quote him in full, although it is not a long passage. It is within the recollection of the House that my right hon. Friend picked out four items which had been mentioned by Mr. Bulganin and suggested that they would be acceptable, not in the form in which Mr. Bulganin put them, but with some elaboration. With slight changes, he said, we could discuss the suspension of hydrogen bomb tests, but widening the issue somewhat. We could discuss not just a nuclear-free zone in Europe but disengagement in Europe. As to the Middle East, we could discuss not just the renunciation of force there, but wider issues also. Lastly, my right hon. Friend referred to the matter of cultural collaboration, the only one upon which the Government appear to be at all forthcoming, and which, he said, was harmless. I am sure most people will agree, that it is the least significant of all those headings. Surely, that is the approach which we ought to make, not to stand on either the Russian list or the American list, but to find some common ground.
My right hon. Friend the Member for Ebbw Vale (Mr. Bevan) today pointed out that we have the usual Parliamentary situation reversed in these debates. Usually, it is the Government who make the running and take the initiatives and the Opposition criticises. Indeed, the common gibe from Government benches no matter what Party is in power, is "What would you do?" In this instance, however, all the positive proposals have come from this side and have been met by a blank absence of Government initiative.
In this connection I want to answer one criticism which, though not prominent in this debate, has been very prominent in speeches outside. I think that the Foreign Secretary has used it in the past. I entirely agree with the right hon. Gentleman that we ought not to expect some new idea from our Government every few weeks on a subject like this; if a position is taken up which is sound, we cannot expect it to be constantly changed just because the other side do not immediately accept it. But that is not what we are asking. Our complaint is that there has been no really significant adaptation of the Western position, especially not on the problems of European defence and Germany, despite the world-shaking events which have taken place over a period not of weeks, but of years.
There has been reference in the debate to the major events which have led to our present situation in which we are discussing the possibility of negotiation, the death of Stalin, the possession of the H-bomb by both sides, the Hungarian revolution, the Sputnik, not to mention the great changes in the Middle East. If all those things have been happening in the world around us, the onus is on those who suggest that no change in Western policy is called for rather than on those who think that some adaptation to current circumstances would be the normal thing. After all, the minds of thinking men have been going through a very rapid evolution during the last few months and years. The Minister of State last night admitted that, although there may be no change in the strategy of the Soviet Government, at least there had been a change in their tactics. One cannot, however, say even that for the British Government or, apparently, for the Western Governments as a whole, whose tactical as well as strategical attitudes seem to be virtually unchanged.
Last night, the Minister of State referred to the policy of strength, which, in my recollection, used to be termed "negotiation from strength" at the time when it was made a key point in Western policy, particularly by Mr. Dean Acheson, a year or two ago. I myself do not complain of that principle as such. I have yet to meet the negotiator who prefers to negotiate from weakness rather than from strength, but the error which


has undoubtedly crept into the Western interpretation of that policy is that Western Governments have allowed it to be doubted by almost everybody whether they are as serious about the negotiation as they are about the strength. There is no doubt at all, I think, that outside observers—many people in our own countries and, I suspect, some inside Western Governments as well—do not really consider that what I may call the classic Western position about Germany, that is to say, the position that there must be free elections and that the subsequent German Government must be free to join N.A.T.O. if they wish, is a genuine negotiating position at all today.
But what are we waiting for, if we have believed in negotiation from strength before we do adopt a genuine negotiating position? Surely, no one now expects that there will be a really major shift of power or strength in our favour which could make a moment a little later more favourable. These things have made most people in this country and elsewhere believe that a shift to a genuine negotiating position on our part is both possible and absolutely necessary.
I now come to the Foreign Secretary's speech today. I find it very difficult to describe what my sensations were as I listened to him, but I am convinced that his general posture towards this problem of negotiating struck depression into the heart of everybody who heard it. We on this side know how we felt about it, and we could see how hon. Gentlemen opposite felt.
As I have said before in the House, I am perfectly prepared to make allowance for the genuine difficulty which faces Governments involved in many alliances about the question of being frank with their own Parliaments while they are in consultation with allies. As my right hon. Friend the Member for Lewisham, South said, this is something we all recognise. The Foreign Secretary, cannot say that the House as a whole, or indeed the Opposition, is not often patient with him when negotiations for a treaty are going on and statements cannot be made. We did not expect that he would announce all sorts of decisions about what the British Government will do.
But if we are expected to accept that the Government cannot even contribute

to an intelligent discussion in the House on a matter of this breadth and importance, and if we are to be told that because they are in consultation with their allies they are not in a position to give a lead to opinion in this country or in the world, frankly any attempt by Parliament to participate in foreign affairs at all becomes a farce. I believe that in adopting this attitude the Government are throwing away what could be a valuable diplomatic weapon, namely, the support of opinion in this country made publicly known.
Our allies do not hesitate to make their opinions known. American opinions at Government level are constantly made known in the Press conferences, both of the President and of the Secretary of State. After all, reference was made today by my right hon. Friend the Member for Ebbw Vale to a statement by a leading State Department official, Mr. Robert Murphy, in which he apparently did not hesitate to make an extremely tendentious statement which now, by being made authoritatively, becomes an element in the situation. If even our leading allies play this game—all countries do it—surely our own Government can afford to be frank enough to enlist the support of public opinion and the House.
I was shocked when the Foreign Secretary, in replying to my right hon. Friend the Member for Ebbw Vale, who asked whether it was not possible for us to be privy to what is going on, leaped to his feet and said "Certainly not", and described it as a fantastic conception. That seemed to me to be not only a discourtesy to the House but also bad diplomacy. I have ceased to believe that the difficulty with allies is the real reason. The reason for the Government's reticence derives from the fundamental barrenness of their own thinking.
I will not take the House again through all the suggestions for various adjustments of our position which have been made from this side of the House. We agree that the main difference that has emerged relates to disengagement in Europe. I want to say a word about that before I finish, but before I do so, I want to probe a little further the question of the Middle East, which many people think is a more dangerous area at present than Europe.
I should like to ask a question to which I do not think we have ever had a clear answer from the Government. We are always told that it is no good trying to approach the Russians for any kind of agreement on any major aspect of the Middle East. I should like to know whether we have, in fact, ever attempted such an agreement. What proposals have we made to them? If we have made some, when did we make them? Can we he told something of the response?
I do not think we can continue any longer relying simply on the statement that it would obviously be no good. We have been told that ever since before Mr. Bulganin and Mr. Khrushchev were here on their visit, and we are entitled to have a more precise answer.
Take, for instance, such a question as the guaranteeing of the Arab-Israel frontier, on which the Foreign Secretary was particularly unsatisfactory today, if I may say so. What worries me about this issue is the unreality of the Government's policy. Lord Gosford may say in another place that the Government stand by the Tripartite Declaration, but surely the Government know quite well that none of the parties who might look to it for protection, and indeed none of those who might seek to commit an aggression, gives a fig for the Tripartite Declaration any longer. It has become discredited. I supported it for a long time and I think that it served its term very usefully, but in fact no one is counting on it today. This is not merely because of the equivocations which went on about it and the doubts about the determination of Governments to carry it out which arose at the time of the Suez affair. It also arises from the fact that in order to be effective today any such declaration requires a fourth signature upon it. In other words, it requires to be the subject of negotiations with the Soviet Union.
Turning to another aspect of this question of the borders of Israel, we were rather shocked to have so blunt a reaffirmation of the Guildhall Speech of November, 1955, because this does nothing nowadays except to sow confusion as to what are the basic objectives of the United Kingdom in any revision which may have to take place along the Israel frontier. When he was asked to be more precise the Foreign Secretary

said that he always refuses to make any gloss upon the text of that speech, which he read in full. I am glad that he read it. I, too, have it here. We are entitled to ask him for more precision than there is in the original statement.
It may be that it was deliberately meant to be ambiguous, but I suggest to the Foregin Secretary, first, that whatever else it means it cannot mean just a rectification of the existing Israel frontier. It must mean something much bigger in the way of the reduction of the area of Israel. If he is not prepared to accept that as a flatter of textual criticism, as it were, surely he will agree that it was not in fact taken to mean that by any of the Arab States and that, after all, is the test for a published diplomatic document. Whatever the text may say, it was not in fact taken to mean that. It was taken to mean something very much more, and I believe that to revive it now can only be mischievous. It will not shift Israel's position and I believe that it promotes unreal thinking among the Arab countries.
I want to say a word on the wider aspects of the Middle East. Frankly, I am not sure how much influence the Government now wield in the area, although on a recent visit to Jordan I was much gratified by the spirit which I found there towards this country, and it may be that we have rather more influence than we have been inclined to think in recent months.
Even in the two weeks since I was there the situation has again changed. We have the Iraq-Jordan alliance, on which I should like to join in offering my congratulations. We have the Syria-Egypt alliance, and I agree with what the Foreign Secretary said about that; it may also be a step forward and we should not rush in to condemn it.
This I would also say, however: I do not believe that these alliances will lead to any fundamental progress in the Middle East if it should turn out that Russia backs one of them and the Western Powers back the other. This would simply be importing the cold war more ferociously than ever into a dangerous area. It would be particularly dangerous if the Iraq-Jordan alliance were to come to represent the old order in Arab eyes, as undoubtedly some Arabs


will try to make it do, while the Syria-Egypt alliance comes to represent the Arab nationalist revolution.
It is true that Iraq, in particular, is doing a great deal of development and that the alliance with Jordan may offer much greater opportunities for Jordan than she has had before. I hope that we shall encourage and help this, but I think we are also entitled to say to countries which have always been friendly to us that social reform will be needed in addition simply to economic development. I think that the very considerable resources which are available to the Jordan-Iraq alliance should make this sort of reform much less painful to them than it is likely to prove to Egypt and Syria.
It may be said that these things are internal matters for the countries themselves, but they are also of deep international concern, and we are entitled to offer our advice because we have such a great interest, as indeed has the whole world, in avoiding these alliances turning into a line-up of East against West.
Disengagement in Europe has been argued to and fro throughout the two days of the debate. I want to deal only with the question of the possibility that there might be what one might call a Hungarian type of revolt after disengagement occurred, and that then the Red Army would return despite formal guarantees. The Minister of State for Foreign Affairs said yesterday,
The West would then be faced with the grave decision of imposing sanctions …"—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 19th February, 1958; Vol. 582, c. 1344.]
Yes, I think that is quite true, but surely this is the same risk as is run with any other aggression anywhere else.
If I may give a particular example, which seems to me quite a close parallel, not far away from Hungary, is not it exactly the situation which would arise today if there were to be an attack upon Yugoslavia? Exactly the same grave decision would face not only the Western alliance but everybody in the United Nations.
If we take the line which the Minister of State took last night, let us think what that sort of attitude must mean to people who are at present in Eastern Europe.

If I put it rather bluntly, it is not because I want to attribute any wicked motives to the Minister of State who said it, but because I want to make it clear how I think it is bound to look to people on the other side. What they will think we are saying is, "The West, rather than see you, the Hungarians or the Poles, free and enjoying the same chance of collective assistance from outside against aggression as other people do, and in addition a specific four-Power guarantee, prefers to have you firmly behind the Iron Curtain because then everybody knows that the nations of the West cannot help you; and so you are off their conscience." It is a pretty deadly thing if we are afraid to have these countries free of foreign troops because there might be aggression against them and we might then feel under obligation to do something about it. But that is the only deduction that these people can draw.
This fully justifies Mr. George Kennan's forecast in his third lecture when he pointed out that if nothing is done about Europe there will be eventually on the part of the people of Eastern Europe
 … general despair, apathy, demoralisation and the deepest sort of disillusionment with the West.
I must allow the Prime Minister, who, I believe, is to wind up, to start his speech now. [HON. MEMBERS: "Hear, hear."] My right hon. Friend the Member for Ebbw Vale said that whether we divided this evening depended upon the Foreign Secretary's speech. Frankly, on the basis of what the Prime Minister said yesterday we did not intend to divide. It is true that he said little, but what little he said seemed constructive, conciliatory and an advance. We had hoped that the Foreign Secretary would follow him in tone and would elaborate constructive proposals, but we got neither. We had the reassertion of the Guildhall speech and only a niggling, legalistic rejection of all the proposals made by my hon. and right hon. Friends. I began to wonder, as I heard the Foreign Office Ministers speaking, whether the Prime Minister had been entitled to strike the note which he did if there was going to be as little substance behind it as there turned out to be.
We thought that the Prime Minister was seeking unity. We still hope that


he is. I should like to ask him for an assurance that he does not take the view of the attitude of the Opposition to foreign policy which seems to be taken by his noble friend, Lord Hailsham, who is quoted as saying:
We shall fight to win because we believe that the foreign policy espoused by our opponents would mean at worst the rendering of this country helpless in the face of Soviet conventional weapons, or perhaps even nuclear weapons, and at best converting it into a satellite—or even a parasite—instead of an ally of the United States.
The Prime Minister knows perfectly well that is not our attitude, and I hope he will not allow that section of his party which apparently thinks it is to win the day. We have not sought disunity, but we cannot associate ourselves with the humiliating lack of leadership which has been shown. We are therefore, obliged, with real regret, to divide the House.

9.40 p.m.

The Prime Minister (Mr. Harold Macmillan): This debate has dealt with issues of such importance and of such gravity that I feel it is due to the House, and to public opinion both at home and overseas, that I should try before the close to restate shortly the Government's position on the broad issues which are involved.
The House, I know, will forgive me if I do not go into some of the many details which have been discussed. I have heard a great deal of the debate; alas, I could not hear it all, for there were other commitments which I had to fulfil, but I have been struck by one fact.
There are, of course, natural differences between parties, and even, I would say, within parties, on matters of this kind, and that is not unnatural and has often been the case. But I did find in the speech of the Leader of the Opposition yesterday a great measure of agreement, and I was very glad to hear some of the opening passages of his speech, in which he took a very clear position, which I hope we can take to be the position of the Opposition as a whole, both in the House and in the constituencies.
I should like to remind the House, because I think they are of such importance, of some of the things the right hon. Gentleman said. He said:
We support N.A.T.O. and the Atlantic Alliance.

It follows from that that we must support it in such a way as to prevent it falling into disunion or disappearing. That is a very good reason for working with one's friends and allies. The right hon. Gentleman went on to say:
Nor do we believe in neutralism.
He was good enough to say that neutralism—
must mean, as, indeed, the Prime Minister said, either sheltering behind the United States, or the destruction of N.A.T.O., and neither of these things commends itself to us.
He then said:
Nor do I believe in the possibility of a so-called third force or new power bloc.
That was a very fashionable doctrine not very long ago, and widely held on the benches opposite. Then, the right hon. Gentleman went on to the most important of all his declarations:
Nor do we favour unilateral disarmament."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 19th February, 1958; Vol 582, c. 1233.]
The right hon. Gentleman said that his party had rejected a resolution asking them to pledge a future Labour Government neither to test, use or make nuclear weapons. I repeat—not to test, not to make, and indeed not to use them. These are not views which I hear expressed everywhere in constituency discussions or even in elections, but I am very glad that this is on the record.
In the course of this debate, a number of points have been put to us in this situation which I should like to answer as frankly and as simply as I can. We are asked to abandon the tests unilaterally, at once. The resolution, of course, was not to make this obligatory upon the Labour Government and I do not see why it should be obligatory upon us.

Mr. Bevan: At the same conference there was a resolution carried unanimously committing the Labour Government to suspending tests.

The Prime Minister: I did detect at the time of the conference the same kind of dualism that I often detect in the House. At any rate, as the right hon. Gentleman and certainly others have said, it would be a foolish thing to do at this moment. Surely the question of tests is just one of those questions which should be kept for the Summit Conference, and to make a unilateral declaration


now that we will abandon these would have none of the good effects that we want. We know well that it would not induce other countries to follow, if we merely said this. It would not necessarily induce the United States to follow, and it would have none of the effects we want. Surely this is a thing, above all, that should be reserved for discussion at a Summit Conference.

Mr. Roy Mason: Nonsense.

The Prime Minister: Then I was asked to deal with the question of disengagement, which is a very complicated matter. A large number of schemes have been put forward, some by the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition, and very well argued, and some by other hon. and right hon. Gentlemen.
To put forward these schemes may be a valuable exercise for individuals or members of an Opposition, or leader-writers or commentators. However, I would ask the House to remember that, if they are put forward from this Box on behalf of Her Majesty's Government, they become schemes or plans which are definite proposals to which we are bound. We do not make them and then retreat from them. I am not prepared—and I must ask the House to support this—to put forward a scheme of this kind until it is agreed in detail with all the countries most affected among our Allies.

Mr. Beswick: Would the Prime Minister answer this question? It is a serious point. Why is it impossible for this country to put forward any definite scheme when our American allies seem to be under no such inhibition?

The Prime Minister: So far as I know the American Government have not put forward a scheme of disengagement. I am talking about disengagement schemes. Alas I was not present, but there was reported to me the observation made in what I know must have been a very powerful speech from the right hon. Member for Lewisham, South (Mr. H. Morrison). He pointed out what I would have pointed out, though I am sure he has done it in greater detail, that there are certain dangers in many of these schemes, and that we cannot just throw away lightly, or without very careful

consideration, the security system which we have built over years. The right hon. Gentleman pointed out that already one of the weaknesses of N.A.T.O. is what he called its lack of depth, and there are many dangers, as well as some possible advantages, in the various schemes which are under discussion.
It is our duty, and it is our intention, to discuss these with our allies specially concerned. Indeed, they are all concerned, but perhaps the Federal Government of Western Germany is one of the most concerned. We must discuss them also with all the rest of the N.A.T.O. allies and with the United States, for nothing could be more terrible than if the result of some plans lightly entered into was the dissolution of N.A.T.O., the loss of Germany and, possibly, the driving of America back into isolation.
I am then asked to give some definite pledge about ballistic missiles. We shall soon put upon the Order Paper a Motion, and this subject will be discussed in the Defence debate on two days next week, where it most properly belongs. I am asked to stop all preparations—even the preparatory work on some of the sites—until after the summit meeting. Even if it were the case that this was possible, or that it would have any great effect upon the military situation in the next few months—which it would not—I wonder whether such a gesture would have more than a day of two's effect. What lasting effect would it have? Does anyone think that, if we made that gesture—which would be an honourable one, and I see the purpose of it—the Russians would stop building all their bases?
Does anyone think that the construction of the long-range missiles or long-range operational bombers would cease in Russia? There is a great danger in making one of these gestures, which sound very well. They work very well for a week or two, but then one is asked, "What more will you do?" I would have thought that this whole question, which belongs to the disarmament problem in its widest form—the question of the location of missiles as well as the control of nuclear armaments—would far better be left until it can be discussed with the hope of some corresponding advantage coming to us in return.
The right hon. Member for Grimsby (Mr. Younger) made a moderate speech,


despite what he said at the end—and he had to say that, because he was told to say it; he clearly belongs to that part of the Opposition which would have preferred not to divide tonight; but he has done his duty in a very agreeable way. He rather wondered why I had said that some advance, however small, on the disarmament front was one of the most hopeful things. I repeat what I said, and I will give the reasons.
I said it partly because I honestly felt, last summer, that we were getting somewhere. There was a point when those nearest the discussions—and especially some of our American friends—felt that there was a chance that we were getting somewhere. I believe that there is an opportunity, and I have reason to hope that in this field we may be able to make some advance. It would also have the great advantage that if we could get controlled disarmament it would deal with some aspects of disengagement—in a way it is part of the same problem—without involving some of the much more difficult political aspects so much affecting the lives and interests of many of the countries of Europe. I still believe that it is in this field that we have an opportunity of making some advance.
Finally, I come to the whole question surrounding what has been called the summit meeting. I made it clear yesterday that I am in favour of such a meeting. I do not think that there was any doubt about what I said. I said—and I hold to it—that I want a summit meeting, but I earnestly want it to achieve at least some success. During the months when the prospect of such a meeting is held out, there would be a sense of relief and hope. If it failed completely, we might win a propaganda success if we proved that the Russians were hopelessly inflexible and we were reasonably flexible, but it would be only a propaganda success and not a real one; and once again there would descend upon us a sense of hopelessness and even despair.
Therefore, when I say that I want a summit meeting but I want it to be successful, I am really sincere, and I am not without hope that if we handle it wisely and manage the preparatory work skilfully we may obtain some modest advance. Then, however small the advance, an immense change would come, because there would always be the

expectation and the possibility of moving on from that to some further step. But if we have a complete and absolute blank, as we had before, I very much fear that the results will be almost worse than if we had not embarked on the enterprise. I therefore want a meeting, but a useful and effective meeting.
I have been asked whether I would announce the date. Of course, that is quite a good question to ask, and I do not have any objection to it. But I do not think that anyone in this House really expects me tonight to announce the date of the summit meeting without the full agreement of those who are to go there. After all, even if one gives a dinner party one takes the precaution to find out whether the guests are likely to come. These are matters which must, of course, be discussed in detail and must be matters of agreement between the Powers involved. To do this unilaterally on my part tonight would seem to me to be an act of folly. I can think of no more certain way of killing the Summit Conference.
When we come to the agenda, I agree with what the right hon. Gentleman said. I think it is rather a mistake at any rate to publish these great lists of agendas which do not look so terribly hopeful on either side. He suggested that perhaps I would help by publishing what I thought would be the best agenda, so that everybody's bid, as it were, would be on the table. But I do not think that is our duty or the best way in which we can use our diplomatic power. I believe that what t said yesterday is still true.
We believe that our best hope lies in serious preparatory work; to lay down a procedure—this is my point, and it answers the right hon. Gentleman—to choose an agenda calculated to achieve concrete results on specific issues, and—I think this is of great importance—to do the preliminary work in disentangling the points of disagreement and revealing perhaps the most promising areas of possible agreement. If that work is well done, we shall have not only a good agenda, which prevents it from being merely a polemic exercise, but there will have been enough preparatory work to know something of what may be the movements and where the most helpful direction for discussion lies.
A great deal of the success or failure will depend on how effectively we do that and I must therefore repeat to the House, as I said earlier in my opening speech, that I think there is—perhaps more than we all realise—a good deal of agreement among us. Of course, there is disagreement on this and that, but I think there is a good deal of agreement.
I hope it is sincere agreement and we are determined to do everything we can to succeed. We have every interest.

We have party and political interests, but we have much more than that. There is hardly a man in this House who, one way or another, if he thinks of his children and his grandchildren, has not a deep personal interest. All I can say is that the Government, both as a Government and, I hope, as men, will do their best to succeed.

Question put, That this House do now adjourn:—

The House divided: Ayes 242, Noes 308.

Division No. 42.]
AYES
[10.0 p.m.


Ainsley, J. W.
Finch, H. J.
Mabon, Dr. J. Dickson


Allaun, Frank (Salford, E.)
Fletcher, Eric
McCann, J.


Allen, Arthur (Bosworth)
Foot, D. M.
MacColl, J. E.


Anderson, Frank
Fraser, Thomas (Hamilton)
MacDermot, Niall


Awbery, S. S.
Gaitskell, Rt. Hon. H. T. N.
McGhee, H. G.


Bacon, Miss Alice
George, Lady Megan Lloyd (Car'then)
McInnes, J.


Baird, J.
Gibson, C. W.
McKay, John (Wallsend)


Balfour, A.
Gooch, E. G.
McLeavy, Frank


Bellenger, Rt. Hon. F. J.
Gordon Walker, Rt. Hon. P. C.
MacMillan, M. K. (Western Isles)


Bence, C. R. (Dunbartonshire, E.)
Greenwood, Anthony
MacPherson, Malcolm (Stirling)


Benn, Hn. Wedgwood (Bristol, S.E.)
Grenfell, Rt. Hon. D. R.
Mahon, Simon


Benson, Sir George
Griffiths, David (Rother Valley)
Mainwaring, W. H.


Beswick, Frank
Griffiths, Rt. Hon. James (Llanelly)
Mallalieu, E. L. (Brigg)


Bevan, Rt. Hon. A. (Ebbw Vale)
Griffiths, William (Exchange)
Mallalieu, J. P. W. (Hudd[...]ersfd, E.)


Blackburn, F.
Hale, Leslie
Mann, Mrs. Jean


Blenkinsop, A.
Hall, Rt. Hn. Glenvil (Colne Valley)
Mason, Roy


Blyton, W. R.
Hannan, W.
Mellish, R. J.


Boardman, H.
Harrlson, J. (Nottingham, N.)
Messer, Sir F.


Bottomley, Rt. Hon. A. G.
Hastings, S.
Mi[...]kardo, Ian


Bowles, F. G.
Hayman, F. H.
Mitchison, G. R.


Boyd, T. C.
Healey, Denis
Monslow, W.


Braddock, Mrs. Elizabeth
Henderson, Rt. Hn. A. (Rwly Regis)
Moody, A. S.


Brockway, A. F.
Herbison, Miss M.
Morris, Percy (Swansea, W.)


Broughton, Dr. A. D. D.
Hewitson, Capt. M.
Morrison, Rt.Hn.Herbert(Lewis'm,S.)


Brown, Rt. Hon. George (Belper)
Hobson, C. R. (Keighley)
Mort, D. L.


Brown, Thomas (Ince)
Holman, p.
Moss, R.


Burton, Miss F. E.
Holmes, Horace
Moyle, A.


Butler, Herbert (Hackney, C.)
Houghton, Douglas
Mulley, F. W.


Butler, Mrs. Joyce (Wood Green)
Howell, Charles (Perry Barr)
Neal, Harold (Bolsover)


Callaghan, L. J.
Howell, Denis (All Saints)
Noel-Baker, Francis (Swindon)


Castle, Mrs. B. A.
Hubbard, T. F.
O'Brien, Sir Thomas


Champlon, A. J.
Hughes, Cledwyn (Anglesey)
Oliver, G. H.


Chapman, W. D.
Hughes, Emrys (S. Ayrshire)
Oram, A. E.


Chetwynd, G. R.
Hunter, A. E.
Orbach, M.


Clunie, J.
Hynd, H. (Accrington)
Oswald, T.


Coldrick, W.
Hynd, J. B. (Attercliffe)
Owen, W. J.


Collick, P. H.(Birkenhead)
Irvine, A. J. (Edge Hill)
Padley, W. E.


Collins, V. J. (Shoreditch &amp; Finsbury)
Irving, Sydney (Dartford)
Paget, R. T.


Corbet, Mrs. Freda
Isaacs, Rt. Hon. G. A.
Paling, Rt. Hon. W. (Dearne Valley)


Cove, W. G.
Janner, B.
Palmer, A. M. F.


Craddock, George (Bradford, S.)
Jay, Rt. Hon. D. P. T.
Pannell, Charles (Leeds, W.)


Cronin, J. D.
Jeger, George (Goole)
Pargiter, G. A.


Crossman, R. H. S.
Jeger, Mrs. Lena(Holbn &amp; St.Pncs,S.)
Parker, J.


Dalton, Rt. Hon. H.
Jenkins, Roy (Stechford)
Parkin, B. T.


Darling, George (Hillsborough)
Johnson, James (Rugby)
Paton, John


Davies, Ernest (Enfield, E.)
Johnston, Douglas (Paisley)
Peart, T. F.


Davies, Harold (Leek)
Jones, Rt. Hon. A. Creech (Wakefield)
Pentland, N.


Davies, Stephen (Merthyr)
Jones, David (The Hartl[...]epools)
Plummer, Sir Leslie


Deer, G.
Jones, Jack (Rotherham)
Popplewell, E.


de Freitas, Geoffrey
Jones, J. Idwal (Wrexham)
Prentice, R. E.


Delargy, H. J.
Jones, T. W. (Merioneth)
Price, J. T. (Westhoughton)


Diamond, John
Kenyon, C.
Price, Philips (Gloucestershire, W.)


Dodds, N. N.
Key, Rt. Hon. C. W.
Probert, A. R.


Donnelly, D. L.
King, Dr. H. M.
Proctor, W. T.


Dye, S.
Lawson, G. M.
Pursey, Cmdr. H.


Ede, Rt. Hon. J. C.
Ledger, R. J.
Randall, H. E.


Edelman, M.
Lee, Frederick (Newton)
Rankin, John


Edwards, Rt. Hon. Ness (Caerphilly)
Lee, Miss Jennie (Cannock)
Redhead, E. C.


Edwards, W. J. (Stepney)
Lever, Harold (Cheetham)
Reeves, J.


Evans, Albert (Islington, S.W.)
Lewis, Arthur
Reid, William


Evans, Edward (Lowestoft)
Lindgren, G. S.
Rhodes, H.


Fernyhough, E.
Lipton, Marcus
Robens, Rt. Hon. A.




Roberts, Goronwy (Caernarvon)
Stonehouse, John
West, D. G.


Robinson, Kenneth (St. Pancras, N.)
Stones, W. (Consett)
Wheeldon, W. E.


Rogers, George (Kensington, N.)
Strachey, Rt. Hon. J.
White, Mrs. Eirene (E. Flint)


Ross, William
Strauss, Rt. Hon. George (Vauxhall)
White, Henry (Derbyshire, N.E.)


Royle, C.
Summerskill, Rt. Hon. E.
Wilcock, Group Capt. C. A. B.


Short, E. W.
Swingler, S. T.
Wilkins, W. A.


Shurmer, P. L. E.
Taylor, Bernard (Mansfield)
Willey, Frederick


Silverman, Julius (Aston)
Taylor, John (West Lothian)
Williams, David (Neath)


Silverman, Sydney (Nelson)
Thomas, George (Cardiff)
Williams, Rev. Llywelyn (Ab'tillery)


Simmons, C. J. (Brierley Hill)
Thomas, Iorwerth (Rhondda, W.)
Williams, Ronald (Wigan)


Skeffington, A.M.
Thomson, George (Dundee, E.)
Williams, W. T. (Barons Court)


Slater, Mrs. H. (Stoke, N.)
Tomney, F.
Winterbottom, Richard


Slater, J. (Sedgefield)
Ungoed-Thomas, Sir Lynn
Woodburn, Rt. Hon. A.


Snow, J. W.
Usborne, H. C.
Woof, R. E.


Sorensen, R. W.
Viant, S. P.
Yates, V. (Ladywood)


Soskice, Rt. Hon. Sir Frank
Warbey, W. N.
Younger, Rt. Hon. K.


Sparks, J. A.
Watkins, T. E.
Zilliacus, K.


Steele, T.
Weitzman, D.



Stewart, Michael (Fulham)
Wells, William (Walsall, N.)
TELLERS FOR THE AYES:




Mr. Bowden and Mr. Pearson.




NOES


Agnew, Sir Peter
Davidson, Viscountess
Hinchingbrooke, Viscount


Aitken, W. T.
D'Avigdor-Goldsmid, Sir Henry
Hirst, Geoffrey


Allan, R. A. (Paddington, S.)
Deedes, W. F.
Hobson, John (Warwick &amp; Leam'gt'n)


Alport, C. J. M.
Digby, Simon Wingfield
Holland-Martin, C. J.


Amery, Julian (Preston, N.)
Dodds-Parker, A. D.
Holt, A. F.


Amory, Rt. Hn. Heathcoat (Tiverton)
Donaldson, Cmdr. C. E. McA.
Hope, Lord John


Anstruther-Gray, Major Sir William
Doughty, C. J. A.
Hornby, R. P.


Arbuthnot, John
Drayson, G. B.
Hornsby-Smith, Miss M. P.


Armstrong, C. W.
du Cann, E. D. L.
Horobin, Sir Ian


Ashton, H.
Dugdale, Rt. Hn. Sir T. (Richmond)
Horsbrugh, Rt. Hon. Dame Florence


Astor, Hon. J. J.
Duncan, Sir James
Howard, Gerald (Cambridgeshire)


Atkins, H. E.
Duthie, W. S.
Howard, Hon. Greville (St. Ives)


Baldock, Lt.-Cmdr. J. M.
Eden, J. B. (Bournemouth, West)
Howard, John (Test)


Baldwin, A. E.
Elliott, R.W.(N'castle upon Tyne, N.)
Hughes Hallett, Vice-Admiral J.


Balniel, Lord
Emmet, Hon. Mrs. Evelyn
Hughes-Young, M. H. C.


Barber, Anthony
Errington, Sir Eric
Hulbert, Sir Norman


Barlow, Sir John
Erroll, F. J.
Hurd, A. R.


Barter, John
Farey-Jones, F. W.
Hutchison, Sir Ian Clark (E'b'gh, W.)


Baxter, Sir Beverley
Fell, A.
Hutchison, Sir James (Scotstoun)


Beamish, Col. Tufton
Finlay, Graeme
Hutchison, Michael Clark (E'b'gh, S.)


Bell, Philip (Bolton, E.)
Fisher, Nigel
Hyde, Montgomery


Bell, Ronald (Bucks, S.)
Fletcher-Cooke, C.
Hylton-Foster, Rt. Hon. Sir Harry


Bennett, F. M. (Torquay)
Forrest, G.
Iremonger, T. L.


Bennett, Dr. Reginald
Fraser, Hon. Hugh (Stone)
Irvine, Bryant Godman (Rye)


Bevins, J. R. (Toxteth)
Fraser, Sir Ian (M'cmbe &amp; Lonsdale)
Jenkins, Robert (Dulwich)


Bidgood, J. C.
Freeth, Denzil
Jennings, J. C. (Burton)


Biggs-Davison, J. A.
Galbraith, Hon. T. G. D.
Jennings, Sir Roland (Hallam)


Bishop, F. P.
Gammans, Lady
Johnson, Dr. Donald (Carlisle)


Black, C. W.
Garner-Evans, E. H.
Johnson, Eric (Blackley)


Body, R. F.
George, J. C. (Pollok)
Johnson, Howard (Kemptown)


Boothby, Sir Robert
Gibson-Watt, D.
Jones, Rt. Hon. Aubrey (Hall Green)


Bossom, Sir Alfred
Glyn, Col. Richard H.
Joseph, Sir Keith


Bowen, E. R. (Cardigan)
Godber, J. B.
Kaberry, D.


Boyd-Carpenter, Rt. Hon. J. A.
Gomme-Duncan, Col. Sir Alan
Keegan, D.


Boyle, Sir Edward
Goodhart, Philip
Kerby, Capt. H. B.


Braithwaite, Sir Albert (Harrow, W.)
Gower, H. R.
Kerr, Sir Hamilton


Bromley-Davenport, Lt.-Col. W. H.
Graham, Sir Fergus
Kershaw, J. A.


Brooke, Rt. Hon. Henry
Grant, W. (Woodside)
Kimball, M.


Brooman-White, R. C.
Grant-Ferris, Wg Cdr. R.(Nantwich)
Kirk, P. M.


Browne, J. Nixon (Craigton)
Green, A.
Lagden, G. W.


Bryan, P.
Gresham Cooke, R.
Lambton, Viscount


Bullus, Wing Commander E. E.
Grimston, Sir Robert (Westbury)
Lancaster, Col. C. G.


Butcher, Sir Herbert
Grosvenor, Lt.-Col. R. G.
Langford-Holt, J. A.


Campbell, Sir David
Gurden, Harold
Leather, E. H. C.


Carr, Robert
Hall, John (Wycombe)
Leavey, J. A.


Cary, Sir Robert
Hare, Rt. Hon. J. H.
Leburn, W. G.



Harris, Frederic (Croydon, N.W.)



Channon, Sir Henry
Harris, Reader (Heston)
Legge-Bourke, Maj. E. A. H.


Chichester-Clark, R.
Harrison, A. B. C. (Maldon)
Legh, Hon. Peter (Petersfield)


Cole, Norman
Harrison, Col. J. H. (Eye)
Lindsay, Hon. James (Devon, N.)


Conant, Maj. Sir Roger
Harvey,Sir Arthur Vere(Macclesf'd)
Lindsay, Martin (Solihull)


Cooke, Robert
Harvey, John (Walthamstow, E.)
Linstead, Sir H. N.


Cooper, A. E.
Harvie-Watt, Sir George
Llewellyn, D. T.


Cooper-Key, E. M.
Hay, John
Lloyd, Maj. Sir Guy (Renfrew, E.)


Cordeaux, Lt.-Col. J. K.
Heald, Rt. Hon. Sir Lionel
Lloyd, Rt. Hon. Selwyn (Wirral)


Corfield, Capt. F. V.
Henderson, John (Cathcart)
Longden, Gilbert


Craddock, Beresford (Spelthorne)
Henderson-Stewart, Sir James
Low, Rt. Hon. Sir Toby


Crowder, Sir John (Finchley)
Hesketh, R. F.
Lucas, Sir Jocelyn (Portsmouth, S.)


Crowder, Petre (Ruislip—Northwood)
Hicks-Beach, Maj. W. W.
Lucas, P. B. (Brentford &amp; Chiswick)


Cunningham, Knox
Hill, Rt. Hon. Charles (Luton)
Lucas-Tooth, Sir Hugh


Currie, G. B. H.
Hill, Mrs. E. (Wythenshawe)
McAdden, S. J.


Dance, J. C. G
Hill, John (S. Norfolk)
Macdonald, Sir Peter







Mackeson, Brig. Sir Harry
Pannell, N. A. (Kirkdale)
Stevens, Geoffrey


McKibbin, Alan
Partridge, E.
Steward, Sir William (Woolwich, W.)


McLaughlin, Mrs. P.
Peel, W. J.
Stoddart-Scott, Col. Sir Malcolm


Maclay, Rt. Hon. John
Peyton, J. W. W.
Storey, S.


Maclean, Sir Fitzroy (Lancaster)
Pike, Miss Mervyn
Studholme, Sir Henry


Macleod, Rt. Hn. Iain (Enfield, W.)
Pilkington, Capt. R. A.
Summers, Sir Spencer


MacLeod, John (Ross &amp; Cromarty)
Pitman, I. J.
Sumner, W. D. M. (Orpington)


Macmillan, Rt.Hn.Harold(Bromley)
Pitt, Miss E. M.
Taylor, Sir Charles (Eastbourne)


Macmillan, Maurice (Halifax)
Pott, H. P.
Taylor, William (Bradford, N.)


Macpherson, Niall (Dumfries)
Powell, J. Enoch
Teeling, W.


Maddan, Martin
Price, David (Eastleigh)
Temple, John M.


Maitland, Cdr. J. F. W. (Horncastle)
Price, Henry (Lewisham, W.)
Thomas, Leslie (Canterbury)


Maitland, Hon. Patrick (Lanark)
Prior-Palmer, Brig. O. L.
Thomas, P. J. M. (Conway)


Manningham-Buller, Rt. Hn. Sir R.
Profumo, J. D.
Thompson, Kenneth (Walton)


Markham, Major Sir Frank
Ramsden, J. E.
Thompson, Lt.-Cdr. R. (Croydon, S.)


Marlowe, A. A. H.
Rawlinson, Peter
Thorneyoroft, Rt. Hon. P.


Marples, Rt. Hon. A. E.
Redmayne, M.
Thornton-Kemsley, Sir Colin


Marshall, Douglas
Rees-Davies, W. R.
Tilney, John (Wavertree)


Mathew, R.
Remnant, Hon. P.
Turner, H. F. L.


Maude, Angus
Renton, D. L. M.
Turton, Rt. Hon. R. H.


Maudling, Rt. Hon. R.
Ridsdale, J. E.
Tweedsmuir, Lady


Mawby, R. L.
Rippon, A. G. F.
Vane, W. M. F.


Maydon, Lt.-Comdr. S. L. C.
Roberts, Sir Peter (Heeley)
Vaughan-Morgan, J. K.


Medlicott, Sir Frank
Robertson, Sir David
Vickers, Miss Joan


Molson, Rt. Hon. Hugh
Robinson, Sir Roland (Blackpool, S.)
Vosper, Rt. Hon. D. F.


Moore, Sir Thomas
Robson Brown, Sir William
Wakefield, Edward (Derbyshire, W.)


Morrison, John (Salisbury)
Roper, Sir Harold
Wakefield, Sir Wavell (St. M'lebone)


Mott-Radclyffe, Sir Charles
Ropner, Col. Sir Leonard
Walker-Smith, Rt. Hon. Derek


Nabarro, G. D. N.
Russell, R. S.
Wall, Patrick


Neave, Airey
Sandys, Rt. Hon. D.
Ward, Rt. Hon. G. R. (Worcester)


Nicholls, Harmar
Scott-Miller, Cmdr. R.
Ward, Dame Irene (Tynemouth)


Nicholson, Sir Godfrey (Farnham)
Sharples, R. C.
Watkinson, Rt. Hon. Harold


Nicolson, N. (B'n'm'th, E. &amp; Chr'ch)
Shepherd, William
Webbe, Sir H.


Noble, Comdr. Rt. Hon. Allan
Simon, J. E. S. (Middlesbrough, W.)
Whitelaw, W. S. I.


Nugent, G. R. H.
Smithers, Peter (Winchester)
Williams, Paul (Sunderland, S.)


O'Neill, Hn. Phelim (Co. Antrim, N.)
Smyth, Brig. Sir John (Norwood)
Williams, R. Dudley (Exeter)


Ormsby-Gore, Rt. Hon. W. D.
Soames, Christopher
Wills, G. (Bridgwater)


Orr, Capt. L. P. S.
Spearman, Sir Alexander
Wilson, Geoffrey (Truro)


Orr-Ewing, Charles Ian (Hendon, N.)
Speir, R. M.
Wood, Hon. R.


Orr-Ewing, Sir Ian (Weston-S-Mare)
Spence, H. R. (Aberdeen, W.)
Wo[...]llam, John Victor


Osborne, C.
Spens, Rt. Hn. Sir P. (Kens'gt'n, S.)



Page, R. G.
Stanley, Capt. Hon. Richard
TELLERS FOR THE NOES:




Mr. Heath and Mr. Oakshott.

ORDNANCE SURVEY DEPARTMENT (REDUNDANCIES)

Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn.—[Mr. Wills.]

10.11 p.m.

Dr. Horace King: I wish to ask the Joint Under-Secretary to the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, who is to reply to the debate tonight and is responsible for the Ordnance Survey Department, not to dismiss as redundant some 80 cartographic surveyors and draughtsmen, most of whom have at least ten years of service, who have families and dependants, who have housing commitments and who are at least middle-aged, when at the same time the Minister proposes to take on 150 new staff, mostly boys and girls.
The Minister's motive is to save a few thousand pounds, but the issue which I wish to put to him tonight is a human one; I want to plead for the happiness and well-being of some Southampton and Chessington men and women who have served the Minister loyally and capably.
The simple facts are these. Ordnance Survey staff were recently awarded a pay increase by an arbitration award, whereupon the Treasury instructed the Department to reduce its staff to save some of the money awarded in the pay increase. The original number to be dismissed was much greater than it is now. The union concerned and the management together have reduced the impact of the Treasury's cruel decision to its lowest possible number and have done their best to ensure that, when dismissals came, the principle of "last in, first out" and the protection of permanent posts applied. After the union and the management have done all that they can, the bitter fact remains, however, that some very good people face tragedy. The villain of the piece is either the Minister who is to reply to this debate or the Chancellor of the Exchequer.
First, a word about the redundancy itself. The Minister cannot say that this is a question of getting rid of inefficient people. Throughout the grim negotiations, it has been admitted that the men and women for whom I am pleading are excellent workers. Even the cold note

of the Director-General when he sacked them ended with his "deep appreciation of the services they had rendered to the Department."
It is not a question of reducing the work of the Department—far from it. The work of Ordnance Survey goes steadily on. Maps change as the face of Britain changes. The work that these people have been doing must continue or the Department will suffer. In fact, newcomers will have to be taught over a number of years the jobs that these people are doing and these newcomers will be carried by the Ordnance Survey Department in their early days. I suggest to the Minister that this is not economy, but waste. It is penny wisdom and pound folly.
Nor is it a question of making Ordnance Survey more efficient by getting rid of overlapping or of limpets If that were true, Ordnance Survey would stand condemned for allowing the Department to remain at a swollen strength so long. It is not true and the Minister knows that it is not true. He is getting rid of skilled people who are doing important jobs and whose posts will have to be filled.
The cut is linked purely and simply with the rise in pay. It is an unintelligent Geddes Axe, and falls on the righteous. The Government now say, "Since we have given this pay rise, someone must pay for it with his livelihood." Inside the temperate plea that I am making tonight, I find it impossible to comment on such an attitude. I am sure that no one in the Department approves of the dismissals. The managers and overseers who just now meet each day their faithful servants who are under notice, must feel unhappy and ashamed, if they are decent and honourable men, as I know them to be.
Here let me pay a tribute to the union concerned—the Institution of Professional Civil Servants. Here is a union that has always taken a positive interest in the efficiency of the Department, and often makes suggestions for improving the quality and efficiency of the work in the Ordnance Survey Department. That union is the last to plead for worthless people. As I have said, management and union have softened the blow. How has this been done? It has been done chiefly by relying on natural wastage by age, by refusing to fill vacancies and by cutting


down the intake. If the reduction is necessary—and I do not think that it is—this is the obvious way of meeting the Treasury demand. In this way all the money that the Treasury want to save could have been obtained within a very short time.
It seems almost as if someone wants blood, because the Minister insists on appointing more newcomers than he is dismissing old hands. When the union begged him not to do this, he replied that if he did not appoint enough youngsters he would be breaking faith with candidates, and would upset
… the even flow of recruits.
Surely, if one has to break faith, it is better to break faith with newcomers, not yet in, than with old and tried servants.
In 1950 and 1955 I said of the Ordnance Survey Department in this House:
In detail, accuracy, skill, science and artistry, our … maps are second to none … we are fortunate to possess … at Southampton and Chessington a highly-skilled and exceptionally loyal and conscientious body of civil servants."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 15th November, 1955; Vol. 546, c. 373.]
Both former Ministers joined in that tribute. Yet it is this loyal team that the Minister now chooses to humiliate and outrage.
I want the Minister to know what he is doing—just who these unestablished people are. Most of them are middle-aged, and have a highly-specialised skill which is invaluable to the Ordnance Survey Department, but is not so broadly useful outside. They will not easily get jobs outside. For instance, it is now two months since they were told that they were under notice but could leave at once if they got another job. In that time, not one of them who is over forty has got a job, and the local employment exchange has made it quite clear that it will be difficult to find them suitable jobs. One man applied for a post. Asked why he left his previous job he replied "Redundancy". The possible employer would not believe him, asking, "How can you be redundant if Ordnance Survey is also taking on, at this moment, 150 new hands?"
I want now to give to the House some of the cases of my constituents. I do not give their names, but I can vouch for

the complete accuracy of what I shall say. A woman over 50 years of age joined the Department in the war years, in response to a patriotic appeal. Her husband had left the Ordnance Survey Department to serve in the Army. She left the Department when her husband came back, but he died in 1948 and she rejoined the Department.
That is why she is unestablished. As I shall show, most of these unestablished people are unestablished for some human reason, not because of technical deficiency in the skill and industry demanded for the job. That woman is a part supporter of an ex-Royal Navy invalid brother. Her father worked for the Ordnance Survey Department for 45 years. She has had excellent reports for every year she has been there, and she is dismissed.
Some of these people tried to get established, and failed. The examination is in two parts—one technical, one personal. Several of them passed the technical examination with flying colours—for example, one was upgraded from Grade IV to Grade II—but they failed merely at the interview. One with twenty years' service, doubly promoted, but highly nervous and incapable of being anything but terrified before an establishment board, has been dismissed. Another man, also promoted on technical grounds, but tubercular and requiring a job where he can sit—a highly competent officer, and sole supporter of his aged mother—has been dismissed. Another, with fifteen years' service, invalided out of the R.A.F. and holding the D.F.M., who, because of his disability has to be near his work, has been dismissed. He started two years ago to buy a house on mortgage, and he will not even get back all his deposit if he has to sell his house because of the rising rate of interest.
There is another woman with eighteen years' service who keeps her aged parents, her 82-year-old father being an invalid; she has been dismissed. A woman who has given twenty-four years of highly competent work as a photo-draughtsman—her life's work—to the Department, invaluable in the Department but in the world outside finding it difficult to get another post, has been dismissed.
Another woman writes:
I have spent moat of my life in Ordnance Survey. Indeed, it is my career. I have suffered the bad with the good.


Incidentally, those of us who know Ordnance Survey know just how bad was the bad and how well these men and women stuck by Ordnance Survey during the war. She goes on:
Is it just that new entrants to whom the Service means nothing should take our places? Remember that it takes three years to make a competent draughtsman, and five a photo-draughtsman. Should the use of trained people be lost to the nation and time be spent in training those who can be of no real use for some time?
Another fine young man came to see me last week, invalided out of the Regular Army, after serving ten years. He is buying his house on mortgage, and now faces disaster—a first-class man, a first-class Southampton citizen. Incidentally, I hope that my friends on the nonparty committee of the House looking after disabled ex-Service men will take note of some of the cases I have mentioned tonight.
These are the kind of people whose life of loyal service has been shattered by a decision of the Minister. All my life, I have fought against the ruthlessness of some private firms which pick up a man and drop him as if he is a tool. When I described the circumstances giving rise to this debate to a friend of mine, an hon. Gentleman opposite, he told me that his firm would never treat a faithful employee in this way. Knowing the hon. Gentleman as I do, I know that he was speaking the truth. Why should the Minister be more unkind than the best private employers in this country? I understand, incidentally, that some of the skilled men have been offered jobs as storekeepers at half the wage.
I am happy that, in this debate, I am supported by two of my Hampshire friends, the hon. Gentleman the Member for Southampton, Test (Mr. J. Howard) and the hon. Gentleman the Member for Eastleigh (Mr. D. Price), and I am happy to know that I am supported by, even if he has not a chance to speak, the hon. Gentleman the Member for Merton and Morden (Mr. Atkins). I beg the Minister, at this eleventh hour, to save these people, to solve the problem of finding economies in his Department by natural wastage and a reduction of intake. His reply tonight can make some 80 families happy or confirm their bitter unhappiness and unjust treatment.
I have recently shown, by Question and Answer in the House, that the Minister has already achieved his main economy in other ways, by reducing the intake. The payment of gratuities and the waste of money and labour in training new entrants between them wipe out the pitiful sum which he proposes to save by repaying honourable service with base ingratitude. What is involved is merely a little time and a few thousand pounds. The Minister has a chance to right a wrong tonight. I sincerely hope that he will take it.

10.24 p.m.

Mr. John Howard: I am glad to be able to speak for a few minutes in this debate, because the Ordnance Survey Office in Southampton is in my constituency, because some of the people made redundant are constituents of mine, and certain of them are my personal friends.
It is always a tragic time when redundancy hits any town. I will not review the personal instances which could be quoted; the hon. Member for Southampton, Itchen (Dr. King) has already demonstrated that there is severe hardship in a number of homes in Southampton as a result of redundancy in the Ordnance Survey Depot. Reduction in armaments, for example, which is applauded frequently on both sides, gives rise to temporary redundancy which may be taken up. Here we have redundancy from a different cause. We are told that the redundancy arises from introducing new entrants into the office with the intention of achieving a better balance. Be that as it may, the introduction of these new entrants has inevitably been at the expense of the temporary staff. Some of them have had no opportunity to become established. Others, as the hon. Member for Southampton, Itchen has indicated, have tried, but have not been successful.
I agree that it is necessary to maintain the distinction between permanent and temporary staffs. But, nevertheless, the temporary staff at the Ordnance Survey Office, once it was decided to retain the office in Southampton and not move it to Wellingborough, certainly believed that their temporary employment would last for the rest of their working lives. It


has been a dreadful blow to them and to the town that these redundancies have occurred.
In speaking in this debate, I would like to ask my hon. Friend the Parliamentary Secretary to be as generous as possible with gratuities, to use his good offices to the utmost extent to find new jobs for people who have been discharged, and, in particular, to leave those who find it impossible to obtain a suitable job until the last possible moment before their discharge or, if practical, fill an unexpected vacancy in the Department.

10.27 p.m.

Mr. David Price: In the one minute to which I promise to restrict myself, I would like to join my two neighbours from Southampton, the hon. Members for Southampton, Itchen (Dr. King) and Southampton, Test (Mr. J. Howard), in their plea in this very serious case of great personal hardship.
I find it almost impossible to apply the definition of "temporary" or "unestablished" to people with over 20 years' service in the Ordnance Survey Office. I speak from my experience in private industry. Although we sometimes have to make the same distinction when a person has been with us as long as that, I can conceive no circumstances under which we would recruit a number of young people to take the place of old faithful servants. It is no good talking in scholastic fashion about the balance of age groups. This is a very real human problem. I wonder what sort of reply the Minister of Labour would make if an hon. Gentleman were to raise this issue in respect of a private firm. I am sure that he would speak grave words of censure about a private firm that behaved like that.
I beg the Parliamentary Secretary, who I know is on our side in this matter, not to allow himself to be tied up entirely with the Departmental answer. This is a case of organisation getting out of hand. I know him as a great personal friend and a sincere lover of humanity. Let him show, even in this age, that human beings do control Departments and that we are not subjected entirely to the organisation as a mere cog in the machine.

10.28 p.m.

The Joint Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (Mr. J. B. Godber): I am grateful both to the hon. Member for Southampton, Itchen (Dr. King), who raised this important debate, and to my hon. Friends the Members for Eastleigh (Mr. D. Price) and Southampton, Test (Mr. J. Howard) for the way in which they have all dealt with this matter. Of course, we are dealing with a very acute human problem.
I realise the force, feeling and genuineness behind the words of both the hon. Member for Itchen and my two hon. Friends. But I must put one or two facts before the House to try to get this matter in perspective, as I see it.
First, I should like to express my own very genuine regret that it has been found necessary to terminate the services of some of these people, who have served for many years in some cases and have given loyal service. I am satisfied that, in the circumstances which I am coining to in a moment, and for the reasons which I shall give, the course which we had to take was the right and proper one. I do not say that it was an easy one, but I say that it was the right one.
For some years, the Ordnance Survey has been endeavouring to recruit cartographic draughtsmen and surveyors through the Civil Service Commission to fill the overall non-industrial complement authorised by the Treasury. This target was never reached because the high rate of resignation, particularly from the surveying staff, and the normal wastage were greater than the number of acceptable recruits coming forward. But during last summer, as a result of a special effort by the Civil Service Commission, there was a marked improvement in recruitment. Nearly 300 candidates were interviewed during August, September and October, and over 200 were accepted for appointment as cartographic draughtsman or surveyors.
Had recruiting continued at this rate or thereabouts for another two or three months the Department's then authorised complement would have been filled, and a sufficient number of established recruits would have been available to replace the temporary staff during the course of 1958. I emphasise that fact because it is of some importance, in that there was not


merely the point which the hon. Member made—as to the wage increase—but also the fact that there would have been a sufficient number of men to fill the complement and, that being so, the temporary staff would have had to go in any case.
A claim by the Institution of Professional Civil Servants for improved rates of pay for cartographic draftsmen in the Government service was under consideration during the summer months, and it was ultimately submitted to the Civil Service Arbitration Tribunal on 11th October. The Tribunal awarded an increase of about 15 per cent. Before the Tribunal's award was announced the Civil Service Commission had informed these 200 or so candidates that they had been found acceptable for appointment to the Government service, and the Department had at that time arranged for some 50 of them to report for duty. At the same time, the gravity of the country's economic situation had led to the announcement of the Government's attitude towards wage increases which was made in this House on 29th and 30th October, when the determination of the Government not to finance inflationary wage and salary awards was clearly explained. 'The then Chancellor said:
If costs, including wage costs, go up, activity will have to be reduced and this will be the policy where the Government are looked to as the source of cash "—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 29th October, 1957; Vol. 575, c. 57.]
In other words, it was and is the Government's policy that increased wages costs falling on the Exchequer should be met by corresponding saving elsewhere.
It was accordingly necessary to consider the implementation of the award by the Civil Service Arbitration Tribunal, in so far as it concerned the Ordnance Survey Department, in relation to the Government's economic policy, and as a result it was decided that the Department should restrict its non-industrial strength to 3,827, which was a cut of 200 on the previously authorised complement.
We were then faced with a situation in which we had 200 fewer posts and over 200 additional draughtsmen. It was then apparent that few of the new recruits could be offered appointments within a reasonable period if the Department was to keep its complement to the new figure, unless a corresponding reduction was made from the staff already in posts. In those circumstances, three

courses seemed to be open. First, we could retain the existing staff, including the temporary staff, in which case we would have had to inform all the accepted candidates other than those who had received joining instructions that appointments would not be available for some months, and in some cases perhaps not for over a year; secondly, we could have discharged all the temporary staff at once and replaced them by new recruits; and, thirdly, we could have discharged some temporary staff immediately and the remainder later and by stages, and replaced them gradually by new recruits.
After careful consideration—this was after my right hon. Friend had seen a delegation led by the General Secretary of the union concerned—it was decided to adopt the third course for several reasons; first, because, after a special drive by the Commission to obtain recruits, the failure to offer them appointment within a reasonable period would have been regarded as a breach of faith by the candidates, their parents and their schools and would have been bound to have an adverse effect upon Civil Service recruitment as a whole and the Ordnance Survey in particular; secondly, it was very desirable to have an even flow of new recruits. It really is important to secure a proper age distribution and avoid upsetting training arrangements. Thirdly, a further limited competition for establishment to the temporary staff could not be justified while the Department had awaiting appointment over 200 candidates who had already been informed that they had been accepted. Fourthly, it had always been the aim that staff in these posts, because of the long-term nature of the work of the Department, should be permanent. This is, indeed, a principle which is applied throughout the whole of the Civil Service.
Fifthly, the recruitment position in the autumn last year had in any case made it likely that during the course of the next few months it would have been possible to fill these posts with permanent staff, which would in any case have involved the discharge of the temporary staff. I do not think we should overlook that point. Sixthly, the temporary staff had been given one, and in most cases more than one, opportunity to become


established. The hon. Member for Itchen instanced some cases in which he said there was great difficulty, but in the main it is important to appreciate the fact that most of these people had an opportunity to become established at some time.
Lastly, most of the staff concerned will be eligible for consideration for a gratuity on their discharge. My hon. Friend the Member for Test referred to this matter of gratuities. Undoubtedly it is true that in some cases there will be very substantial gratuities, and I am very glad indeed that that is so. Of course, that is an important consideration for those who are on temporary engagement.
My right hon. Friend agreed, after seeing the representatives of this union, that the discharge of these temporary surveyors and draftsmen should be spread over a period of nearly a year and that not more than 25 would go in any period of three months. This spread-over should ease the position a good deal. Most of these people will be eligible for a gratuity. Arrangements have been made to draw the attention of the Ministry of Labour and National Service and other Government Departments to the fact that these discharged officers will be available for other employment. My own Ministry has also made arrangements to inform the staff of any other vacancies which are brought to its notice. It is hoped that most of them will be able to obtain other employment without undue delay, and we are indeed making special attempts to this end.
I should emphasise that the decision in this matter arose directly from a reduction in the staff complement following the pay award. It was due to the fact that candidates had become available who satisfied the Commission that they were suitable for appointment as established staff. I would point out that these appointments can only be made within a reasonable period by the discharge of temporary staff. There is no suggestion that temporary staff are other than what their name implies.
I listened to my hon. Friend the Member for Eastleigh who takes a keen interest in labour problems of this kind.

He differs from me on this question, but the fact remains that if they are temporary staff they have certain advantages as such. One cannot have it both ways. If they are temporary staff, they must accept the uncertainty of employment. That uncertainty must go with that very term. I am sorry that hon. Members do not agree with that, but I am afraid that that is really fundamental to the position in the Civil Service.
Unless this principle is accepted—and there is no reason to believe that it is not accepted by the organisations representing civil servants—there would be little point in differentiating between staff who make the Civil Service their career and who are suitable for appointment to pensionable posts, and those who, knowing the position, either do not attempt to pass the necessary examinations or fail to do so. It is because of the insecurity of their position that provision is made for the payment of these gratuities to those who serve more than five years.
I have every sympathy with those whose employment will be terminated in this way, but I must point out that this difficulty was bound to arise sooner or later as recruiting improved, irrespective of the Government's announcement on wages at the end of October. I hope very much that they will be able to obtain alternative employment, and I assure hon. Members that my own Ministry and the Ministry of Labour and National Service will do all they can in that respect.
I realise the hardship in individual cases—I am very sorry indeed that it should be so—but, faced with this problem and faced with the terms of employment in the Civil Service, I do not see what more my right hon. Friend could have done than he has already to try to ease the difficulty that undoubtedly exists. I understand very much the feeling of hon. Members, but I have tried to put the position, as I see it, it its proper perspective. I believe that if t looked at in that way, everyone will realise that we have tried to do the best we could within the terms within which we can operate.

Question put and agreed to.

Adjourned accordingly at twenty minutes to Eleven o'clock.